



ReVista

HARVARD REVIEW OF LATIN AMERICA • SPRING/SUMMER 2005

U.S. Foreign Policy

Towards Latin America and the Caribbean

EDITOR'S LETTER

This was supposed to have been the anniversary issue. The only problem was that with the temporary cutback in *ReVista's* schedule from three to two times a year, it is no longer the anniversary year of 2004: 25 years since the Sandinista Revolution, 45 years since the Cuban Revolution and 50 years since the toppling of the Arbenz government in Guatemala.

"Why don't you make it an issue on U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America?" helpfully suggested DRCLAS Director John H. Coatsworth, who has a practical solution for just about everything. I readily assented.

Building on the anniversary cornerstone, which had first been suggested by my friend and colleague Steve Kinzer of *The New York Times*, I began to see foreign policy everywhere. It came in the form of a rather plaintive e-mail from Cuba after a visit from a group of Harvard's mid-career journalism Nieman Fellows: "What's really lamentable is the policy of the United States to prevent this type of exchange, because it is of equal benefit to the Cubans and the North Americans, because this confrontation of ideas is really where there is mutual recognition of the defects and virtues of all kinds of human workmanship."

Foreign policy followed me into the kitchen of DRCLAS, where, amidst Brazilian coffee and leftover tamales, DRCLAS Financial Associate Irene Gandara gave us blow-by-blow information about the chaos in her homeland, Ecuador, and U.S. reluctance to get involved because of Ecuador's support of Plan Colombia. Visiting Scholar Fernando Coronil mused over the situation in Venezuela, and U.S. policy there.

I couldn't read the newspapers or listen to the radio without thinking of how U.S. foreign policy, past, present and future, influences the lives of so many people. On a recent trip to Los Angeles, I was struck by how immigration reflects the waves of interventions and U.S.-supported wars, especially in Central America. I wondered if the Salvadoran woman who served me pupusas in a Central American cafeteria (thanks to my friend Felipe Agredano honoring my *antojo*) just might have been someone I might have snapped a picture of when I covered the war there as a foreign correspondent.

Ultimately, U.S. policy is personal. It affects human lives, whether through immigration, health policy, the drug war, trade and direct or indirect interventions. I began to feel that I could never capture all of foreign policy in this *ReVista*, so I've tried to bring you slices, glimpses, some of it quite personal.

Just as I was finishing up this issue of *ReVista*, I learned that I had been awarded a Fulbright Fellowship to Colombia for 2004-2005 and have been granted a sabbatical here at DRCLAS. I suspect that I will return with an even more intimate and personal view of how U.S. foreign policy affects Latin America and those of us in the United States who care about it.



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Guerriero, a documentary, fine arts and commercial photographer based in New Jersey, <www.joeg.com> took this portrait of a Cuban man and his tattoos.



Bush Administration Policy

A View toward Latin America

BY JORGE I. DOMÍNGUEZ

"So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." Thus spoke President George W. Bush during his Second Inaugural Address. As we contemplate this president's second term, consider whether his first term's policies toward Latin America echo the elements of this extraordinary sentence. By affirming universalist principles, the president commits his administration to the support of democratic movements and institutions but in the process deliberately downplays the possible importance of context, subtleties or historical trajectories.

The president's clarion call also suggests a fully transparent foreign policy that will match words and deeds. Thus, a first question to be raised focuses on the first term's policies toward democracy in

Latin America: were they consistent and universalist? A second question is whether transparency marks administration policies clothed in pro-democracy language. The third question steps outside the "democracy basket" to ponder whether an universalist and transparent thrust generally characterized Bush administration policy toward the Americas in issue areas other than democracy.

Beginning in the second term of Ronald Reagan's presidency, the United States developed an impressive policy in support of democracy in the Americas. This policy endured, notwithstanding changes of incumbent and political party in the White House. Although democratic institutions were not defended with equal vigor, efficacy or success in every instance, the general direction of U.S. policy was clear and for the most part successful through three otherwise quite different U.S. presidents.

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S POLICIES REGARDING DEMOCRACY

The incumbent's president record with regard to the defense of democratic institutions in the Americas is mixed, however. In April 2002, a coup attempt sought to overthrow Venezuela's President Hugo Chávez. Some allege that the U.S. government supported the coup. The administration itself protests that it did not. Unfortunately, if one is to believe the administration, the inescapable conclusion is that the U.S. government at this time behaved with stunning ineptitude, incapable of communicating its pro-democracy views to just about anyone and unable to dispel widespread contrary impressions.

Almost two years later, the Bush administration took a leading role in deposing

From the oilfields of Venezuela (Lago de Maracaibo, "Apocalyptic Postcards series") to Bolivian markets, from Argentina to Haiti, the Bush administration record has been mixed.



Haiti's constitutional President Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Aristide was not a good president. But President Bush's father behaved quite differently when a military coup first overthrew Aristide: in 1991 the United States supported Haiti's constitutional government, even if headed by a bad president. In early 2004, the U.S. government publicly and strongly pushed Aristide out, even though Haiti's government was facing an insurrection led by a diverse group of people, some of whom had been accused of serious crimes. Thus, U.S. actions abetted the rule of the mob to overthrow constitutional government.

The Bush administration not only failed to support constitutional presidents whom it detested but it also failed to support its best allies in the Americas. In 2001, Argentina headed toward a severe financial crisis. The Bush administration did little to help solve any of the problems that the Argentine government faced. The administration's first Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, went out of his way to undermine and ridicule the Argentine government's efforts, publicly according Argentina no credit for its remarkable economic performance in most of the 1990s. The fact that Economy Minister Domingo Cavallo—the architect of Argentina's economic success in the early 1990s—was again attempting to rescue his country from financial meltdown, seemed not to matter. Nor was the Bush administration moved by claims that Argentina's democracy might not survive a crisis of the foreseeable magnitude. The construction of democracy in Argentina had been slow, painful, and complex — a great achievement of the 1980s and 1990s. The Bush administration did virtually nothing to defend Argentine democracy at this hour of peril. That Argentine democracy has sur-



Workers in rural Brazil, father and son bicyclists in Cuba and a mural in Mexico: The sign on the Mexican mural reads: "America for the Americans; Monroe Doctrine; Manifest Destiny."

vived is a credit to Argentines — alone.

If you once make a mistake, try and try again to make it one more time — that seemed to be the lesson drawn. In early 2003, Bolivia's President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada faced both a budget shortfall and a serious set of entangled social, economic, and political problems. He asked the U.S. government for budget support; he received a laughably insignificant sum. Sánchez de Lozada warned the Bush administration that his government might fall if such aid were not forthcoming. His government did fall for various reasons, as riots and street protests compelled the president to resign — the lack of U.S. support was no help. Yet Sánchez de Lozada was probably the Latin American president whose policies were closest to Washington's virtually across the board.

Less important but still characteristic of Bush administration policies have been the behavior of its embassies at key junctures. In the last Bolivian presidential election, the U.S. ambassador publicly denounced one of the presidential candidates, Evo Morales,

leader of the coca growers. Morales' popularity surged, putting him within a whisker of winning the presidential elections. In El Salvador in 2004, U.S. officials spoke out during the presidential campaign against the leading opposition party, the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN). The U.S.-preferred candidate won the election. This intervention in the campaign was, however, unnecessary, because the winning government party was perfectly capable of advancing its own interests. The intervention was probably adverse to democracy, however, by sending the signal that Washington was unwilling to let Salvadorans construct democracy on their own.

The Bush administration's record regarding democracy is not entirely negative, fortunately. The U.S. government played a constructive role during Brazil's 2002 presidential election, supporting an agreement between the International Monetary Fund and the Brazilian government and opposition. That agreement allowed the Brazilian left, for the first time ever, to win the presidency. Similarly in 2004, the Bush administration adopted a hands-off policy in Uruguay's presidential elections, won also for the first time ever by the left. At times of crisis, the Bush administration supported the governments of Peru and Ecuador, and it has provided impressive support to the constitutional government of Colombia.

On balance, therefore, the record is mixed. The Bush administration seems as likely to foster as to retard democratic processes in the Americas. May the president

take seriously his own words from his Second Inaugural Address, and may his second term provide consistent support to democrats in Latin America, not excluding — as in Argentina and Bolivia in the first term — the best friends that the United States has had in the region.

THE TRANSPARENCY OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION PRO-DEMOCRACY POLICIES

U.S. policy toward Cuba has been clothed in the language of democracy promotion. No other U.S. policy toward Latin America — and, outside Iraq, perhaps in the world — is as transparently pro-democracy as U.S. policy toward Cuba. But, is it?

In fact, Bush administration policy toward Cuba is not what it seems to be. From public rhetoric, we would infer that there is nothing but relentless hostility between the U.S. and Cuban governments. And yet, it is during this Bush administration that the first significant breach of the decades old U.S. trade embargo on Cuba occurs. Since late 2001, the United States has become Cuba's principal source of imported agricultural products. Moreover, President Bush without fail has suspended the implementation of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act — the segment of the law designed to prevent international firms from

effect, this U.S. government decision helps the Cuban government censor information. The same can be said with regard to U.S. regulations that prevent most U.S. citizens who read this article from traveling lawfully to Cuba. U.S. policies that prevent the export of communications equipment such as modems and fax machines to Cuba equally help the Cuban government's censorship policies. In short, U.S. policy toward Cuba in the name of democracy is opaque and, more importantly, probably adverse to the very goal of promoting democracy.

THE UNIVERSALISM OF BUSH ADMINISTRATION POLICIES IN OTHER ISSUE AREAS

What, then, of the third implication of the Second Inaugural Address, namely, whether — as President Bush once put it — this administration will not do nuance? Is the Bush administration, in areas other than democracy, likely to pursue universalist, even dogmatic policies, or would it display varieties of pragmatism?

The Bush administration's trade policies toward the region allow us to assess the range of universalist claims. Is the administration consistently and universally in favor of free trade as its words suggest? During his first term, President Bush was the source of

costs by generating a maze of rules and procedures to keep legions of lawyers gainfully employed, and most likely will produce more trade diversion than trade creation. This particular design for the FTAA, moreover, stands at odds with the effort to create a truly more universalist approach to freer trade via the so-called Doha Round of the World Trade Organization.

Consistent with its approach to the FTAA, the Bush administration has favored an array of subregional deals, all of which have similar characteristics. The Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), which the Dominican Republic proposes to join, illustrates another problem. These countries do need ready access to U.S. markets in order to grow. But they lack negotiating clout. CAFTA represents a triumph of U.S. clout but virtually no change on the one basket of issues that would demonstrate a serious U.S. ongoing commitment to free trade: U.S. agricultural subsidy programs remain in place.

CONCLUSION

May President Bush take seriously his Second Inaugural Address in Latin America. Bush administration policies regarding democracy in Latin America were at best inconsistent. In fact, in various countries and circumstances they caused substantial harm and failed to stop damages that might have been prevented or mitigated. Some Bush administration policies in the name of democracy, as in Cuba, were neither transparent nor effective and, indeed, were adverse to the very goals that the U.S. government proclaimed. Moreover, the universalist thrust implicit in the president's Second Inaugural had been systematically undercut in the administration's trade negotiations in Latin America. May the president, therefore, be true to his word during his second term: Don't do nuance. Support free trade. Support democracy. May your deeds match your words.

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Bush administration policies regarding democracy in Latin America have been inconsistent.

trading with or investing in Cuba — leaving that seemingly draconian law virtually toothless. The U.S. and Cuban governments have very good professional military relations in the environs of the U.S. base at Guantanamo Bay: both share the interest in preventing prisoners at the base from escaping into Cuba. The Bush administration cheers the Cuban government's authoritarian will and capacity to prohibit its citizens from emigrating without the Cuban government's permission; the U.S. government wants the Cuban government to be even more restrictive.

Many U.S. policies toward Cuba that supposedly promote democracy have the exact opposite effect. In mid-2004, the U.S. government made it substantially more difficult for Cuban-origin persons to visit their relatives in Cuba, and thereby communicate to family members in person that the future of Cuba might be different from its past. In

an odd innovation within the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). In announcing sanctions against an array of imported steel products, the president exempted steel producers in Canada and Mexico. NAFTA became a tool to strengthen a protectionist steel cartel.

Bush administration negotiations over a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) similarly demonstrate the retreat from free-trade policies. In late 2003, the FTAA co-chairs, the United States and Brazil, with the support of most other states in the region, issued a framework draft treaty built on the "cafeteria model." Beyond some very broad principles, in practice states will be allowed to pick and choose which articles of the treaty will apply to them, on what schedule, and to what extent. This transforms the FTAA into a neomercantilist vehicle that permits specialized deals between states, raises transaction



COLLECTIONS

What For? Interventions

by John H. Coatsworth

with engravings by the

United States Interventions

What For?

BY JOHN H. COATSWORTH WITH ENGRAVINGS FROM THE GUATEMALAN POPULAR GRAPHICS WORKSHOP

IN THE SLIGHTLY LESS THAN A HUNDRED YEARS FROM 1898 TO 1994, the U.S. government has intervened successfully to change governments in Latin America a total of at least 41 times. That amounts to once every 28 months for an entire century (see table).

Direct intervention occurred in 17 of the 41 cases. These incidents involved the use of U.S. military forces, intelligence agents or local citizens employed by U.S. government agencies. In another 24 cases, the U.S. government played an indirect role. That is, local actors played the principal roles, but either would not have acted or would not have succeeded without encouragement from the U.S. government.

While direct interventions are easily identified and copiously documented, identifying indirect interventions requires an exercise in historical judgment. The list of 41 includes only cases where, in the author's judgment, the incumbent government would likely have survived in the absence of U.S. hostility. The list ranges from obvious cases to close calls. An example of an obvious case is the decision, made in the Oval Office in January 1963, to incite the

Guatemalan army to overthrow the (dubiously) elected government of Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes in order to prevent an open competitive election that might have been won by left-leaning former President Juan José Arévalo. A less obvious case is that of the Chilean military coup against the government of President Salvador Allende on September 11, 1973. The Allende government had plenty of domestic opponents eager to see it deposed. It is included in this list because U.S. opposition to a coup (rather than encouragement) would most likely have enabled Allende to continue in office until new elections.

The 41 cases do not include incidents in which the United States sought to depose a Latin American government, but failed in the attempt. The most famous such case was the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of April 1961. Also absent from the list are numerous cases in which the U.S. government acted decisively to forestall a coup d'état or otherwise protect an incumbent regime from being overthrown.

Overthrowing governments in Latin America has never been exactly routine for the United States. However, the option to depose a sitting government has appeared on the U.S. president's desk with



The United States and its foreign policy towards Latin America and the Caribbean has played a powerful and almost mythical role in the world.

remarkable frequency over the past century. It is no doubt still there, though the frequency with which the U.S. president has used this option has fallen rapidly since the end of the Cold War.

Though one may quibble about cases, the big debates—both in the public and among historians and social scientists—have centered on motives and causes. In nearly every case, U.S. officials cited U.S. security interests, either as determinative or as a principal motivation. With hindsight, it is now possible to dismiss most these claims as implausible. In many cases, they were understood as necessary for generating public and congressional support, but not taken seriously by the key decision makers. The United States did not face a significant military threat from Latin America at any time in the 20th century. Even in the October 1962 missile crisis, the Pentagon did not believe that the installation of Soviet missiles in Cuba altered the global balance of nuclear terror. It is unlikely that any significant threat would have materialized if the 41 governments deposed by the United States had remained in office until voted out or overturned without U.S. help.

In both the United States and Latin America, economic interests

are often seen as the underlying cause of U.S. interventions. This hypothesis has two variants. One cites corruption and the other blames capitalism. The corruption hypothesis contends that U.S. officials order interventions to protect U.S. corporations. The best evidence for this version comes from the decision to depose the elected government of Guatemala in 1954. Except for President Dwight Eisenhower, every significant decision maker in this case had a family, business or professional tie to the United Fruit Company, whose interests were adversely affected by an agrarian reform and other policies of the incumbent government. Nonetheless, in this as in every other case involving U.S. corporate interests, the U.S. government would probably not have resorted to intervention in the absence of other concerns.

The capitalism hypothesis is a bit more sophisticated. It holds that the United States intervened not to save individual companies

Guatemalan Popular Graphics Workshop: Engravings on these pages are by Rafael Valladares (AGCA), Alicia Aranales and María de Carmen Muñoz (exhibition of engravings, MUSAC 2004).

but to save the private enterprise system, thus benefiting all U.S. (and Latin American) companies with a stake in the region. This is a more plausible argument, based on repeated declarations by U.S. officials who seldom missed an opportunity to praise free enterprise. However, capitalism was not at risk in the overwhelming majority

of U.S. interventions, perhaps even in none of them. So this ideological preference, while real, does not help explain why the United States intervened. U.S. officials have also expressed a preference for democratic regimes, but ordered interventions to overthrow elected governments more often than to restore democracy in Latin

America. Thus, this preference also fails to carry much explanatory power.

An economist might approach the thorny question of causality not by asking what consumers or investors say about their preferences, but what their actions can help us to infer about them. An economist's approach might also help in another way, by distinguishing between supply and demand. A look at the supply side suggests that interventions will occur more often where they do not cost much, either directly in terms of decision makers' time and resources, or in terms of damage to significant interests. On the demand side, two factors seem to have been crucial in tipping decision makers toward intervention: domestic politics and global strategy.

Domestic politics seems to be a key factor in most of these cases. For example, internal documents show that President Lyndon Johnson ordered U.S. troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 not because of any plausible threat to the United States, but because he felt threatened by Republicans in Congress. Political competition within the United States accounts for the disposition of many U.S. presidents to order interventions.

The second key demand-side factor could be called the global strategy effect. The United States in the 20th century defined its strategic interests in global terms. This was particularly true after World War II when the United States moved rapidly to project its power into regions of the earth on the periphery of the Communist states where it had never had a presence before. In the case of Latin America, where the United States faced no foreseeable military threat, policy planners did nonetheless identify potential future threats. This was especially true in the 1960s, after the Cuban Revolution. The United States helped to depose nine of the governments that fell to military rulers in the 1960s, about one every 13 months and more than in any other decade. Curiously, however, we now know that U.S. decision makers were repeatedly assured by experts in the CIA and other intelligence gathering agencies that, in the words of a 1968 National Intelligence Estimate, "In no case do insurgencies pose a serious short run

CHRONICLING INTERVENTIONS

U.S. DIRECT INTERVENTIONS

Military/CIA activity that changed governments

COUNTRY	YEAR	EVENT SUMMARY
Cuba	1898-1902	Spanish-American War
	1906-09	Ousts elected Pres. Palma; occupation regime
	1917-23	U.S. reoccupation, gradual withdrawal
Dominican Rep	1916-24	U.S. occupation
	1961	Assassination of Pres. Trujillo
	1965	U.S. Armed Forces occupy Sto Domingo
Grenada	1983	U.S. Armed Forces occupy island; oust government
Guatemala	1954	C.I.A.-organized armed force ousts Pres. Arbenz
Haiti	1915-34	U.S. occupation
	1994	U.S. troops restore constitutional government
Mexico	1914	Veracruz occupied; US allows rebels to buy arms
Nicaragua	1910	Troops to Corinto, Bluefields during revolt
	1912-25	U.S. occupation
	1926-33	U.S. occupation
	1981-90	Contra war; then support for opposition in election
Panama	1903-14	U.S. Troops secure protectorate, canal
	1989	U.S. Armed Forces occupy nation

U.S. INDIRECT INTERVENTION

Government/regime changes in which U.S. is decisive

COUNTRY	YEAR	EVENT SUMMARY
Bolivia	1944	Coup, uprising overthrow Pres. Villaroel
	1963	Military coup ousts elected Pres. Paz Estenssoro
	1971	Military coup ousts Gen. Torres
Brazil	1964	Military coup ousts elected Pres. Goulart
Chile	1973	Coup ousts elected Pres. Allende.
	1989-90	Aid to anti-Pinochet opposition
Cuba	1933	U.S. abandons support for Pres. Machado
	1934	U.S. sponsors coup by Col. Batista to oust Pres. Grau
Dominican Rep.	1914	U.S. secures ouster of Gen. José Bordas
	1963	Coup ousts elected Pres. Bosch
El Salvador	1961	Coup ousts reformist civil-military junta
	1979	Coup ousts Gen. Humberto Romero
	1980	U.S. creates and aids new Christian Demo junta
Guatemala	1963	U.S. supports coup vs elected Pres. Ydigoras
	1982	U.S. supports coup vs Gen. Lucas García
	1983	U.S. supports coup vs Gen. Rios Montt
Guyana	1953	CIA aids strikes; govt is ousted
Honduras	1963	Military coups ousts elected Pres. Morales
Mexico	1913	U.S. Amb. H. L. Wilson organizes coup v Madero
Nicaragua	1909	Support for rebels vs Zelaya govt
	1979	U.S. pressures Pres. Somoza to leave
	1941	U.S supports coup ousting elected Pres. Arias
Panama	1949	U.S. supports coup ousting constitutional govt of VP Chanís
	1969	U.S. supports coup by Gen. Torrijos



The democratically-elected Arbenz government hoped for economic prosperity through economic reform and a highway to the Atlantic.

threat... revolution seems unlikely in most Latin American countries within the next few years." Few challenged the idea that leftist regimes would pose a security threat to the United States.

Thus, in a region where intervention was not very costly, and even major failures unlikely to damage U.S. interests, the combination of domestic political competition and potential future threats—even those with a low probability of ever materializing—appear to

explain most of the 20th century US interventions.

It is difficult to escape the conclusion that U.S. interventions did not serve U.S. national interests well. They generated needless resentment in the region and called into question the U.S. commitment to democracy and rule of law in international affairs. The downward trend in the past decade and half is a positive development much to be encouraged.

ENGRAVINGS FROM THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION (1944-1954)

In 1952, the Presidential Information Secretary through the initiative of Luis Cardoza y Aragón contracted the Mexican engraver Arturo García Bustos, to organize an engraving workshop in the National School of Plastic Arts, sponsored by Guatemalan Magazine and the Saker-Ti Group (Amanecer). García Bustos had earlier set up a Mexican Popular Graphics Workshop. In that workshop, the Mexican Revolution had been the principal theme, and a great part of the artistic production was aimed at supporting revolutionary changes with a clear popular-didactic purpose, bringing the masses closer to the revolution and the changes it involved.

The Mexican artist arrived in Guatemala at a key moment in the country's history. The government was attempting to carry out a series of economic, political and social changes for the benefit of the Guatemalans. The revolutionary effervescence of the moment provided inspirational themes for the young artists and was used for political propaganda for the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán (1951-1954). Contests were held and scholarships awarded, as well as contracts for the elaboration of revolutionary posters. Guatemala was filled with posters made in the Free Engraving Workshop.

Engraving as a technique uses a chisel over a surface to sketch out a slogan, a figure or a representation of any object. It can be made on metal, wood, rock or rubber plates used to print or stamp with pressure or rubbing to obtain several copies of the work.

Through its realistic expressionism, Guatemalan engravings acquired the character and form of propagandistic posters, serving as a vehicle for aesthetic-functional information. The engravings are political propaganda that respond to a moment in history. They

were inspired in the agrarian reform, anti-imperialism and advocacy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Guatemala, social struggle and the economic aspirations aroused by the Atlantic Highway and other new means of communication. The revolution was besieged by its enemies, the coffee oligarchy, the Catholic Church, powerful Guatemalan interests and the United States. Thus, it used the posters to publicize its achievements and to defend itself against the aggression to which it had been subjected.

In 1954, after Arbenz was overthrown, Guzmán suspended the engraving school, but it started up again under Enrique de León Cabrera in 1957 with the introduction of new techniques. However, many of the former students did not continue their studies because of political persecution. The legacy of the Free Workshop of Engraving forms part of an important period in the political and social life of Guatemala, a period frustrated by the overthrow of Arbenz, but which defended its achievements in many ways—even through the art of engraving."

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U.S. Policy Toward Latin America

A View from the Arab World

BY FEDERICO VÉLEZ

IN THE ARAB WORLD, RECENT EVENTS IN IRAQ HAVE REIGNITED A growing interest with the recent history of Latin America and with the past and recent history of U.S. involvement south of its borders. The Arab media constantly report on the events in the region and on U.S. policies towards Latin America. From major newspapers to television stations such as Al-Jazeera, the channel that has revolutionized the news media in the Arab world in the past few years, the Arab media is looking toward Latin America as a mirror and beacon.

Many here in this part of the world are beginning to understand the parallels between our recent histories—Latin America and the Arab world—and are realizing how in different forms and shapes our histories have been intertwined in our not so distant past.

Perhaps a good example of this interest was Al Jazeera's announcement on December 2004 of its second exclusive interview with a personage the channel described as one of the most popular leaders in the Arab world: Hugo Chávez. The diva of Arab journalism, Faysal Al-Qasim, introduced Chávez as one of the most respected leaders in the Arab world. The "average Arab" admires Chávez, Al-Qasim continued, because of two things: The first was his care for the poor and the downtrodden in his country, the second being his defiance of the only superpower in the world, the United States of America.

Arab sympathies toward Chávez, and, for that matter, other Latin American leaders who have enjoyed ample admiration such as Fidel Castro and Inacio "Lula" da Silva should not surprise anyone. Those with a political discourse that runs counter to Washington's view of the world are particularly welcome in the Arab world. This is particularly true at a time in which the United States is at its lowest level of popularity due to its recent unilateral invasion of Iraq under the flag of its war against terrorism, its unquestionable support for Israel's policies in the West Bank and Gaza, and its urgent and unequivocal calls for a democratic change, particularly for regimes that have fallen out of Washington's favor. Now that Saddam Hussein is gone and Mohamar Qadafi has pledged to collaborate with the West, Arab sentiment against the United States—and in certain way against their own governments—is best articulated by leaders of the Americas.

In his interview with Al-Jazeera, Chávez did not spare a second before he went on to fustigate the United States foreign policy towards Latin America and the Middle East. Echoing a first interview in Caracas, as well as earlier declarations in Tripoli, Libya, he justified the resistance in Iraq against the American army as legitimate. He called the war in Iraq and Afghanistan not a war on terrorism, but "terrorism itself." Announcing the emergence a collective front throughout Latin America against the unilateralism of the United States, he proceeded to condemn Washington's



neo-liberal economic model. Nowadays, not a single Arab leader dares to say these things on public in the region. Thus, no wonder these statements have such an impact to an audience frustrated with the state of affairs of their own economies and societies. Chávez, Castro, Lula and the emerging Latin American left in their own way evoke for Arabs nostalgia for years gone-by in which Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Egyptian leader who nationalized the Suez canal in 1956, rallied the masses with his calls for Pan-Arabism, self-determination, and calls for a multi-polar world in the mist of the bipolar division of the Cold War.

It is not only that certain Latin American leaders have a welcoming forum in the region. The media has increasingly been making parallels between Latin American and the Middle East events after September 11, 2001. Shortly after the failed coup d'état against Chávez in April 2002, the dean of Arab newspapers, the Egypt's *Al-Ahram*, warned its readers about a possible CIA complicity in the events and of the potential implications for the Middle East. The newspaper argued that U.S. covert operations against regimes that were not fully in line with Washington's view were here to



stay in the post-September 11 world both in Latin America and the Middle East. Therefore, the newspaper warned, the history of both regions are linked, taking lessons from what happened to the democratically elected leaders of Iran, Mohammed Mossadeq in 1953, Guatemalan president Jacobo Arbenz the following year, and “Salvatore Allende” (sic) in Chile in 1973. *Al-Abram* prophesized that Washington would extend its hand first to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, possibly to Iran and Syria, and then to any state not fully in tune with the views and policies of Washington’s fight against terrorism—beginning with Hugo Chávez.

PARALLELS AND INTERTWINED HISTORIES

The growing Central Americanization of the Middle East comes to many as an appropriate term to use here, reflecting parallels in the recent history of the two regions. Take for example United States policy towards the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Shortly after taking power in 1981, President Reagan and his advisors were convinced that the Sandinista government of Nicaragua had entered into an alliance with the Soviet bloc that was about to facilitate the expan-

sion of communism in the region, or, to use the jargon of those years: “the empire of evil.”

The Reagan administration employed all efforts, short of a direct military invasion, to force a regime change in Nicaragua. The country’s economy was destroyed as an undeclared embargo that closed access to trade and loans from the U.S. and most of the international lending community. The CIA directly and indirectly plunged the country into a civil war, at times using the services or cover-up of the “contras,” an anti-Sandinista militia, many of them mercenaries. Much of Nicaragua’s infrastructure was destroyed with violent acts, some of which the Hague Tribunal condemned in 1985 as open violations of international law. Interesting enough, the first weapons were given to the “contras” in 1983 and 1984 came from the Department of Defense and the CIA after a joint operation called “Tipped Kettle” allowed these two agencies to get hold of weapons captured by Israel from the PLO during the invasion of Lebanon in 1982.

Riots in Caracas: Much of the Arab world admires states that are not fully in tune with Washington's views and policies against terrorism.

When the funds provided by Congress to sustain the “Contras” started to dry up, with legislators expressing their unwillingness to support additional monetary commitments, the Reagan administration approached its friends in Israel, South Africa, and Saudi Arabia for surrogate funds. Old times, old friendships. The Saudis paid a total of \$32 million to finance the militia that was suppose to install a democratic regime in Nicaragua. In 1985, in an effort to complement the funding of those whom President Reagan called the “moral equivalent of our founding fathers,” the U.S. and Israel agreed to sell arms to Iran—country the United States had previously declared a sponsor of terrorism—and diverted the money of the operations to finance the “Contras” in Nicaragua. It was thanks to the investigative report of the Lebanese newspaper *Ash-Shiraa* that the whole operation began to unravel in November 1986, and the Reagan administration plunged into its most serious scandal, also known as the Iran-Contra affair.

Many Bush administration foreign policy figures acted in Reagan's anti-communist Central American policy.

The war in Nicaragua continued unabated throughout the 1980s, partly because it was framed within a propaganda campaign that installed fear amongst the U.S. public, and gave the Sandinistas and the opponents of the war no respite. To that effect, the Reagan administration created the Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean that articulated a complex story that members of the Reagan administration assumed as their mantra. In part, this narrative argued that the Sandinista government was a threat to the security of the region and the United States, and had to be removed from power. Moreover, the Sandinistas were acting as members of an international network of terrorist organizations and states consisting of outlawed organizations, such as the Palestinian Liberation Organization—PLO— and states, such as Iran, Syria, and Libya. This network was controlled from Moscow and Havana, and was using Nicaragua as a training camp, and a springboard to the rest of Central America potentially reaching the United States, hence the need for fast and decisive action. Houston, President Reagan once warned America in a television address, was closer to San Salvador than to Washington, so the war had to be fought there before it reached the streets of the United States. None of these accusations ever proved to be true, yet they instilled fear of an international terrorist conspiracy against the United States and its allies. The persistent propaganda allowed the Reagan administration to divide public opinion, giving the administration a degree of flexibility for its controversial policies both in Latin America and in the Middle East.

Twenty years later, many of those functionaries who articulated these policies returned during the first Bush administration and presented a similar policy towards the Middle East framed within the same parameters of a war against terrorism, and the need for democracy. The latest official with ties to the United States policy towards Latin America and now joining the prominent ranks of the Bush administration is the proposed Director of National Intelligence John G. Negroponte, the former Ambassador to Honduras during the height of the Central American conflict (1981-1985). In 2004, Ambassador Negroponte was appointed as the first U.S.

ambassador to the post-Saddam Hussein regime. Ambassador Negroponte, probably the next director of National Intelligence in the U.S., has been accused of covering up the Human Rights violations committed by regime of General Gustavo Alvarez Martínez a vital ally of the United States in the region, and for running the embassy from which the CIA campaign against Nicaragua was launched. Not the best credentials for the person who is now in charge of supporting the democratic transition to a post-Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, concluded one editorialist writing for the influential newspaper *Khalij Times*, based in Dubai.

Others of the resurrected players from Central America include, among others, the special ambassador to the Middle East Donald Rumsfeld, and the former National Security Advisor Colin Powell. Middle level functionaries have also returned. The former Director of the State Department's Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean from 1983 to 1986, and latter ambas-

sador to Venezuela, Otto Juan Reich, also resurrected since 2000. President Bush appointed him in 2001 through the back door during a Congress recess, certain that Reich nomination was not going to

pass the scrutiny of the Senate. When his appointment expired in 2003, Reich was reappointed as special envoy to the Western Hemisphere.

Reich's latest contribution to America's foreign policy towards Latin America has been the designing of a transitional strategy for the end of the Fidel Castro era that has tightened the embargo towards Cuba. The new measures have enraged the public opinion in the Arab world where Washington is being accused not only of trying to destroy the country, but of setting the stage for an “invasion and possible annexation of the stubbornly independent socialist island,” as *Al Ahram* observed in one recent article. The same newspaper has called these new measures “weapons of mass destruction.”

In all, twenty years after the wars in Central America, the regimes that the United States intervention left are fierce supporters of Washington foreign policy —Honduras and El Salvador even sent briefly a contingent of soldiers to Iraq. However, with standards of living among the lowest in the region and with one of the worst income distribution in the world, many in the Arab world question the overall success of such long and bloody conflict.

Latin America will continue as to be a topic of great interest in the Arab world as the second Bush administration promises more of the same policies of the first, and the Middle East continues to be deprived of leaders willing or able to dare to question Washington's view of the world. With a situation like this, it is no wonder that those in Latin America articulating policies that run counter to the U.S. will continue to enjoy a great deal of popularity. A great good deal, if we judge from what Al-Jazeera augured for Chávez during his visit to Qatar. According to Al Jazeera, Chávez could easily be elected president in any Arab country with a genuine 90 percent of the vote —“I mean a genuine 90 per cent, not a falsified one,” his interviewer added.

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The Academic and the Censor

The Case of the Missing Letter in Foreign Affairs

BY DAVID GALLAGHER

I AM WRITING FROM NEW YORK. IT IS ONE OF THOSE FRIGID days in which the air is cold, but the sun is shining and the city bursts with energy and the joy of living. But this provides no escape from the dark affairs of our political past. The dark shadows of human rights abuses are almost more relevant here and now than in Chile itself. These shadows are now not just our own: they have become global, universal. Practically every day something is published in the U.S. press about the Riggs bank accounts in which General Augusto Pinochet hoarded millions of dollars or Operation Condor, a state-sponsored terror network set up by the Pinochet government to do away with opponents. But the “Chilean” history that makes the greatest impression on me is one that the editor of a famous New York journal tells me over lunch.

This story begins towards the end of 2003, when a distinguished expert in Latin American affairs, Professor Kenneth Maxwell, published a review of Peter Kornbluh’s *The Pinochet File* in the journal *Foreign Affairs*. Maxwell, discussing the book based on files recently declassified by the U.S. government, insinuates that the United States was complicit in the Chilean coup and in certain later violent actions. His review provoked Henry Kissinger’s fury. William Rogers, Kissinger’s lifelong collaborator, sent *Foreign Affairs* a fulminating reply, but Maxwell refuted it with brutal efficiency.

Here, the situation gets nasty. Pressured by its bosses, the Council on Foreign Relations, the journal reaches an unusual agreement with Rogers. Rogers would respond to Maxwell’s rebuttal, but Maxwell would not have the right of reply to him: Rogers would have the last word. James Hoge, the journal’s editor, was breaking a sacred principle observed by that publication that writers always have the right of reply. Hoge was reacting to the heaviest type of pressure from two businessmen, who had already donated more than \$34 million dollars to the Council on Foreign Relations. A lot of money to insist on editorial independence.

What was Maxwell’s worst offense? He described a confusing series of telegrams that few would have learned about, had it not been for the exaggerated repressive haste on the part of Kissinger and his operators. Maxwell recounts that on August 23, 1976, Washington sent a telegram to its ambassadors in the Southern Cone, asking them to warn each country that an assassination campaign of enemies within and beyond its borders “would create a moral and political problem” and would now be looked upon askance by the United States. Frowned upon going forth? Was this a new development? How was such a campaign viewed before the telegrams were sent?

These questions pose the first enigma. In the case of Chile, U.S. Ambassador David Popper held on to the telegram, because

he felt that its contents would be offensive to the Chilean government. In any case, on September 20, Washington sent a second telegram, asking its embassies to overlook the first one. What had happened in the meantime? After 27 days, did Washington decide that political assassinations were legitimate? What makes the situation even worse is that, as Maxwell points out, “by cruel coincidence,” the day after the second telegram was sent, Orlando Letelier, a Chilean diplomat under the Allende government, was killed in Washington DC, along with his American assistant Ronnie Moffit. Coincidences of any kind, whether cruel or happy ones, do not necessary imply cause and effect. But the nervous sensibility of Kissinger and Rogers appeared to perceive an implicit accusation.

The story has a happy ending for Maxwell. His academic colleagues supported him without reservations. He resigned from the Council and was named Senior Fellow at Harvard’s David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. He almost imme-

It can hardly be believed that a journal with the prestige of *Foreign Affairs* would sacrifice its reputation this way. Fortunately, this is a case in which, thanks to the determination of North American academics, the censors lost out and Maxwell had the last word.

diately wrote a fascinating document about the episode, which has been published as part of the Center’s Working Papers on Latin America series <<http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/>>. The paper is entitled, “The Case of the Missing Letter in *Foreign Affairs*: Kissinger, Pinochet and Operation Condor.” To read it is like reading a mystery novel.

It hardly can be believed that a journal with the prestige of *Foreign Affairs* would sacrifice its reputation this way. Fortunately, this is a case in which, thanks to the determination of North American academics, the censors were the ones who lost out and Maxwell was left—by a long shot—with the last word.

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FOCUS ON CUBA

The Changing Future p.15

U.S. Covert Activities p.18

Academic Exchanges with Cuba p.21

For the past 46 years, Cuba and the United States have experienced rocky and often hostile bilateral relations. Here are three glimpses of the past, present and future.

On Learning the Right Questions

The Changing Future of U.S.-Cuban Relations

BY RAFAEL HERNÁNDEZ

WHENEVER I'M INVITED TO SPEAK about Cuba to audiences outside the country, I'm inevitably asked, "What's going to happen when Fidel Castro disappears from the scene?" Curiously, when I talk about the United States in my own country, there is another inevitable question, "What will happen when the North Americans lift the embargo?"

These are both perfectly legitimate and relevant questions for the future of bilateral relations. At the same time, the questions reflect a problem that traverses the history of the relationship, and is customarily described as a "difference of perception." In my opinion, however, the intention of each of the two questions points to something more revealing than a simple (and natural) difference in perspectives. It is not only a matter of what both sides identify as the cause or the nature of the conflict, as the factors that can be modified, of the uncertainties and fears associated with these factors and their possible alteration. These questions also reflect a way of representing the future, of constructing the future based on past history and anticipating how it plays out in the pres-

ent, as an actuality. The image of this future, to express it in some form or other, slips away from us like those Indonesian shadow puppets that project constantly changing images on a screen: the same pair of hands that at one moment appear to be a profile of a horse suddenly are transformed into that of a rooster or a dragon.

We Cubans imagine the end of the embargo as an event that will take place at a precise hour of a specific day, when the president of the United States will appear on television and declare that from that moment forth, this policy that has lasted for almost half a century, will have ended for once and for all. This is a dramatic representation of this future, foreseen as a visual happening—that is, theatrical—something along the lines of John F. Kennedy's tragic intervention October 22, 1962, that sparked the missile crisis with his announcement of the naval and aerial blockade of the island. According to this imagined vision of the end of the blockade, when this historical future that already preexists in our minds takes place, everything is supposed to begin to change.

Now then—what change are we talking about? Well, possibly we Cubans can expect to face a situation unlike anything that has been experienced in the last 46 years. The

United States would have ceased throwing its weight around through its policy of economic isolation, a situation with which the majority of Cubans on the island have learned to live from the time they were born—I belong to the minority that can remember what it was like to live in a country without a blockade. This much longed for and awaited change will suddenly thrust us into a totally disconcerting and unexpected set of circumstances that encompass a new future. Let's say that instead of preparing ourselves for the "surgical attack," the "sudden and massive air strike" or "the invasion," we are facing the imminent landing of a million *gringo* tourists at the José Martí Airport, including our relatives from Miami.

At the bottom of this Pandora's box are not one, but several, difficult questions. Are we ready for this contingency? Will Cuban socialism resist the crush of this flock of "barbarians from the North"—as Colombian writer José María Vargas Vila described them—with their consumer crazes, their lifestyles, their cult of individualism, their mercantile mentality, their dollars? What could unite us with a single national will, if the imperial threat suddenly disappears? To what extent can we keep on being independent, determining our own policies, maintaining the course of our par-

A woman in Havana with a figure of San Lazaro, the healer saint, by her side. U.S.-Cuba relations also need healing.



Fidel Castro speaking at Harvard 1959: there was once more hope for bilateral relations.

ticular development project, imagining at the very least a socialism (or however one wants to call a better society) in Cuba, if we are standing at the edge of a huge sucking force generated by the greatest capitalist market in history, that happens to be—or so they claim—our “natural” market. And how can we avoid the noxious effects of all this, from only 90 miles away?

These powerful uncertainties can have the effect of making some believe that the devil you know is better than the devil you don't in terms of lifting the blockade and normalizing relations with this imperial neighbor. Paradoxically, it is simpler to struggle with this neighbor in his guise of Goliath than with this hypothetical incarnation of an ogre (not exactly philanthropic) that invites us to sit down at the dinner table in his castle. Personally, however, although I share some of those concerns regarding the costs of normalizing relations, I do not entirely concur with this narrative line about our future.

In the first place, I have my doubts that this dramatic announcement televised from the Oval Office proclaiming the end of the embargo is ever going to occur. There's that lack of *dramatis personae*. In our imagination, the inevitable protagonist of this scene is a democratic and pragmatic president, capable of understanding the interests of the United States and of confronting the rightist Cuban-American lobby in Miami—a kind of Frankenstein cobbled together from the good-natured remnants of Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton and, naturally, JFK. This personage, in whose utopian “second term” the golden opportunity to normalize relations

with Cuba would finally arise, is a friendly ghost that although he appears necessary, no one has ever seen or knows if he exists. If he appears through some miracle, it's most likely that he would neither have the time nor give the subject of Cuba the necessary priority nor have the willingness to pay the political cost of making this decision, that after all he could keep on postponing until his term was over.

It would be much more reasonable to expect that the Congress would be the body to make headway in the possible changes in the Cuba policy of the United States—that is as a matter of fact already happening. Unlike

Powerful uncertainties can have the effect of making some believe that the devil you know is better than the devil you don't in terms of lifting the blockade.

the executive branch, the legislative branch has interests opposed to the embargo that include both Republicans and Democrats and that represent the interests of agribusiness corporations, the pharmaceutical industry and tourism. In line with these same interests, the question of freedom to travel to the island appears to be the weakest chink in the blockade's armor—as indeed the Cuban-American lobby and their allies have warned. In this fashion, the prohibition on travel might be brought as a case before the Supreme Court as a flagrant violation of the First Amendment. Paradoxically, free trade and North American freedom are two good and legitimate reasons for the senators,

representatives and judges to order what no president would really want to: to lift the sanctions on Castro's Cuba. This has nothing to do with recognizing the legitimacy of the Cuban regime, just a matter of respecting U.S. interests and values, and allowing trade and tourism to try to accomplish what the most varied resources—military, paramilitary, economic, diplomatic, propagandistic—have not been able to do over the course of four decades.

The clearest evidence of this other future is that today people on both sides of the Florida Straits have more interest in getting to know each other personally than in any other time during all these years. If the magnitude of this change is taken into account, one can see that already the wall of the embargo has begun to crumble. It will not be torn down overnight nor with sledge hammers, and even less, will its destruction lead to territorial reunification like that of Berlin. Nevertheless, the wall has already begun to disintegrate because of all the cracks that have been opening, and that makes the embargo seem absurd to more and more people every day. Strict Bush administration regulations have had short-term negative effects on bilateral exchanges, resulting in the persecution of ordinary U.S. citizens who come to ride bikes or stroll along the Havana boardwalk, who visit to donate pianos to Cuban art schools or to learn to dance Cuban *son*. Nevertheless,

maintaining the policy of the blockade is an uphill battle.

The question should not be when it will begin to fall, but what we can do now to anticipate the consequences. The hothouse in which the system and the culture of socialism could flourish was shattered more than ten years ago. The negative impact of the growth of tourism, the growing gap in social equality, the presence of fashion and behavior foreign to socialism in everyday life is already sufficient to consider that challenges associated with a reencounter with capitalism do not belong to a faraway and improbable future.

Finally, the fundamental question is not

even if we can resist the cultural onslaught of capitalism, but rather what a system (or the project of a system) is worth that cannot endure the merciless blast from the elements outside of its hothouse and flourish on its own. The system, the culture and the values of a possible socialism cannot be protected by an ideological condom, but through acquired immunities that permit it to survive even in the face of the virus coming from contact with the outside. This vaccination, this acquired immunity, has been taking place for 12 years now, not without cost, but still without showing signs of fatal illness.

Unnoticeably, we have entered into the terrain of the second question, the one that is most popular outside the island. Many accustomed to Cuba not being anything more than “Castro’s Cuba” can imagine that the disappearance of Fidel from the stage would turn everything upside down.

Boy waving Cuban flag



That is, we must go back to where we started from, when he made his appearance, and history and the future took this “strange route.” An alternative answer—one, however, that is hardly ever heard outside the island—is that Raúl Castro will assume the presidency of Cuba and as a result, the question arises if the government of the United States would rather negotiate with Fidel’s brother. Is there any reason to consider this scenario any more likely? Unless someone out there thinks Raúl is a negotiator more inclined to make concessions to the United States—of which there is absolutely no shred of evidence—the bilateral relation will continue basically the same. In this way, the most plausible scenario of the so-called “transition” (post-Fidel Castro) does not provide us with much hope for bilateral changes.

I personally believe that the key to what can provide significance to this second question resides in the interpretation of the

problems that the first question raises. In the last 15 years, Cuba has been the setting for change, much more so than the United States. Both societies have advanced towards a reencounter, although from very different historical experiences and political cultures. No discussion about what would happen between the two parties if Fidel Castro was not around can have much depth without understanding these changes and differences. Along these lines, a post-embargo Cuba would be much more filled with favorable scenarios—including progress in bilateral understanding—than a post-Castro Cuba that still awaited its oft-dreamed dialogue with the United States. It is difficult to imagine that the disappearance of Fidel by itself could wipe out—as if by the wave of a magic wand—the legacy of distrust and resentment, the attitude and the habit of command with which the United States has historically treated Cuba. In any case, the costs are those that (all) Cubans—including the new generations who will continue to be born under an endless embargo—will have to pay, continuing to mortgage the future of bilateral relations and reproduce resentment and mistrust.

Finally, a post-embargo Cuba could make a reality of the progress that some invoke to sell the concept of a post-Castro Cuba. The primary beneficiaries of a post-embargo Cuba will be the corporations nationalized in 1960, which are interested in restoring ties with the island, and the Cuban-Americans, who finally will find their path without obstacles to reencounter their fatherland, the country of their mothers and fathers.

All these different hands, like the Indonesian shadows, may shape a new bilateral future that doesn’t look like the dragon, but rather like the rooster—the auspicious symbol, according to the Chinese traditional calendar, of work ethics, pioneering spirit and the quest of knowledge.

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U.S. Covert Activities Against Cuba

An Untold Tale of Secret Foreign Policy

BY DON BOHNING

LESS THAN A YEAR AFTER FIDEL CASTRO seized power in Cuba on January 1, 1959, the United States concluded that co-existence between Washington and Havana would be impossible. This conclusion led to six years of futile covert programs under three different American presidents to depose Castro. U.S. efforts included every arrow in the covert quiver, from organizing and supporting a proxy exile invasion to economic and political destabilization, from sabotage and propaganda to psychological warfare and assassination plots.

It is now painfully obvious that the myriad U. S. covert activities directed at Cuba more than four decades ago failed miserably. Not only did they fail to oust the Cuban leader, but instead triggered the Law of Unintended Consequences, consolidating and prolonging Castro's rule and contributing to a Soviet decision to install nuclear missiles in Cuba. Simultaneously, they transformed South Florida into a hub of anti-Castro ferment and upheaval, making it the frontline in the attempts to end his rule.

The U.S. public—if it was aware at all—saw only the tip of the covert iceberg. The broad outlines emerged slowly and piecemeal in newspapers, magazines and books over the ensuing decades. Only in recent years has the scope of the U.S. government's secret war against Castro become apparent—abetted by the declassification of thousands of once secret documents and increased willingness of surviving participants to talk with the passage of time.

Essentially, this covert war can be broken down into three phases, beginning under President Eisenhower, continuing under President Kennedy and ending under President Johnson. Each of the three phases included Castro assassination plots, but none came close to succeeding. The debate continues today as to whether Eisenhower, Kennedy or Johnson was even aware of them.

THE FIRST PHASE BEGAN IN LATE 1959 WITH the accelerating deterioration in Washington-Havana relations. By October, U.S.

officials were convinced that if Castro wasn't a Communist, he was under Communist influence and had to go.

In January 1960, a Cuban task force within the CIA was formed to undertake the effort. Jake Esterline, a guerrilla warfare veteran with the OSS in Burma during World War II and prominent in the CIA's 1954 overthrow of Jacobo Arbenz, Guatemala's left-leaning president, was selected to lead it. Two months later, March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower approved a covert action plan to remove Castro. After a change in administrations from Eisenhower to Kennedy—and with many permutations in the original concept—the first phase culminated with the disastrous April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion by a U.S. trained and supported Cuban exile brigade.

Esterline originally designed the plan to train and infiltrate several hundred guerrillas into the Trinidad area in the middle of the island's south coast to join with anti-Castro insurgents already active in the Escambray Mountains of central Cuba. But Richard Bissell, then head of the CIA's clandestine services, had other ideas and the plan evolved from a guerrilla infiltration to an exile invasion. The hopes was that the invasion would spark an internal revolt or, at the least, seizure of a beachhead where a provisional government could be established which could appeal for international help. In September 1960, Jack Hawkins, a Marine colonel with amphibious landing experience, was brought in as the project's paramilitary chief.

Kennedy succeeded Eisenhower in January 1961, raising uncertainties about the future of the project, but Kennedy eventually gave his approval. However, in mid-March, he ordered the exile brigade's landing site changed from Trinidad to a "less noisy" locale, in the hopes of keeping U.S. government's fingerprints off the action. The isolated Bay of Pigs, 80 miles west of Trinidad, was the new choice, providing the criteria Kennedy demanded to maintain "plausible deniability" of U.S. involvement. Still, on Sunday, April 16,

1961, the eve of the invasion and under pressure from Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Kennedy ordered the last minute cancellation of already approved D-Day air strikes intended to take out the remnants of Cuba's ragtag air force.

Esterline and Hawkins made it clear in interviews that they believe the belated change in landing site and cancellation of the D-Day air strikes doomed the invasion. They held Kennedy and Rusk responsible. However, as once-classified documents emerged, Esterline and Hawkins added Bissell to the blame list, accusing him of withholding vital information both from them and from President Kennedy, so convinced was Bissell by his own arrogance that the invasion could not fail.

As Esterline declared at a 1996 Bay of Pigs conference: "I don't think he [Bissell] was being honest up...with Kennedy and maybe with [Allen] Dulles, too; and I don't think he was being honest down in dealing with his two principal aides, Esterline and Hawkins. I don't believe he was leveling with any of us." This sentiment was further reinforced later when the two aides learned for the first time that Bissell had agreed with a Kennedy request only days before the invasion to cut back on air support but did not tell them of the decision.

In a significant incident largely overlooked by historians, Esterline and Hawkins met for three hours with Bissell at his home in the Cleveland Park section of Washington on Sunday morning, April 9, eight days before the invasion brigade's landing at the Bay of Pigs. They told Bissell that the change in landing site and other limitations put on the project by the Kennedy administration made it impossible to succeed. They recommended he call off the invasion saying would resign if he did not.

Bissell beseeched them to stay. He argued that the project would go ahead anyway but had a better chance to succeed with them on board. They agreed, extracting a pledge from Bissell that the promised air support they felt needed for success would be forthcoming. Yet, after their Sunday meet-



Street protest, 1959

ing, Bissell agreed to cut it back, despite his pledge to Esterline and Hawkins. They did not learn that until reading declassified documents 34 years later.

THE INVASION DEBACLE LED TO THE SECOND phase, this time with the active participation of Robert F. “Bobby” Kennedy, the president’s brother and attorney general, who previously had played no role in either Cuba policy. In an April 19, 1961, memo to the President the day the invasion collapsed, he urged a renewed campaign against Castro. Another Cuba task force

was formed—headed by White House aide Richard Goodwin—to draft a new covert program. President Kennedy approved it in November 1961. Codenamed Operation Mongoose, it brought together all the relevant government agencies under a single umbrella.

Reflecting the distrust of both Kennedy brothers of the CIA following the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy named Brig. General Edward Lansdale, a flamboyant and eccentric officer with a reputation gained earlier in the Philippines as a counter-insurgency expert. But everybody involved knew

Bobby Kennedy was the real Mongoose czar, making sure Cuba became the Kennedy administration’s highest priority.

The overall objective of Mongoose, in Lansdale’s words, was “to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people [that] will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live.” Under Lansdale’s programmed timetable for Mongoose, Castro’s fall would come the following October, coincidentally just a month before U.S. Congressional elections. Mongoose effectively ended in November 1962, not with the revolt Lans-

dale had scheduled, but with the Cuban Missile Crisis, a crisis Mongoose helped provoke by signaling Moscow and Havana that a new Cuba invasion was likely.

Even without the missile crisis, it appears that Mongoose eventually would have floundered to an unmourned end. It failed to achieve even minimal expectations, except for intelligence gathering. Many of its participants, institutional and individual, had little enthusiasm for Mongoose. There was, as well, a general antipathy among them for Lansdale and Bobby Kennedy, its two leaders and principal proponents.

By the beginning of 1963, Mongoose was officially dead. The missile crisis had

“autonomous groups” of Cuban exiles, one headed by Artime and the other by Manolo Ray. Both were to receive CIA logistical and financial, but not tactical, assistance.

The autonomous program remains among the least known, least understood, most creative and most controversial of all the U.S. covert activities targeting Cuba. At the same time President Kennedy named Oliva, the second in command and a hero of the invasion brigade, as the official representative of all Cubans in the U.S. military, with the idea clearly being that he would work in tandem with Artime.

Ray, an early cabinet minister under Castro and favorite of the Kennedy White

we didn't have anything to do with what they were up to. They just told us what they were going to do and we said 'fine. We're not stopping you.' And we didn't.”

Artime set up camps in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, with full knowledge of both Central American governments and Washington. After more than a year of preparation, his commandos carried out their first raid May 13, 1964, against a sugar mill in Cuba's Oriente Province. By then, President Kennedy had been assassinated, Lyndon Johnson was president and, with both the war in Vietnam heating up and Johnson's personal antipathy towards Bobby Kennedy, enthusiasm for the secret war against Cuba had begun to wane. The death knell sounded in September 1964 when the Artime group fired on a Spanish ship en route to Havana, mistakenly thinking it was a Cuban freighter leaving Havana with a rice shipment to Japan. Several Spanish crewmen were killed. A major diplomatic row ensued.

Ray, who claimed to have a major underground network in Cuba which he intended to exploit, accomplished even less, continuing to operate from Florida and Puerto Rico, despite pressure for him to move his operations outside U.S. territory. He set up a base in the Dominican Republic in late 1964, but did nothing, although declassified documents show him receiving a monthly subsidy of \$10,000.

By late spring 1965, U.S. funded and supported covert actions—apart from intelligence gathering and propaganda—ended. The CIA's new director, Adm. William Raborn, made an abortive effort to resurrect the covert program in a June 26, 1965, memo to President Johnson. It went nowhere. The only thing left was cleaning up the residue of six futile years aimed at ousting Fidel.

The autonomous program “Mongoose” remains among the least known, least understood, most creative and most controversial of U.S. covert activities against Cuba.

been resolved. The remaining Bay of Pigs prisoners returned to the United States in exchange for a \$53 million ransom of food and medicines. The time had come for the Kennedy administration to again revamp its Cuba policy, but one now constrained by Kennedy's no-invasion pledge given Moscow in return for the missile withdrawal.

SO BEGAN PHASE THREE OF THE COVERT WAR, this time with the State Department in the coordinating role. President Kennedy made clear that “an assurance covering invasion does not ban covert actions or economic blockade or tie our hands completely. We can't give the impression that Castro is home free.”

A cornerstone of the new Cuba policy, as suggested earlier by Ed Martin, the assistant secretary of State for inter-American affairs, was to be a “program of ‘giving Cubans their heads’ in an effort to affect the downfall [of Castro] from within.”

Although not officially approved by President Kennedy until June 1963, the new covert program was well underway by early 1963, its rough outlines sketched by Bobby Kennedy to invasion brigade leaders Manuel Artime and Erneido Oliva at his Hickory Hill, Virginia residence within a month after their release from Cuban prisoners. As one component of the new effort, the CIA would continue to externally mounted sabotage raids against Cuba, but the greater focus was to be on two so-called


House, but a man who many Cuban exiles regarded negatively as a proponent of *Fidelismo sin Fidel*—Castroism without Castro—had been a late addition to the Cuban Revolutionary Council, the exile group organized by the CIA to front for the Bay of Pigs invasion. Artime, already a member of the Council, was its representative to the Bay of Pigs Brigade and was captured at the time of the invasion.

The “rules of engagement” for the Ray and Artime autonomous groups specified that all their operations would be “mounted outside the territory of the United States” and that the “United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum.”

Sam Halpern, a CIA official involved in Cuban covert activities at the time, put it most succinctly as the program got underway. “The next thing we knew,” said Halpern, “the word was, ‘let Cubans be Cubans.’ Let the Cubans do their own thing. But the Cubans didn't have any money. So the CIA's got money. Give ‘em money. We gave them money. We told ‘em where to buy arms, ammunition. We didn't give it to ‘em. They went out and bought their own. They decided what they wanted. They picked their own targets, then told us what the targets were. We provided them intelligence support...and

Don Bohning is the author of a new book entitled The Castro Obsession: US Covert

Activities Against Cuba, 1959-1965. This essay is based on his book, published this spring by Potomac Books (formerly Brassey's, Inc.) of Dulles, Virginia. Longtime Latin America editor for The Miami Herald, Bohning covered Cuba, Haiti and the rest of Latin America for many years.





Academic Exchanges with Cuba

The Impact of Recent U.S. Policy Changes

BY LORENA BARBERIA

U.S. POLICIES TOWARD DIRECT CIVILIAN contacts with Cuba have been significantly tightened in recent years as part of the George W. Bush Administration's concerted efforts to further exert pressure to bring about regime change on the island. This crackdown affects regulations that allow educational exchanges between countries only 90 miles apart from each other, U.S. universities and colleges that have maintained ongoing academic exchange programs for several years with Cuba, are finding that escalating restrictions on academic exchanges have imposed difficult, but not insurmountable, challenges.

The latest tightening of U.S. policies toward the island nation is a continuation of a U.S. policy that has sought the demise of the Castro government for more than four decades. At times, U.S. presidents have slightly loosened these restrictions. The gradual opening of academic exchanges between the countries slowly came about in the late 1970s, aided by negotiations between the Carter Administration and the Cuban government aimed at improving bilateral relations. These exchanges gradually increased so that by 1989, the year of the collapse of the island's trade with the Soviet Union, 1,500 U.S. travelers in 95 groups were vis-

iting the island, some through educational exchanges, according to data from the travel agency Marazul Charters.

In the early 1990s, U.S. policies toward direct contact between civilians in both countries were tightened in response to the 1994 crisis sparked by the exodus of more than 35,000 rafters and the 1996 Cuban military shooting down of two civilian Brothers to the Rescue aircraft. In 1994, President Clinton banned direct flights to Cuba and introduced enhanced restrictions to the Cuban Assets

These two Havana boys live in a country cut off from its neighbor 90 miles away.

and Control regulations requiring special licenses for academics on a case-by-case basis. While the Clinton administration in 1995 permitted U.S. undergraduate travel for the first time, by 1996, it had banned all direct flights to Cuba. In 1999, the Clinton administration reversed its earlier hardline stance and introduced policies to enhance people-to-people exchanges, including initiatives directed at promoting two-way interactions among academics and scientists.

In spite of restrictions in U.S. policy, during the 1990s, visits between both countries surged and academic exchanges grew both in number and scope. As a result, a significant number of institutions, including universities and colleges, initiated activities with Cuba, site of one of the earliest universities in the Americas. This sharp increase in bilateral academic exchanges coincided with what would be one of the most dramatic decades of Cuba's history. The country

number of Harvard faculty and students traveling to Cuba for research or other educational activities has increased.

DRCLAS has hosted six academic conferences related to Cuba. Topics ranged from the history of U.S.-Cuban cultural relations, the impact of Cuba's recent health reforms on public health systems, the history of the former Harvard Botanical Garden (now Jardín Botánico de Cienfuegos), the lessons to be learned from Cuba's dengue control program, the current and future prospects for U.S. business in Cuba, and issues relating to poverty and social policy in the United States and Cuba were organized in the U.S. and Cuba. Four of these conferences were held on the island, with Harvard students and professors experiencing exchanges with their Cuban colleagues in their home environment. DRCLAS has also published two edited volumes resulting from joint collaborations with Cuban co-

U.S. embargo on Cuba. These new rules eliminated people-to-people exchanges that do not involve studies in pursuit of an academic degree. This means that groups such as K-12 teachers and their students, university alumni associations and art museum associations were barred from making educational trips to Cuba in 2003.

President George W. Bush's Commission for the Assistance to a Free Cuba chaired by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell recently imposed new restrictions on U.S. students, faculty and staff undertaking academic studies on the island. In June 2004, OFAC announced amendments to the 1963 Cuban Assets and Control Regulations that make short-term student programs virtually impossible. Undergraduates and graduate students are prohibited from participating in study abroad programs of less than ten weeks to Cuba. U.S. university faculty invited to teach in Cuba can only do so if their stay lasts for more than ten consecutive weeks. This new ruling is intended to weed out short academic visits frequently combined with tourism and socio-political or cultural exploration of the Caribbean's largest island. Ironically, this strangling of U.S.-origin travel occurs at the same time that the Bush administration continues to allow Cuba to purchase U.S. agricultural imports, an activity that is part of the embargo against the island since 1963. These restrictions were eased for humanitarian reasons in 2001 after Hurricane Michelle. By 2004, the cash-strapped island had purchased more than \$400 million in food from the United States.

In December 2004, NAFSA surveyed the impact on study abroad programs for U.S. undergraduates (For complete survey results, see <<http://www.nafsa.org/content/publicpolicy/nafsaonthissues/cuba.htm>>). Of the 52 responding institutions, 37 reported suspending existing programs to Cuba after August 2004 because of the new amendments. Two additional institutions reported canceling plans to offer new programs to Cuba in the coming academic year. Universities, such as De Paul, that had received OFAC licenses to travel to Cuba since 2000 and carried out three-week undergraduate study abroad programs in Cuba for the last four consecutive years, were anticipated to be denied licenses because their proposed programs were less than the ten week minimum.

The David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies has prioritized academic exchange programs with Cuba, looking for ways to overcome the many obstacles that impede scholarly collaboration.

was grappling with the extraordinary shock of 1990 from the breakup of the Soviet Union and its impact on Cuban productivity and welfare. As the Cuban economy began to gradually recover, academics from both countries would seek to better understand the implications of this experience for Cuba's economic strategy and social development, as well as the impact of the successive tightening of the U.S. embargo through the enactment of the 1992 Cuban Democracy Act and the 1996 Helms-Burton Act.

One such academic exchange program was started by the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (DRCLAS). Since its founding in 1994, the Center has prioritized finding ways to overcome the many obstacles that impeded scholarly collaboration. In the last ten years, DRCLAS has hosted more than fifty Cuban visiting scholars for extended periods of research and collaboration in fields as diverse as archival preservation, economics, history, tropical medicine, political science, public administration and public health in the last ten years. Each year during the last decade, the

editors and showcasing scholarship by both U.S. and Cuban scholars. The first volume was *Culturas Encontradas: Cuba y los Estados Unidos* (Havana, 2001), edited by John H. Coatsworth and Rafael Hernández. The second volume is *The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century* (Harvard University Press, 2004), edited by Jorge I. Domínguez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and Lorena Barberia.

NEW RESTRICTIONS

Of the six countries sanctioned by the U.S. government as state sponsors of terrorism, only Cuba is restricted to specific categories of U.S. travelers. The U.S. does not regulate travel to Iran, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. In recent years, however, U.S. policy has sought to rescind travel exemptions for some groups who had been granted permission to travel to Cuba under special licenses, granted by the United States Treasury Department Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the agency charged with enforcement of the

Despite the stringent restrictions on educational travel to Cuba, some categories of travel for academics and students still continue to be legal. Graduate students, for example, are still able to travel to the island to carry out research projects as part of a credited course towards their graduate degree. Cuban-Americans hoping to visit their family on the island, accounting for more than three-quarters of the estimated 154,000 U.S.-origin travelers to Cuba in 2003, did not fare so well (*El Nuevo Herald*, October 10, 2004). Rather than being able to visit once every year, they may now only do so once every three years subject to the approval of a special OFAC license.

DELAYS AND DENIALS

Since 9/11 and the subsequent passage of more restrictive legislation by Congress, Cuban scholars and scientists have been effectively denied visas because of prolonged delays in processing. These several-month delays have affected even Cuban scholars who have visited the United States many times. Some Cuban academics have been denied visas based on section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which specifies criteria to deny entry for senior officials in the Government of Cuba and the Communist Party of Cuba.

For example, at the 2004 Latin American Studies Association (LASA) Congress, a scheduled book launching party was transformed into a special session on "Academic

Freedom and Scholarly Exchange with Cuba," a session that garnered a standing-room only audience. Sixty-five chairs sat empty in protest for the denial of visas to the same number Cuban academics. Each chair bore the name of an absent Cuban academic and his or her institution. The October 8 session, hosted by DRCLAS, was to have been a cheery event, a panel to celebrate the publication of *The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century*, a book on the Cuban economy. The panel was to have included all three editors—Jorge I. Domínguez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva and the author of this article—as well as most of the contributors. However, one week before LASA, the U.S. State Department denied the visas to all the Cuban academics, whether they taught psychology, poetry, or politics and whether or not they had previously visited the United States. The unprecedented action meant that the Cuban economy book's co-editor and four contributors could not attend the book launching, which was eventually held in March in Mexico City.

OFAC REMOVES SOME RESTRICTIONS

However, good news for academic exchanges across the Florida Straits was announced in late December 2004. OFAC unexpectedly removed prohibitions on the editing and publication process of property owned by authors in countries embargoed by the U.S. such as Cuba, Sudan and Iran. OFAC removed its relatively recent requirements

that U.S.-based author or publishers seeks special permission from the agency prior to editing manuscripts with Cuban copyright. Some Cuba policy watchers interpreted the new amendments as a response to the lawsuit filed in New York Courts in September 2004 on behalf of Association of American University Presses, the Association of American Publishers Professional and Scholarly Publishing Division, PEN American Center and Arcade Publishing. They deemed the new regulations an important and significant victory for academic collaboration. Many Cuban-authored publications previously halted by publishers will now go forward.

In addition to this significant reversal, some other recent developments have sparked cautious optimism. Overturning initial restrictions announced in June 2004, OFAC granted special permissions to 88 U.S. students enrolled in Cuba's Latin American School of Medicine to complete their five-year training as medical doctors. In November 2004, DRCLAS received notification of visa approval for three Cuban microbiologists pioneering medical research on tuberculosis and dengue for three-month long visits to Harvard. The visas had been in process for more than two years.

U.S. policy continues to vacillate between tightening and loosening of restrictions on academic exchanges. At the turn of the 21st century, it is startling to imagine that in a nation that prides itself on free speech and exchange of ideas, some policymakers view certain types of travel by its students and educators to foreign countries as not serving legitimate educational purposes. At the same time, some recent policies involving academic exchanges such as the lifting of publishing restrictions have been eased. And in the midst of this environment, despite the limitations, academic exchanges across the Florida Straits are continuing to forge ahead, adapting to adverse policy changes.

ACADEMIC TRAVEL TO CUBA PERMITTED BY THE U.S. IN 2005

- Full-time professionals doing research in their fields under the general license.
- Full-time professionals attending international meetings and conferences, if these meetings and conferences are organized by an international organization not based in Cuba or the United States under the general license.
- Graduate students engaged in research for any length of time under an institutional educational license valid for one year issued to universities. Students must be enrolled in that particular university in graduate programs, and must be receiving credit toward that degree through this research.
- Undergraduate students in a structured educational program of a minimum of ten weeks in Cuba under an institutional educational license valid for one year to colleges and universities.
- Faculty and administrators planning and setting up for any future programs for any length of time under an institutional educational license valid for one year issued to college and universities.
- Any individual or group, such as a research institute, that has applied for and received a specific license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control.

Lorena Barberia, Program Associate at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, is co-editor of The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press, 2004). This piece was originally written for NAFSA's International Educator and appeared in its March/April 2005 issue.

FOCUS ON GUATEMALA

Contemporary U.S. Policy p.25

The Force of a Myth p.28

Photoessay: The Aftermath p.30



In 1954, the United States sponsored a coup that overthrew a democratically elected government in Guatemala. These articles provide insights to that legacy and beyond.

Age of Enlightenment?

Contemporary U.S. Policy in Guatemala

BY MICHAEL J. CAMILLERI

WHEN IN THE EARLY 1980S PRESIDENT RONALD REAGAN SOUGHT the restoration of direct military aid to Guatemala, he praised the country's leader Efraín Ríos Montt as "a man of great personal integrity." Reagan brushed aside allegations that Ríos Montt's scorched earth tactics had resulted in the mass murder of civilians, insisting that the military dictator was "getting a bum rap on human rights."

Twenty years later Ríos Montt again sought the presidency of Guatemala, but this time the U.S. was unwilling to countenance the return to power of a man now known as the "Pol Pot of the Americas." The State Department declared that the United States would find it "difficult" to work with the former strongman were he to win the 2003 Guatemalan elections (he did not). Though delivered diplomatically, the message from the Bush administration was clear: The United States opposed Ríos Montt's bid for the presidency.

U.S. foreign policy in Guatemala has undoubtedly come a long, long way in the past two decades. The 1996 Guatemalan Peace Accords signaled not only the end of Latin America's longest and bloodiest civil war, but also the dawning of a new era in U.S.-Guatemalan relations. The six major Accords, on issues such as human rights, indigenous rights, land distribution, the strengthening of civilian power and the resettlement of displaced persons, officially concluded 36 years of armed conflict between a leftist insurgency (the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca) and a right-wing government long supported by the United States. As recently as the early 1990s, the CIA was funneling \$5 million to \$7 million annually to the most notorious elements of the Guatemalan military. Such support was the legacy of four decades of Cold War policy-making, beginning with the CIA-sponsored overthrow of a democratically elected government in 1954 and continuing largely uninterrupted through a series of despotic regimes that squelched basic freedoms and carried out brutal counter-insurgency operations. This period of injurious U.S. influence came to a close with

the 1996 Accords, and was repudiated three years later when President Bill Clinton issued a historic apology for the support provided by the United States to repressive military and intelligence units.

Today, U.S. priorities in Guatemala differ markedly from those of the not-too-distant Cold War past. Contemporary U.S. initiatives generally fall into one of three broad categories: development and governance, including USAID programming; free trade, notably the Central American Free Trade Agreement; and security, specifically efforts to combat drug trafficking, street gangs, terrorism and illegal immigration. This third category appears increasingly central to current U.S. policy, and these security concerns are certainly real.

Guatemala faces serious challenges in attempting to reign in violence and control its territory, and its difficulties with gangs, drugs, and other problems readily spill over into the United States. Nevertheless, U.S. policymakers' focus on security issues comes at a time when Guatemala still urgently needs assistance building democratic institutions and fostering sustainable development. Income distribution in Guatemala is among the most unequal in the world. The country has disturbingly high rates of poverty (56 %), chronic malnutrition (49 %), and maternal mortality (153 per 100,000 births). Crime is rampant, the legal system dysfunctional, and public institutions subject to corruption and intimidation. The Peace Accords, a road map to a more democratic, inclusive, and equitable society, remain largely unimplemented.

These challenges and others must ultimately be addressed by Guatemalans, if they are to be addressed at all. There remains, however, an important role for the United States to play. Its participation in Guatemalan affairs is far more constructive than it was just a decade ago, but U.S. policymakers must maintain a strong focus on democracy, development and human rights if the United States is to continue influencing Guatemala in a positive way.

These scenes from Guatemala show the National Palace, portraits of indigenous women and a Jacobo Arbenz campaign scene.



Graffiti on a Guatemala city building reads "No more corruption."

There are encouraging signs that United States officials, both at the State Department and USAID, understand the most important challenges faced by contemporary Guatemala. USAID's country strategy acknowledges the potential for renewed crisis and conflict if the basic promises of the Peace Accords—namely broad-based economic growth and fair political and legal processes—are not delivered. The Agency's programs focus on issues such as representative governance and the rule of law, indigenous participation, improvements in health and education, and rural economic diversification and growth. Unfortunately, the USAID mission in Guatemala recently experienced significant budget cuts, and Guatemala does not currently stand to benefit from either of President Bush's major foreign aid initiatives: the Millennium Challenge Account and the Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief.

For its part, the State Department has maintained a strong focus on promoting the rule of law in Guatemala, with the notable exception of its active opposition to Guatemala joining the International Criminal Court. In May of 2004 the U.S. Embassy announced an agreement with the Guatemalan attorney general to provide technical and financial assistance to the special prosecutors for narco-trafficking, corruption, and money laundering. The State Department also provided steady support, and promises of funding, to a proposed U.N. commission (known as CICIACS) to investigate Guatemala's so-called "hidden powers," a shadowy network of powerful figures with connections to organized crime and top government officials. Guatemala's highest court found aspects of the agreement creating such a commission to be unconstitutional, and the commission now faces an uncertain future.

Finally, the State Department has revoked the visas of more than

200 Guatemalans suspected of crimes such as corruption, drug trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering and murder. Visa revocation is a powerful shaming tool, and its targets have included former government ministers, military officers and bankers. In a country where impunity for the powerful is the norm and only about one crime in ten is ever solved, efforts by the United States to promote the rule of law are welcome and significant.

The highest profile U.S. foreign policy initiative in Guatemala today is probably the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The United States, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras and El Salvador signed CAFTA in May 2004, and the Dominican Republic joined the agreement in August. If ratified by the U.S. Congress—by no means a certainty given strong opposition by U.S. labor groups—CAFTA would remove tariffs and reduce other barriers to trade in a wide range of goods and services. CAFTA has been greeted by the conflicting assertions that inevitably surround the announcement of a free trade agreement. Supporters in the U.S. and Guatemalan governments and in the Guatemalan business community herald the accord as a boon to foreign investment and economic growth. Detractors argue that the agreement in fact encourages a "race to the bottom," on environmental and labor standards for example, as countries cut costs in an effort to attract foreign investors. The result, opponents contend, is not long-term growth but short-lived gains that are unsustainable and narrowly distributed.

While debates about the virtues of CAFTA will undoubtedly continue, few would suggest that the agreement will not have any effect: The United States is Guatemala's most important trading partner, providing 40% of its imports and purchasing 36% of its exports.

Increased competition will provoke a restructuring of the Guatemalan economy as some sectors thrive and others suffer, with benefits concentrated in urban areas and costs borne chiefly by small farmers. To its credit, USAID is seeking to identify and develop niche agricultural markets for Guatemalan farmers. Still, the immediate economic impact of CAFTA on Guatemalans' lives is uncertain, and the government will have to cope with a not insignificant loss in tariff revenue equivalent to one-half of one percent of GDP.

If there is a silver lining in the agreement, it may be the potential for positive externalities in business practices stemming from a reduction in monopoly. The accord would give U.S. firms greater access to Guatemala in areas such as financial services, telecommunications, insurance, energy, engineering and construction. A business environment replete with firms subject to U.S. disclosure requirements and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act could, at least in theory, result in greater levels of fiscal transparency and lower levels of corruption and tax evasion in the Guatemalan private sector.

While CAFTA may be the most prominent U.S. initiative in Guatemala at present, national security interests have been increasingly central to United States foreign policy since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001; bilateral relations with Guatemala are no exception. U.S. security concerns in Guatemala broadly encompass traditional worries such as illegal immigration and narco-trafficking as well as newer concerns such as terrorism and street gangs. A recent report by Latin America policy groups in Washington shows that U.S. officials working on Latin America—the bulk of whom are employed by the military's Southern Command—are tending to lump the solutions to these problems into a strategy known as "effective sovereignty." Pointing to the porousness of national borders, the lawlessness of city slums, the prevalence of drug and arms trafficking, and the potential ease with which terrorists might operate undetected, proponents of the effective sovereignty doctrine argue that the ungoverned spaces of Latin America pose a threat to U.S.

Contemporary Guatemala faces new challenges. In a country where impunity is the norm, the United States has made efforts to promote the rule of law.

national security. The tactics they propose for extending the apparatus of the state to these areas often blur the lines between civilian and military responsibilities. In nations such as Guatemala, still struggling to draw a line between the civilian and military spheres after decades in which no line existed, the United States' willingness to push for military solutions to law enforcement challenges is alarming.

There is little doubt that U.S. policymakers are justified in harboring concerns regarding Guatemala's capacity for securing its territory. According to the State Department, 220 tons of cocaine passed through Guatemala in 2002 alone, more than two-thirds of Americans' consumption of the drug. Guatemala's northern border with Mexico is virtually lawless: Hundreds of illegal immigrants cross daily trying to reach the United States, police and plantation owners exploit those they encounter, gangs members assault, rob, and kill with impunity, and smugglers sneak across with guns, drugs, wood, cattle and rare animals. In Guatemala's cities and towns, street gangs born in 1980s Los Angeles commit 80% of the more

than 1000 gun killings each year; their cohorts drive crime in places like Southern California, Chicago, and suburban Washington, D.C. Finally, a suspected Al Qaeda member was recently alleged to have been spotted at an Internet café in neighboring Honduras, raising the specter of international terrorists using Central America as a staging ground for attacks on the United States.

In response to "sovereignty" problems of the kind that plague Guatemala, United States officials have come to view military units and military tactics as part of the solution. In recent years the U.S. has trained Latin American military officers in civic action, trained civilian police in light infantry tactics, and provided almost as much military as economic aid to the region. This trend may soon extend to Guatemala. Though most funding for Guatemala's military was still banned as of February 2005, the Defense Department and U.S. Ambassador John Hamilton have been pushing hard for its reauthorization. Privately, officials justify this push on drug interdiction grounds.

Though the 1996 Peace Accords limit the role of the Guatemalan armed forces to defending the country's independence and territorial integrity, the Guatemalan government has already displayed a willingness to merge civilian and military security operations. In July of 2004, for example, President Oscar Berger ordered 1,600 soldiers to patrol the streets of the capital. Berger was understandably frustrated by the inability of an undermanned, under-equipped, and often corrupt police force to protect the public. U.S. officials were equally frustrated when a now disbanded anti-drug police unit was accused of stealing more cocaine from police warehouses than it had seized in raids. But the army—an admittedly tempting solution—remains a problematic institution. It has shrunk in size and shed some of its more notorious officers, but it maintains links to organized crime, balks at civilian oversight of its finances and offers scant assistance in the investigation of past abuses. The army's reinsertion into domestic, civilian affairs threatens to undermine critical processes of democratization and demilitarization in Guatemala. In the long run, this can only be considered a security risk for the United States.

The pursuit of "effective sovereignty" over Guatemala's lawless, ungoverned regions must instead prioritize the extension of government services such as courts, police, health clinics, schools, roads and agricultural services. Likewise, the lack of an effective police force should be addressed not by dispatching the military but by improving police training, equipment, salaries, and manpower. Gang membership and illegal immigration should be tackled by both improving law enforcement and expanding economic and social development programs. By cutting development funding while seeking to reauthorize military aid, the United States has sent Guatemala the wrong signals—prioritizing short-term security gains over the establishment of a strong democratic state. If U.S. officials can now reverse course and redouble their laudable efforts to promote democracy, development and human rights, we will truly have entered a period of enlightened United States foreign policy in Guatemala.

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The United States and Guatemala

The Force of a Myth

BY OSCAR GUILLERMO PELÁEZ ALMENGOR

THE FIGURE OF GUATEMALA'S OVERTHROWN PRESIDENT JACOBO Arbenz Guzmán powerfully illustrates lost hopes and dashed dreams, what could have been and wasn't. It portrays, in essence, the life of men and women in Guatemala with its marvels and miseries. And in the same manner, it illustrates, for better or for worse, the force of a myth that has grown in the past fifty years.

Today, it is no secret that the United States financed and directed "Operación Éxito" that led to the overthrow of the government of Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán in 1954. Neither is it a secret that many Guatemalans participated as mercenaries in Arbenz' defeat. There is, on this point, a shared responsibility that Guatemalans have not fully assumed.

On June 27, 1954, more than 50 years ago, Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, the constitutionally elected president of Guatemala, resigned his post. In his farewell speech, he declared that his decision was based on the fact that he did not want a bloodbath among Guatemalans. How wrong Arbenz was...the bloodbath lasted for almost half a century and political instability a fact of everyday life since then. The political life of Arbenz Guzmán illustrates the lights and shadows of Guatemala's contemporary history.

OCTOBER 20, 1944

At dawn on October 20, 1944, Lt. Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán, dressed in civilian clothing in the midst of a group of students, burst into the Honor Guard, already under the control of Francisco Javier Arana. The insurgents captured the Guatemalan Army's most modern arsenal of weapons, including several armored cars. The skirmish between the rebellious troops and those loyal to dictator Jorge Ubico's chosen henchman Federico Ponce Vaidez lasted the entire day. The insurgents finally won, with Arbenz Guzmán playing a leading role in the uprising. However, Arana's command of the armored vehicles was decisive in the victory. Together with the civilian Jorge Toriello Garrido, Arbenz and Arana became the heads of the first government of the October Revolution. Both rose to the position because of their participation in the military

uprising, Arbenz as one of the officials of the "School" (educated in the military academy) and Arana as one of the "line" (officials who rose through the ranks by their bootstraps).

Later, during the government of Juan José Arévalo (1945-1951), Arana served as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and Arbenz as Defense Minister. Both were the most influential Army officials of the October Revolution.

THE DEATH OF FRANCISCO JAVIER ARANA

Major Francisco Javier Arana, enticed by sectors wanting to overthrow the Arévalo government, became a conspirator. Emboldened by the president's lack of firmness, Arana went to Morlón in Amatitlán on July 18, 1949 to recuperate a cache of arms intended for Arévalo's use by the Caribbean Legion, the so-called "Legión del Caribe." This was the awaited moment. Arévalo contacted Arbenz, who left the capital with his men in two vehicles. His companions included Colonel Felipe Antonio Girón, Commander of the Presidential Guard, his chauffeur Francisco Palacios and his assistant Major Absalón Peralta. The force that attempted to detain Arana was led by Lt. Colonel Enrique Blanco and Alfonso Martínez, the head of the Congressional Armed Forces Committee. At the bridge known as the Puente de la Gloria, Arana's vehicle was intercepted, immediately producing crossfire. Arana, Peralta, and Blanco were killed, and others were injured, including Martínez. The news of Arana's death spread like wildfire, and within a few hours, the most important military barracks in Guatemala City rose up against Arévalo.

The armed insurrection lasted for several days. However, Arbenz – leading the sector of the Army loyal to Arévalo – won the battle. The defeated military men remained thirsty for revenge. Arévalo never sufficiently explained the circumstances that had led to Arana's death, leading to rampant rumor.

THE ELECTION OF JACOBO ARBENZ GUZMÁN

Jaco Arbenz Guzmán won the presidency with a clear victory over his opponents. Arbenz' role in July 1949 during the uprising follow-



The election campaign took Jacobo Arbenz to virtually every corner of the country.



ing Arana's death and his firm support of Arévalo's government had earned him the respect of political leaders and the Army. Political party leaders believed that Arbenz was somebody who could unify the different political currents stemming from the October Revolution. Towards the end of 1949, political parties, the Partido de Acción Revolucionaria (PAR) and the Renovación Nacional (RN), both in the government, were preparing to give their support to Arbenz. However, the electoral strategy was distinct; a group of large landholders and industrialists Quetzaltenango, having known Arbenz for many years, formed the Partido de Integridad Nacional (PIN) at the end of 1949 to back him. On February 5, the PIN declared Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán to be its presidential candidate. The PAR and the RN followed shortly afterwards.

After an election campaign that took Arbenz to virtually every corner of the country—the images from which illustrate this article—between November 10 and 12, 1950, Arbenz was declared victor at the polls. Of the 404,739 votes cast, Arbenz won 258,987, Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes obtained second place with 72,796 votes. This indisputable victory carried Arbenz to the nation's presidency March 15, 1951, with a government program that sought to modernize the nation or, in Arbenz' own words, "to convert Guatemala into a modern capitalist country."

THE AGRARIAN REFORM

Arbenz signed the Agrarian Reform Law, Decree 900, on June 17, 1952. According to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), its objectives were to "develop the capitalist economy in Guatemalan agriculture through the abolition of the semi-feudal relations between landowners and workers, moreover, it sought the improvement of cultivation methods through adequate assistance."

The rapid and complete application of the Law of Agrarian Reform, apart from its benefits, triggered a series of problems. On the domestic front, the agrarian situation with its latent conflicts was pushed into political and legal action. The long conflicts over the land among different communities were daily, weakening the government's support among strong sectors of the population because of this. The conflict between merchants and industrialists against large landowners, produced by the agrarian reform, undermined the government's alliance with key economic and political sectors. Finally, the open conflict against multinational interests, especially those of the United Fruit Company, complemented by the anti-imperialist

rhetoric of the government, added one more hostile element to an already existing problem. As the Canadian historian Jim Handy has suggested, perhaps the agrarian reform was the "revolution's most beautiful fruit," but also the nails of its coffin.

THE RETALIATION

Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán confronted increasing discontentment about his policies on the part of the Guatemalan elite. The industrialists and merchants abandoned him because of his association with radicalized groups, especially the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT, the Communist party founded in 1949). The Catholic Church declared war on his government because of the confessed atheism of some of the leaders of the revolutionary left. In those years, there was a war to the death between religious and socialist ideas. The venerated Christ of Esquipulas was used as a symbol to spear the campaign against revolutionary ideas in the name of faith and religion. The army was divided even more after the death of Francisco Javier Arana, and the counterrevolutionaries offered their services to the U.S. State Department to head up whatever rebellion that would promise to overthrow the government. The large landowners were the most affected group because of the application of the agrarian reform, and they had a better reason than anyone to hate Arbenz and his government. Finally, the anti-imperialist language and legal actions by the government against the United Fruit Company, stimulated the intervention of the United States on behalf of the interests of the multinational corporations. The States Department financed approximately \$3 million for a campaign that psychological warfare, airplanes and a mercenary army to overthrow the government.

Nevertheless, the principal achievements of the October Revolution outlived its promoters; the domestic market has been expanded; trade and industry have grown, and Guatemala is now a modern capitalist country with an emerging democracy in the process of consolidation. The patch laid out by the October Revolution has finally become a road and Guatemala today is surely what Arévalo and Arbenz desired fifty years ago.

Oscar Guillermo Peláez Almengor is the Central American Visiting Scholar at the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, 2004-2005. He is a professor at the Center for Urban Studies at the University of San Carlos in Guatemala.

Guatemala: The Aftermath

Repression, Refuge and Healing

A PHOTOESSAY BY JONATHAN MOLLER

THE YEAR 2004 MARKED the 50th anniversary of the CIA-orchestrated coup in Guatemala that overthrew the democratically elected government of Jacobo Arbenz in the name of U.S. economic interests. CIA piloted planes bombed areas of Guatemala City, and the United States installed a virtual puppet government. Thus began a series of military dictators and their armies and death squads that would bring incredible suffering and grief to the Guatemalan people over the next four decades and literally up to the present.

For over six years between 1993 and 2001 I worked as a human rights advocate and freelance photographer in Guatemala, principally working with indigenous Mayans uprooted by that country's long and brutal civil war. I spent much of my time in rural areas, working to support Guatemala's displaced and refugee populations in their struggle for respect of their basic rights. Most recently I worked with a forensic anthropology team, supporting and documenting the exhumations of clandestine cemeteries.

When I first arrived in Guatemala from neighboring El Salvador in early 1993, I was only peripherally aware of the extent of the violence and repression that was being carried out with U.S. support against innocent and impoverished populations of that country. In the 1980s, compared to other countries in Latin America—Chile, Argentina, El Salvador and Nicaragua—little news was getting out about Guatemala. U.S. readers often did not hear about the atrocities being carried out there: the massacres, the genocide, the tremendous repression, that were overwhelmingly carried out against the Indigenous, the Mayans, who make up 65% of the total population of that country. In the words of Uruguayan author and journalist, Eduardo Galeano, from his endorsement of my book *Our Culture is Our Resistance*, "... It was the worst massacre since the times of the Conquest in the 16th century. It happened just twenty years ago, but the world, blinded by racism, never knew."

The images that appear in this essay are but a few of the hundreds of photographs that I took in the context of my human rights work in Guatemala. The images themselves are stories of life and death, of hope and despair, and of struggles for survival, respect and truth.

My work focuses primarily on the Communities of Population



in Resistance (CPRs)—beginning with photographs that I took between 1993 and 1995 in northern Guatemala. The CPRs emerged from the violent repression directed against civilians by the Guatemalan Army in the early 1980s. While tens of thousands of indigenous campesinos spilled across the border into Mexico, the people who would form the CPRs fled to remote mountain and jungle areas, where they formed highly organized, self-governing communities that silently resisted death and Army control, remaining in hiding until the mid 1990s. During this fifteen-year period, they were accused by the government of being guerrillas, and were hunted by the Army.

Twelve years ago, in those profoundly beautiful mountains and jungles soaked with blood, I joined my passions for photography and social justice. It is my hope that this work not only speaks to my vision as an artist and as an activist, but most especially to the lives of those in Guatemala that survived and resisted death and exploitation, and who continue to struggle for their basic rights, their survival and their dignity. And to those who were killed, but whose memories live on.

*Jonathan Moller worked in Guatemala for six years with the National Coordinating Office on Refugees and Displaced of Guatemala (NCOORD), the Guatemala Accompaniment Project (GAP), and most recently, with the Forensic Team of the Office of Peace and Reconciliation of the Quiché Catholic Diocese. His photographs have been widely exhibited and published. His recent photography book *Our Culture is Our Resistance: Repression, Refuge and Healing in Guatemala* includes testimonies by survivors of the violence, as well as essays by Francisco Goldman, Susanne Jonas, and Ricardo Falla, among others. Author royalties will be donated to the Association for Justice and Reconciliation in Guatemala.*

For more information about Jonathan Moller's book, please visit the following web sites: <www.powerhousebooks.com/titles/ourcultureisourresistance.html> or <www.jonathanmoller.org>. Spanish language edition by Turner Libros, Madrid & Mexico City: <www.turnerlibros.com>.




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




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COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES

Brazil and the United States p.39

Nicaragua and the United States p.42

Vieques' Struggle for Peace p.44

U.S. foreign policy affects virtually every corner of Latin America. Here are three perspectives, taking a close look at Brazil, Nicaragua and Puerto Rico.

Lula and Jorge

Brazil and the United States

BY KENNETH MAXWELL

LULA, AKA LUIZ INACIO “LULA” DE SILVA, the president of the Federative Republic of Brazil, and Jorge aka George W. Bush, the president of the United States of America, seem by all accounts to get on quite well together on the personal level. This surprised many observers and probably surprised the two men themselves. It is a relationship that has certainly helped diffuse the wilder accusations of malevolent intent that were and can still be heard in both countries about the other. But these good personal feelings have not so far translated into a full recognition of how important both countries are to each other in the hemisphere and beyond.

The Brazil/U.S. relationship is a complicated one to be sure, and it should not be taken for granted. Albert Hirschman's classic work, *Journeys toward Progress*, used as its frontispiece Paul Klee's painting “Highways and Byways” to symbolize the manifold and ambiguous ways in which nations “journey” toward their goals. This is also a good caution when looking at Brazil and the United States. The relationship between the two nations has always been one of “byways” and occasionally of cul de sacs.

Hirschman was of course examining Brazil's actions to alleviate the chronic economic backwardness of its drought-ridden and stagnating northeastern provinces, the birthplace—as it happens—of Brazil's first working class president, a biographical fact that profoundly influences Lula's worldview.


In his book, Hirschman criticized the overconfident belief that all problems were inherently solvable, as well as the prevalent notion of the period in which he was writing, the 1960s, that reform in Latin America could be achieved only by opposite processes of violent revolution or of peaceful change. Hirschman argued that both routes were in fact radical, since they both implied shifts of power and wealth, and that to achieve these shifts what was required were alliances to bring about a process he called “reform mongering,” a method of action that used unsuspected and unorthodox opportunities for maneuver and advance.

Curiously over his first two years as president of Brazil it has been Lula, the former lathe operator and trade union leader with an elementary school level of formal education—and not Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Hirschman's friend and colleague

at Princeton's Institute for Advanced Study, the world famous sociologist who was Brazil's president between 1995 and 2003—who appears to have taken the lessons of Hirschman's journeys toward progress most seriously.

Lula's government has been all about “maneuver and advance.” And no less curiously it has been George W. Bush, scion of a wealthy Yale-educated U.S. political dynasty, who has been the president with little patience for “mongering” of any sort, and has been infinitely more radical, unilateral and unambiguous in his foreign and domestic policies than Lula has been in Brazil.

Since 9/11 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq much of this is perhaps understandable. But the result has been that U.S. attention to what is going on in Latin America in general and Brazil in particular has been sporadic at best. Not that such indifference is new. The United States has tended to neglect Brazil, punctuated by moments of attention prompted by crises. But this pattern has reduced U.S. influence and brings with it costs. Trade, once at the top of the U.S. agenda in Latin America, for



Brazilian boy studying: economic and social reform requires consistent attention.

instance, has slipped into invisibility.

Brazil in the meanwhile has quietly pursued in own South American agenda making the strengthening of its ties to its immediate neighbors a major objective of Brazilian foreign policy. Brazil has also strengthened its relationship with the European Union. Both these efforts are seen in Brazil as a means to increase Brazil's and by extension Mercosul and South America's bargaining power with North America, and reflects Brazil's attempt to balance its international relations rather than commit to exclusivity. Lula has also expanded trade and diplomatic relations in Asia, especially with China and India. He does not see Brazil's interests confined to the Western Hemisphere and as a consequence Brazil has become increasingly active on the global stage, often in an informal alliance with other major developing countries such as China, India and South Africa.

But if Brazil at long last seems to have got the message that economic and political

reform requires long term and consistent attention, and that this consistent sustained and pragmatic effort is essential to begin reversing centuries of inequality and exclusion and diminishing the cavernous gap in Brazil between those who have and those who do not, it is not at all clear that the United States is paying much attention to these remarkable developments or is aware of how important it is to the United States that these efforts succeed.

The United States in fact needs Brazilian cooperation in South America. The Andean countries are all facing major problems, some of which would be much worse if it were not for the current high price of petroleum (which particularly benefits Ecuador and Venezuela). Brazil has acted to sustain democracy in Paraguay, played a discreet role in Peru, and has a major ongoing stake in the stability of Bolivia. In Colombia, Brazil could be an important player in any future peace negotiations. And Brazil

has worked hard to retain good relationships with Venezuela, a major oil supplier to both the United States and Brazil, despite the fact that Venezuela has set out under Hugo Chávez to provide an alternative model that challenges the market friendly policies that Brazil as well as many other South American countries have pursued in recent years, policies which have been continued by Lula.

In fact, the Chávez vision of an Andean based "Bolivarian" alternative form of regional integration is as much of a challenge to Brazil's aspirations for leadership in South America as it is to the United States. Chávez' populist message will undoubtedly find a strong resonance among disadvantaged sectors in many of Brazil's neighbors, especially in the Andes among newly mobilized and disaffected indigenous peoples. And if social and economic conditions do not improve under Lula's government in Brazil, this populist message will find increasing resonance among many of those who placed their faith in Lula and his promises to improve their conditions of life. In the face of these very predictably uncertain times ahead in South America, it should be self evident that Brazil and the United States have many common interests; and most especially in the success of sustainable economic development as well as democratic legitimacy in the Americas.

The United States with its overstretched military also owes Brazil a very big favor: Brazil has provided an important respite for the United States by providing Brazilian soldiers for the UN peacekeeping force in Haiti, a high risk and thankless task for Brazil if ever there was one. But Brazil also needs the United States. Its diplomats and businessmen know that in the end access to the U.S. market on equitable terms is important for the growth and competitiveness of the most dynamic and value added sectors of the Brazilian economy. Despite the impasse over the creation of a free trade area of the Americas, they understand that Brazil and the United States will need to strike a deal over trade. And Brazil wants U.S. support for its aspirations for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in the face of opposition from other Latin American contenders. For this it may need to engage in some hard bargaining on other issues in which the United States wants Brazilian cooperation, such as the delicate ques-



The peasants and workers in Brazil place faith in Lula and his promises to improve their conditions of life.

tion of Brazil's enriched uranium.

In the final analysis, both countries need to see clearly where their mutual interests coincide and to be aware where they do not. They have to remember that the powerful elements of competition within their relationship are unlikely to go away any time soon; nor is it sensible to expect that misun-

clashed with indigenous populations. Each created a domestic market large enough to create the illusion that they do not need to compete internationally or worry too much about international trade. Both have had an ambiguous relationship with the outside world, at times heavily involved but at other moments in their history retreating into

can learn much from each other. And this process is well underway already, whatever the efforts or the obstacles of governments. Contacts between nongovernmental organizations and within the private sector are wide-ranging, as they are within and between universities, between religious and environmental organizations, in sports and among musicians and artists, in movies and among documentary film makers, in the burgeoning *capoeira* clubs in U.S. cities, between Brazilians who have been trained and worked in the United States and those Americans who have studied, written about, lived, loved, worked and invested in Brazil. These are Albert Hirschman and Paul Klee's "byways". In the end the web they create is more permanent than the grand "highways" pushed into the Brazilian rainforest, only to be quickly washed away by the tropical rainfall.

Kenneth Maxwell is a Visiting Professor at Harvard University's History Department, and Senior Fellow, David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, Harvard University.

The United States and Brazil share a great deal, and the two countries have much to learn from each other. And this process is well underway.

derstandings and temporary irritation will disappear, even if the two presidents get on well in private. Both the United States and Brazil are continent-sized nations. Each has a vibrant national culture. Each of their societies is composed of the descendents of large migrations with populations that are part of overlapping global diasporas. Both countries must deal with the deep-rooted heritage and lingering injustices of centuries of African slavery. Both were influenced by frontier cultures in which settlers often

isolationism. Both have domestic politics that are excessively local in which parochial interests prevail. Each has complex regional, federal and state interests that require conciliation. As Lula told "Jorge" when they first met, both presidents face unruly congresses that impose constant deal making and negotiation to get anything done.

But it is also true that as the two greatest democratic, multiracial and ethnically diverse societies of the Americas, the United States and Brazil share a great deal, and

Nicaragua and the United States

Troubled Neighbors

BY SEAN ADRIAN REAGAN

WHEN I ARRIVED IN NICARAGUA IN 1997 to work on a grassroots environmental project, Managua was in chaos. Six thousand students were raging against spending cuts in education. President Arnoldo Alemán had placed new restrictions on funding for state universities. The city was paralyzed.

I was witnessing the latest chapter in Nicaragua's violent history plagued by civil war, self-interested tyrannical rulers, and foreign political intervention. Due to this turbulent past, Nicaragua has struggled to achieve political stability or significant economic growth. Although only the last of a succession of foreign invaders, the United States has played a leading role in Nicaragua's recent past. U.S. involvement began in 1909 when marines lent support to the new Conservative government and continued into the 1930s with U.S. interest in a trans-isthmus canal. Before the United States withdrew forces in 1933, it established and trained the Nicaraguan National Guard, and installed a commander sympathetic to U.S. anti-communist policy. The Somoza family would dominate Nicaraguan politics and

industry for the next 43 years.

Even before independence, Nicaragua was divided between anti-clerical free-trading Liberals and Catholic conservatives. In the 1960s, the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (FSLN or Sandinistas), a leftist armed revolutionary force bent on overthrowing the pro-U.S. Somoza government, emerged, finally claiming victory in 1979. The rebels were visionaries, not statesmen. Sabotaged by some of their original

college janitor, he had spent five years guiding new recruits to mountain camps during the uprising against Somoza. He commanded weapons and food in the mountains to feed Sandinista guerrillas. Some of the cattle he stole belonged to the poor farmer who would later host me in Momotombo, an agrarian village outside Managua where daily necessities were scarce. As a well-meaning undergraduate student from the world's preeminent consumer society, I was going

Washington's frequent attempt to keep Nicaragua in its political orbit affects the lives of all Nicaraguans in many ways. Here is a personal account of that impact.

supporters and besieged by counter-revolutionary forces covertly funded by the Reagan administration, their economic experiment persevered a scant eleven years. During my stay in Nicaragua, I lived with Sandinistas and Liberals; their lives and stories offered a personal insight into Nicaragua's past.

I stayed in Managua with the family of Don Isaac. Forty-five at the time and a

there to preach sustainable development. Getting there was going to take some time, however. Student blockades barred access to every major thoroughfare, suggestive of the barriers to higher education they were protesting.

During the week of riots, my Sandinista host family wrenched cobblestones from the streets and lighted gasoline drenched tires, pushing lung searing smoke into the night air. Students armed with *morteros* burned vehicles, while police in riot gear fired tear gas into the crowds. Students, journalists and police had been injured before the dissenters gave way when Alemán promised five percent of the state budget for education.

When the shooting stopped I continued on to Momotombo, an agrarian community where I lived in a tin hut with Señor Lailado and his family. Lailado was a seventy-plus liberal who waxes nostalgic about a time before the revolution when, as he remembers, food was cheap and everybody ate well. He had heard of the protests in Managua and told me the government needed to instill a healthy fear in the people to govern properly. Lailado has known fear. He remembers being dragged from his bed by guerrillas and forced to hand over the rifle he needed to put meat on the table. They took the rifle as they had taken the cattle.

I had come to like and respect the heads

ROBERT F. KENNEDY VISITING PROFESSOR NOT COMING VISA PROBLEMS DETER FORMER SANDINISTA GUERRILLA

Dora María Tellez recently declined her appointment as the 2004-2005 Robert F. Kennedy Visiting Professor in Latin American studies after the State Department denied her a visa to study at the University of California, San Diego. The reason: the well-known Nicaraguan historian commanded Sandinista forces during the revolution and played a key role in toppling the dictatorship.

For the State Department, Tellez's guerrilla activities in the 1970s were acts of terrorism. Tellez was among the guerrilla forces that took the National Palace and held 2,000 government workers in a 1978 two-day stand off. She also led the attack on the city of Leon, a watershed event in the Sandinista revolution. While she is a heroine to many Nicaraguans, Tellez remains an enemy to the United States government.

Tellez's UCSD application was denied, DRCLAS offered to assist her in reapplying so that she could accept her appointment with the Harvard Divinity School. Tellez however declined Harvard's offer and is currently running for a seat in Nicaragua's National Assembly as the head of the Sandinista Renovation Movement.

—SEAN REAGAN



Two Nicaragua families on two political sides: above, Don Issac building a barrier; below, Lailado and his family

of both my host families, despite their opposite political ideologies. Listening to their stories I wondered how well I might have done under the same circumstances. Both families welcomed me as an honored guest, a friend, even though I was from the United States, a country whose foreign policy had shaped their destiny.

My host families may not even have been aware of Washington's earlier attempts to keep Nicaragua in its political orbit. In 1907, at Washington's instigation, an international court consisting of judges from five signatory republics, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras, convened to arbitrate regional disputes. The Central American Court of Justice credibly fulfilled its role until the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty of 1916. The treaty, a side-bar alliance

between Nicaragua's U.S.-backed regime and the United States gave the United States canal rights along the San Juan River Nicaragua shares with Costa Rica, and the right to fortify the Gulf of Fonseca which Nicaragua shares with Honduras and El Salvador. The treaty, adversely affecting three of the five signatory states, was rejected by the judicial court. When Nicaragua ignored the injunction, the court, rendered irrelevant by U.S. attempts to influence domestic policy in Central America, ceased to exist.

In 1987, the presidents of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras—the same five republics who made up the Central American Court of Justice in 1907—signed a peace agreement. On being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for his peacemaking efforts, Costa Rica's

president, Oscar Arias, urged the superpowers to leave Central America. Eighty years of corruption and tyranny might well have been mitigated by an impartial court of justice. And the United States was the primary cause of its dissolution.

Corruption and chaos continues in Nicaragua, much of it a legacy of U.S. interference. Since my return to the United States, Arnaldo Alemán has been sentenced to 20 years for electoral fraud, money laundering and embezzlement. Daniel Ortega, former Sandinista president, is once again running for office.

Sean Adrian Reagan, an international development specialist, is a DRCLAS staff member. He can be contacted at <reagan@fas.harvard.edu>.

Vieques' Struggle for Peace

A Lesson Learned for all Puerto Ricans???

BY SEBASTIÁN J. SÁNCHEZ

EVER SINCE THE SPANISH-AMERICAN War in 1898, the history of relations between the United States and Puerto Rico has been a complex one. Yet the nature of this relationship cries for elucidation because it crucially shapes—stunting or strengthening, your pick—the identity of every Puerto Rican. I have lived my life under such a relationship, personally, experiencing the torn feeling of growing up on an island that has shared for so many years a direct and symbiotic relationship with the United States. Daily, on the radio, on TV, in the newspapers, at work and schools, one listens to the same fruitless political debate between “*independentistas*” (those who favor independence), “*estadistas*” (those in favor of statehood), and “*autonomistas*” (those in favor of commonwealth status).” And every election year, the status issue controls the main chunk of the political discussion.

What the ubiquity of the issue suggests—and all three main political parties actually do agree on this—is that the relationship, how it is perceived and managed, is an anachronistic one that earnestly calls for a redefinition. The question now is how to guide Puerto Ricans to agree on something they are so strongly and emotionally divided about, or if it is even possible to strike a sustained and productive dialogue between such differing views that could conceivably produce a coherent voice of appeal to the United States. Well, if the struggle for peace in Vieques has proven to Puerto Ricans anything, it is that we should not lose hope, that with a united voice we can in fact effect change. But the caveat is that the civilian population must mobilize and take the reins of the struggle away from political party ideologues. The aim, therefore, is to figure out how and what can unite us as a people in finding that common voice or, at the very least, a clearer one in defining our relationship to the United States.

For those of you unfamiliar with the case of Vieques, it is an island roughly twice the size of Manhattan that lies off the southeastern coast of Puerto Rico and which for the first half of the 20th century had been the

economic site of two large sugar companies and the home of about 10,000 US citizens (who from this point forward I will refer to as Viequenses). Yet by 1939, during the incipient stages of the Second World War, the US Navy singled out the island as part of a major defense project for the Caribbean basin. Declaring a national emergency, the Navy quickly expropriated two-thirds of its lands, buying out both sugar companies and relocating the entire civilian population to the heart of the island, uncomfortably squishing them between two military zones.

The relocation was clearly not pleasant for Viequenses. The Navy uprooted them from their homes without offering any type of compensation, placing them on new plots of lands to which they did not even have protected property rights. Because of this, they lived under the constant fear of facing further eviction. But there was not much Puerto Ricans or Viequenses could do about this at the time. During those days, Puerto Rico had passed from the US Department of War (now the Department of Defense) to the power and jurisdiction of the US Department of the Interior, meaning that the U.S. government made most, if not all, of the islands' decisions. And Puerto Ricans had to endure all of this quietly: nationalists were fiercely persecuted and jailed without evidence and demonstrators had been gunned down in what has become known as the Ponce Massacre. Nevertheless, little anti-American sentiment existed, much less a well-organized anti-U.S. movement that could pose a serious threat to the U.S. government control over the island.

Many Puerto Ricans—and even some Viequenses—strongly believed that a continued association with the United States would improve the dismal economic situation and possibly deliver them out of their misery. Military bases are often known to be economic motors that spur local economies, and there was great hope that this would be the case in Vieques. This, however, never turned out to be the case. For more than 60 years, two-thirds of Vieques' lands remained empty except for storage, artillery and small arm firing, naval gunfire support, missile

shoots, amphibian landing exercises, parachute drops, and submarine maneuvers.

As a result of these practices, Vieques came to be known as the “University of the Seas.” The problem with “Vieques' University” was that, in contrast to a place like Harvard, its students neither came to stay for a substantial amount of time nor to create a stable community that could consistently stimulate an economy. Marines would merely visit the island to do their practices for a short period of time and leave; they would not settle to commit their lives and money. These visits were sporadic throughout the year, many times purely for a day's military practice after which they would immediately return to the main island – Puerto Rico. For these same reasons, the Navy's presence in Vieques did not require a significant steady number of laborers to support its operations. The numbers speak loudly for themselves: the Navy barely employed around 25 Viequense civilians at the bases, while 73% of the approximately 10,000 others remained unemployed.

To survive, many Viequenses turned to fishing and subsistence agriculture. Even today, many Viequenses still live mainly off of these two forms of sustenance. Fishing, especially, has been such a wide practice that it is now an intrinsic part of what it means to be Viequense. The tragic death of David Sanes, a Viequense civilian, during one of the Navy's military practices on the island in April 1999 served as a catalytic agent for Vieques' recent peace struggle for civilian control of the island.

Because of the fear of Communism and the theory of containment, the Navy did not return these expropriated lands to civilian control after the end of the war emergency of the 1940s. In fact, Vieques was such an ideal spot for their practices that during the 60s, the Navy even made a concerted effort to remove all civilians from the island. Luís Muñoz Marín, the governor of Puerto Rico at the time, mediated the situation, and President John F. Kennedy intervened, pronouncing an executive order that prevented the Navy from evicting the residents. Nevertheless, the Navy



Puerto Ricans express their viewpoints: mainland influence is never far away.

intensified its practices on the two-thirds of the island that it did indeed have in its power. Without needing to pay any permission costs for compensation for the base, as it does in the rest of the world, the Navy took the freedom to advertise Vieques to foreign navies as a place to have military practices using “most non-conventional weapons inventory.” In common language, “most non-conventional weapons” typically means nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. There have now even been revelations that the Navy went as far as firing depleted uranium munitions in violation of federal law.

Which makes us ask the troubling question about how the Navy was protecting Viequenses, U.S. citizens just as any other, when it did this? The answer is that it simply was not. The Navy contaminated and lived off Vieques by renting it out to foreign navies from which it made yearly profits of approximately \$80 million. For more than 60 years, Vieques civilians, basically, had to put up with experiencing daily war conditions. However, for the most part, Viequenses refused to turn this protest into a nationalist issue. The island residents raised their voices to complain against the bleak social and economic conditions they had to bear, rather than concentrate on the unfairness of the US-PR relationship.

For well more than 85 years, Puerto Ricans have been, acquiescently, exemplary U.S. citizens and soldiers. Puerto Ricans have proven to the world that we believe

in the tenets of capitalism and democracy; yet, nevertheless, the United States does not seem to have much regard for the island. If it does, how can the U.S. government explain why it allowed this injustice to continue for so long? And when the issue of Vieques became internationally polemical, why did the U.S. government decide to just tolerate the protests and keep on, sanctioning further practices for three more grueling years after Puerto Ricans had already unified in a virtually unprecedented unanimous plea to terminally end these military practices. As Puerto Ricans, we are now ever more ready for the U.S. government to provide us with some answers.

Yet the U.S. government finally saw its hand forced from the perseverant spirit of the civil movement which united across parties with a common penchant for justice in Vieques. If this had not been the case, and Puerto Ricans had left the Vieques issue solely in the hands of political parties instead of uniting into a broad civil coalition, we might have today still found ourselves struggling with the Navy’s presence in Vieques. The sad fact of the Vieques struggle, however, is that it took Puerto Ricans more than 60 years, high cancer rates, and a couple of civilian deaths before it nationally mobilized to stop this. And even today, the fight still continues for the decontamination, devolution and proper development of these lands. The first one, decontamination, is presently the most imperative because it has been con-

firmed that Vieques has the highest rates of cancer in Puerto Rico—26.7% higher than Puerto Rico’s average.

Puerto Ricans must now avoid turning the Vieques peace movement into simply a bittersweet part of our history books and rather look for it to become a momentous lesson learned that we can apply to other thorny political issues that are facing the island, such as the ever-present status issue. The Vieques peace struggle demonstrated that if Puerto Ricans organize and mobilize across political parties persistently, a civilian grassroots movement has the potential of summoning enough international attention that could twist the U.S. government’s hand hard enough for it to change policy. For the status issue, we must again find that lowest common denominator to which most Puerto Ricans can agree to. Only then will the United States be compelled to pay it its due attention. And only then can we begin hoping for a better Puerto Rico. It is in our hands to embrace the challenge to design it. *Que así nos ayude Dios!*

Sebastián J. Sánchez graduated from Harvard College in the class of 2004, where he majored in government. Since then, he has joined the DRCLAS staff full-time. In the near future, he looks forward to continuing his graduate studies. He kindly thanks June Carolyn Erlick and Silvia Álvarez Curbelo for their significant contributions to this article.

HEALTH AND DRUGS

U.S. Foreign Aid and Health p.46

The Golden Gag p. 49

Brazil and AIDS p.51

When Ideology Undermines Public Health

Distortions in the U.S. Foreign Aid Program

BY BONNIE SHEPARD

RECENTLY I REVIEWED A REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS TO EVALUATE a USAID-funded organization in Latin America, and was dismayed to see the following description: “an evaluation of the adolescent programs, compliance with the Tiahrt Amendment and the Mexico City Policy and the post-abortion care activities of X, an NGO dedicated to reproductive health and family planning programs.” I told the agency asking me to take the lead that I found the assignment ethically unacceptable.

Using illustrations from Latin America, I want to take a look at how these recently imposed compliance issues in U.S. foreign aid affect reproductive health programs. In doing so, I aim to provide a general introduction to the multi-faceted distortions in U.S. foreign aid based on conservative interpretations of religious tradition. These distortions undercut the effectiveness of U.S. investments in foreign aid in health, wasting scarce resources and allowing preventable illness, suffering and death to continue.

U.S. government support for public health programs in Latin America and the Caribbean has diminished drastically in the past two decades. Indeed, only one high priority “joint programming” country—Peru—is left, along with 13 others where the reduced sup-

port goes for special issues or initiatives such as HIV/AIDS. Three of the five major goals of the USAID global health strategy are related to sexual and reproductive health, and suffer from policies based in conservative interpretations of religious traditions. (The two relatively unaffected goals are related to infant and child health, and infectious diseases.)

The issues described here affect both policy and program levels. For example, the U.S. government joined forces with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan, Syria, and the Vatican during the 2002 UN Special Session on the Child to oppose comprehensive sexual health education and services for adolescents. During the recent 10-year of Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), at the ECLAC Latin American and Caribbean regional meeting in Puerto Rico in June 2004, the U.S. government’s lobbying against ICPD was unanimously repudiated by the Latin American delegates. The Latin Americans actually increased their level of commitment to reproductive and sexual health policies, compared to a similar meeting in 1999.

The effects of U.S. policy on sexual and reproductive health



From the war on drugs to restrictions on funding for reproductive health, U.S. foreign policy permeates the lives of ordinary people throughout Latin America.

issues are felt most strongly, however, at the program level. Comparing the USAID strategic goals in health to the current policies illuminates the negative impact of ideology-based distortions in public health practice.

Goal #1: "reduction of unintended and mistimed pregnancies." According to well-known public health evidence, achieving this goal requires national coverage for provision of a full array of contraceptive education and services to all sexually active people, in ways that are accessible and culturally acceptable. However, many of the "mistimed" pregnancies are among adolescents. In Latin America, political pressures from the Catholic hierarchy combine with the growing political pressures on USAID, UNICEF, and UNFPA from conservative religious sectors in the U.S. government. The result is widespread failure to provide comprehensive sex education and reproductive health services to the region's adolescents. A significant portion of the USAID budget is dedicated to "abstinence-only" programs, even though research on sex education programs clearly shows that these programs are not effective once adolescents have begun sexual activity. The logic is perverse: since it is morally frowned on for adolescents to have sex before mar-

riage, programs should not protect their health when they do, thus subverting the very health goals of USAID strategy.

Another area of political pressure in U.S. global health policy relates to emergency contraception. Even though the World Health Organization has certified that this method is not an abortion (the technical word is "abortifacient"), religious pressure groups fight to exclude emergency contraception from U.S. family planning assistance, and eliminate provision of emergency contraception from guidelines for health services treating rape victims.

Goal #2: Reduction of HIV transmission and the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic in developing countries. A tragic consequence of the widespread failure in Latin America and the Caribbean to serve adolescents' sexual health needs is that it also stymies many serious efforts to achieve both country-level and USAID goals to stem the progress of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In the region, an estimated 560,000 youth (15-24) live with HIV/AIDS and approximately half of all new HIV infections are among youth ages 15-24. Yet the US

Left, a wall in Oaxaca, Mexico's Mixteca region promotes different kinds of birth control. Above, a couple enter a Brazilian health clinic.

government consistently discourages programming that provides condoms to sexually active youth, and provides grants for adolescent programs worldwide that provide incomplete and skewed information on contraception. Political pressure led the Center for Disease Control to alter a key HIV website: “Facts about Condoms and their Use in Preventing HIV Infection” to emphasize abstinence and condom failure rates, and eliminate the section on correct condom use. Unfortunately, most “abstinence-only” educational programs exaggerate the failure rates of contraceptives, especially condoms. In effect, this type of program discourages sexually active young people from protecting themselves against HIV.

Goal #3: Reduction in deaths and adverse health outcomes to women as a result of childbirth. USAID-supported programs in several countries have provided support to a comprehensive array of strategies to reduce maternal mortality, with one glaring exception. Unsafe clandestine abortion is a significant cause of maternal mortality and morbidity, causing an estimated 800,000 hospitalizations a year in Latin America, according to the research conducted by the N.Y.-based non-profit -- Alan Guttmacher Institute. Yet the “Mexico City Policy,” otherwise known as the “global gag rule,” forbids any organization receiving U.S. funds from advocating for legalization

of abortion, or even referring women for an abortion. Movimiento Manuela Ramos, a Peruvian feminist non-governmental agency, signed the policy after much internal soul-searching, in order to continue their USAID-funded program, Reprosalud, which provides culturally-sensitive reproductive health education and links to services for more than 2,500 communities in poor, rural communities. Susana Galdos, the former director, had to ask a federal judge for dispensation in writing so that her testimony on the negative effects of the global gag rule before the U.S. Senate in 2001 would not jeopardize their program. Since no organization can receive contraceptive supplies—not even condoms—from the United States, without signing an agreement to adhere to this policy, it affects all HIV-related programs as well. As pointed out by the “Access Denied” website on the Global Gag Rule, research in several countries in the world has highlighted the negative effects of loss of reproductive health coverage when organizations decide that they cannot in conscience sign the policy. Indeed, the Global Gag Rule violates two central tenets of U.S. foreign assistance: 1) to administer taxpayer funds efficiently, with maximum benefits to the recipients of U.S. aid and 2) to promote and support American democratic values abroad. Indeed, the Gag Rule is contrary to freedom of speech, a basic principle of democracy historically defended by the

U.S., and also to a key foundation of international relations: respect for national sovereignty. To end this article on a positive note, another policy that came into being under pressure from conservatives—the Tiahrt Requirements—is a positive force protecting reproductive rights and informed choice. The policy forbids all quotas in family planning programs, so that health services are not pressured to achieve a certain number of users of any particular contraceptive method. The policy also mandates full information on both benefits and risks of the full range of methods. In other words, it attempts to ensure that all programs supported by the United States adhere to principles of voluntary, informed choice. The amendments were passed in the aftermath of the media scandal surrounding President Fujimori’s coercive sterilization program in Peru in the 1990s. While conservative congressmen from the United States led the movement to pass this bill, feminists in Peru took the lead in exposing rights abuses in Peru’s family planning program. The amendments are a welcome protection of reproductive rights, in face of potential threats to reproductive freedom from anti-natalist governments.

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Workshop for traditional indigenous midwives, San Mateo del Mar, Oaxaca, Mexico.

When Silence is Gold(en)

The U.S. Global Gag Rule and Reproductive Health in Perú

BY TARAYN A. GRIZZARD

AS I WRITE THIS, THERE'S A CROWD PROTESTING, CHANTING and waving banners, 15 floors below my window here in Lima, Peru. Police in full riot gear encircle protesters and occasionally restrain the 1,000-plus demonstrators voicing their demands in front of the Office of the President's Cabinet. It's the third protest this week, one of the innumerable ones I've seen since moving here; the three this week were striking government physicians, but there have been strikes this year by all manner of citizens, mostly in response to the unpopular central government. Peruvian television is no different; an assortment of hard-core, fully costumed parody shows exist, ready to make fun of political foibles and flaws. To my North American eyes, accustomed to a more apathetic citizenry, Peru seems to be a veritable kaleidoscope of civic involvement, the epitome of how a democracy *should* respond when problems surface.

For all the political ruckus and upheaval, however, I've been surprised to hear practically nothing about abortion. Illegal in Peru, as it is in much of Latin America, save Puerto Rico and Cuba, clandestine, unsafe abortion in Peru poses a major health risk and a serious burden on the state's already struggling health system. More than 350,000 clandestine abortions took place in 2003, with about 5%—or 21,000 women—ending up in the hospital for complications. An estimated 800 women died as a result of these clandestine abortions that year. Peru has one of the world's highest per capita rate of abortions in—more than 50 per 100 live births. Therefore, I had expected to hear at least, well, *something* about abortion on TV, or in the news. I'd certainly seen posters and the occasional talk show on abortion while living in the equally conservative Chile. I had anticipated no different here in Peru, expecting to hear about women's organizations rallying together to demand that the government liberalize the abortion law, or about Ministry of Health family planning campaigns stressing prevention as a life-saving measure.

Instead, in my seven months here, I've heard nary a public word about abortion. A well-publicized, controversial Ministry of Health campaign to include emergency contraception within government health plans was launched earlier this year. The so-called "morning-after" pill is now available, although the Minister of Health was threatened with a libel suit (and several years in prison) for denouncing previous Ministry of Health reports stating that the pill was an abortifacient. Abortions indeed were on the rise, despite the restrictive environment. More than 350,000 abortions occurred in 2003, an increase from the 210,000 seen in 1994, undoubtedly as a result of decreased family planning services and/or outreach and education about unsafe abortion.

However, no one is talking about that. Even the debate about the pill was still several steps removed from the abortion issue itself, a topic that's rarely touched upon publicly or even privately. I haven't even heard it discussed among my liberal and educated circle of friends, most of whom are Peruvian or long-term expatriate doctors and researchers. Despite the fact that Peru's staggering abor-

tion rate requires a significant percentage of health system resources, I know of no one doing projects even vaguely related to abortion. It's as if no one cares to discuss abortion, an odd apathy despite the statistics and the grim reality. It simply doesn't fit: in a country so unafraid of protest, where *are* the Peruvian women's groups, feminist organizations, or indignant groups of young women to claim their right to safe womanhood?

Of course, these groups—among them, the well-known and respected Movimiento Manuela Ramos, Flora Tristan, and others—are still here, working in Lima and in the provinces to provide women with reproductive healthcare, economic resources, and other development tools. Yet, with the Bush administration, one of the equally vital roles of these organizations, that of advocacy for women's rights including the right to safe abortion, has been silenced due to the signing of the so-called "Global Gag Rule."

It was the scrawl heard around the world: on January 22, 2001, Bush signed into the law the Mexico City Policy for U.S. aid which states that any organization receiving US federal funds cannot discuss abortion in any context with its clients. Originally signed into law by former President Reagan while attending a UN conference in Mexico City, the policy is a throw-back to the conservative 80s, and is an ideological rather than practical policy regarding how US-funded organizations may *manage* the topic of abortion as an option with clients. Abortions are already prohibited from being paid for with U.S. funds abroad by the anti-choice Helms Amendment. Given that this amendment prevents use of US aid in abortion *provision*, the Mexico City policy is theoretically a measure that prevents maternal-child health and family planning organizations from promoting abortion to clients or to the general public as a family planning option with U.S. funds. Yet in Latin America, where abortion is largely illegal, the Global Gag Rule has gone beyond the walls of NGOs and clinics to the public fora to limit advocacy and lobbying for abortion rights by these groups as well.

In Peru, the region's largest recipient of U.S. aid, these effects of the Global Gag Rule to limit advocacy have been felt more strongly. While social conservatism makes any changes in Peru difficult, prior to the institution of the Global Gag Rule in the 1990s, and prior to the reinstatement of the Global Gag Rule, a more open public environment existed toward discussing abortion and how unplanned pregnancies arise and become complicated. According to Susan Chavez of feminist organization Flora Tristan, which refuses to conform to the gag order, this openness led to research on abortion by NGOs and feminist organizations, which helped them to develop and propagate public education campaigns and to open debate about the idea of abortion as a public health issue rather than as a criminal offense.

Now, with half of the organizations gagged because of their dependence on U.S. aid—and the others less-funded and/or isolated from their colleagues—this environment has virtually vanished, making abortion the topic *non grata*. Those organizations that chose



A typical scene from Peru, a country affected by U.S. restrictions on reproductive health funding.

to sign the Global Gag Rule and receive U.S. funds now often struggle to find their way through the potentially dangerous grey areas of the policy to work in the area of abortion rights, should they choose to do so at all. As one feminist organization leader in Peru, speaking confidentially to the Center for Reproductive Rights, said, “We used to hold debates, invited medical doctors, produced research publications. We cannot speak as freely now. No one knows at what point it becomes prohibited speech. USAID told us that we couldn’t lobby for abortion liberalization or decriminalization. That, for example, if we attend a general conference and the issue of abortion comes up we can speak. But we don’t know how much we can talk about it before it crosses over to not being permitted anymore. We, for example, can do research on unsafe abortion. But if we draw conclusions, someone can say ‘that’s lobbying.’”

Peruvian citizens working for U.S.-funded organizations were even limited from full, unrestrained involvement in their own country’s legislative process, in an outrageous violation of free speech that would be illegal under the U.S. Constitution. When a constitutional amendment further restricting abortion was proposed in 2003, an NGO leader speaking anonymously said that despite the group’s outspoken pro-choice stance, they could not “. . . even sign on without colleagues to a public statement on the constitutional clause on abortion. Our silence . . . surprised Parliament members. The Bishop could speak to the Parliamentarians, but we could not.”

Those not receiving U.S. aid—and thus not under the Global Gag Rule—suffer from isolation from like-minded but gagged colleagues and by the lack of collegial support and critical mass for change. Organizations now speak of being divided in two camps—those who are receiving aid, and thus gagged, and those not. The competition for funds has spawned an atmosphere in which many

organizations feel the need to guard self-interests, thus fostering self-censorship. Obviously, the Global Gag Rule has affected Peruvian women’s rights groups’ collective strength in front of conservative anti-choice forces, as Susana Chavez says, on “our advances, our social organizations, our coalitions, our unity.”

Yet the real victims of the Global Gag Rule aren’t the organizations, but rather the more than 350,000 women in Peru who suffered through illegal and frequently unsafe abortions in 2003. The real effects of the Mexico City policy are on the 800 estimated dead, women unable to obtain a legal abortion because of lack of services available to them, as well as the many others whose stories have yet to be part of these statistics.

One can only hope that these stories—and the choice movement of Peru, along with the rest of Latin America—will begin to change as pro-choice advocates do battle in the U.S. Congress to recuperate what has been lost in Peru through less-restricted U.S. aid and through private donors. Given the health effects of illegal abortion in Peru, the effects of the Global Gag Rule, and USAID’s associated “sustainable development” for reproductive health, as it is currently practiced, it is certain that the future reproductive health and status of women in Peru, and likely much of the rest of Latin America, will continue in the future to depend on foreign aid as it has in the past—with all of the ramifications that may entail.

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A Victory Over Patents

How Brazil has faced the HIV/AIDS challenge

BY RENÉ DANIEL DECOL, PHOTOS BY LUCIANA DE FRANCESCO

BRAZIL HAS BECOME THE FIRST DEVELOPING COUNTRY TO PROVIDE free and universal treatment to HIV-infected people and a relative stabilization of the disease incidence has been observed since 1997, one year after the Brazilian Ministry of Health has guaranteed free access to antiretroviral drugs for people living with HIV / AIDS.

The measure faced a heated dispute with the United States over patents, which Brazil won. Since then, the country "has been internationally regarded as capable of putting in place a sound health policy, and confronting pharmaceutical companies if needed," says Sérgio Queiroz, a University of Campinas professor in his study published by the London-based Panos Institute. With this, the country achieved a significant reduction in deaths and hospital admissions. The World Health Organization (WHO) has recognized it as role model. "Brazil has the most advanced program among developing countries," recognizes WHO director Jong-Wook Lee.

Now in its third decade, AIDS may become one of the deadliest epidemics in the human history, with more than 20 million deaths related to the disease. According to the latest United Nations report, 39.4 million people are now living with the virus, and are likely to die a decade or more prematurely. Millions of people are infected with HIV every single year, 95 per cent in the developing world.

Compared to Africa and nearby Caribbean islands, Latin America has not faced a full scale AIDS epidemic. With 0.6 per cent of adults aged 15-49 with HIV/ AIDS, Latin America is below the world's average infection rate. But thanks to its huge population, the region ranks in third in number of people with the disease: 1.7 million live with HIV/AIDS in the continent, according to the latest United Nations estimates.

In Brazil alone, 600,000 live with the infection. The fact that this figure is less than half of projections made one decade ago is an evidence of the Brazilian government policy success. "It has been recognized internationally as a role model," says Beatriz Tess, a 42 year-old epidemiologist who headed the Ministry of Health's department of Science and Technology between 1999 and 2003, when the project was implemented. The Brazilian program contrasts with other Latin American countries where response to the threat, according to a World Bank report, "has been slow, small-scale, and largely only supported by international agencies and international programs."

At the 2002 Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) meeting in Washington, the Brazilian delegation received personal congratulations from many, but not from the United States. U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services Tommy Thompson reportedly was irritated because Brazil supported the candidacy of Dr. Mirza Perigo Roses as the new director of the Pan American Health Organization, while the United States favored the Mexican candi-

date, Dr. Jaime Sepúlveda Amor. At a reception, Thompson made a welcome speech where, maybe joking, when he said: "We thank you all for coming, you are very welcome, but we are going to be god damn mad at you if you don't vote our candidate..." According to people present, many took Secretary Thompson speech as a demonstration of Bush-style diplomacy, and decided to vote the candidate launched by Brazil: Argentina's Perigo won.

Although Brazil's program owes much to the mobilization of society, free and widespread distribution of antiretrovirals through the public-health system is its major feature.

In 1996, then-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso signed a law establishing free distribution of drugs to people living with HIV/AIDS. Although the measure faced political, financial and logistic challenges, the number of people receiving treatment increased steadily: only 35,000 were enrolled in the program in 1997, while currently 154,000 people are being treated. But the costs also increased: the Ministry of Health last year spent R\$ 550 million (US \$200 million) just to buy the drugs.

Brazil soon faced challenges to its bold approach to treat the disease. Some in the international community urged that developing countries should focus on prevention because treatment would be too costly. The Brazilian policy, however, proved to be quite cost-effective. The free distribution of a 'cocktail' containing about 15 different drugs for those enrolled in the program caused a 50 per cent decrease of the AIDS mortality rate, and more than 80 per

In a victory over U.S. patent policy, Brazil has become the first developing country to provide free and universal treatment to HIV-infected people.

cent decrease in hospitalizations. From 1996 to 2001, an estimated 358,000 hospitalizations were prevented, representing savings of approximately US \$1.1 billion. Preventive measures such as condom free distribution and nationwide campaigns has stabilized the rate around 18 per 100,000 habitants, with the more urban southern region reaching 27/100,000.

The success of the Brazilian anti-HIV drugs free distribution was based in a twofold strategy: increased local production of generic antiretrovirals and the negotiation of discounts of patented drugs produced by international laboratories. Since the high cost of purchasing antiretrovirals could threaten the program, Brazil favored domestic drug production, although the lion's share still had to be purchased on the international market. Therefore, Brazilian authorities tried to negotiate a better deal.

In 2001, blaming high costs, José Serra, then Brazil's Health Minister (currently São Paulo mayor) threatened to break patents of certain antiretrovirals if companies do not reduce prices. "Such

a measure, called compulsory licensing, would be admissible under Brazilian patent law, given special circumstances,” observes Jane Galvão, a New York-based senior program officer at the International Planned Parenthood Federation, in her *The Lancet* article, one of the best panoramic studies of the Brazilian HIV/AIDS program. As a matter of fact, many argue that any country is allowed to break patents in case of war or health emergency. What Brazil did was to declare the AIDS pandemics as such a case, when public health was at danger.

Despite the threat, compulsory licensing has not been applied in practice, and was used only as a negotiation tool. In early 2001 Brazil announced it was considering breaking the patents for both American Merck Sharp Dohme and Swiss Roche laboratories’ drugs if manufacturers did not reduce their prices. After harsh negotiations, Merck agreed to reduce the price for its antiretrovirals by a 60 per cent margin. Reductions offered by Roche, however, were considered inadequate and the Ministry announced plans to produce an equivalent at Far-Manguinhos institution, a government-run laboratory. The Brazilian government argued that 28 per cent of the annual budget for antiretrovirals was being spent on this drug alone. Eventually, Roche agreed to reduce the price of the drug, and plans for breaking patents were dropped. Recently, however, Brazil again announced plans to begin production of Merck’s Efavirenz, even if its patent is due to expire only in 2012.

Brazil’s move evoked both support and challenges in the international arena. Immediately after announcing the threat, the World Trade Organization (WTO) accepted a request by the United States for a panel questioning the procedure. But Brazil reacted quickly. In April of the same year, the United Nations Human Rights Commission approved a resolution proposed by Brazil establishing access to medical drugs during pandemics as a basic human right. Months later United States withdrew the panel against Brazil.

The strategy of threatening companies with the break of patents would not work if Brazil did not meet certain conditions. An important part of the program is the promotion of local production of drugs, particularly generics. International laboratories would not take the Brazilian threat of patent breaking seriously if the country did not have the know-how to produce them at home. Reinforcement of public laboratories such as Far-Manguinhos, Fundação Para o Remédio Popular (FURP), and others were instrumental in negotiating with international laboratories. The Ministry of Health invested in both production and developing capabilities of these laboratories, particularly in Far-Manguinhos, a division of the



At a Brazilian health center, patients can receive free antiretrovirals.

Oswaldo Cruz Foundation, an institution with a long tradition of research in the health sector. The Rio de Janeiro-based lab has been enlarging not only its drug production but its research capability. It is currently prepared to develop formulations to be internally produced or transferred to other drug manufacturers throughout partnership agreements.

The logistic and strategic challenges in a country the size of Brazil cannot be overstated. Despite its huge territory and 180 million population, in 1988 the country established the so-called Unified Health System, offering comprehensive health care to the entire population, irrespective of employment status or access to other forms of health insurance. This was an important factor in implementation of a distribution program for HIV/AIDS, as was the country’s ability to train personnel in diagnosis and treatment.

Currently there are more than 400 sites around Brazil where patients can receive free antiretrovirals. These sites, called AIDS Drugs Dispensing Units (ADDU) are located in public hospitals or health centers. To be eligible to receive treatment, a patient must be



Dr. Arnaldo Etzel, head of the Reference Aids Center of Santos, discusses the challenges of the Brazilian program.

enrolled at the unit, and a doctor must follow-up the patient. The Brazilian program still faces many challenges. First, it is far from reaching all affected with the virus. After all, of the 600,000 people estimated to be infected, only 154,000 have been so far enrolled in the Ministry of Health program. The program still has much to improve in its notification collection. The latest UN report, for instance, has called the attention of the authorities to the fact that the disease incidence is likely to increase among Afro-Brazilians, and so registration of data on race and ethnicity is becoming increasingly important. In fact, until recently data by

Brazil established that access to medical drugs during a pandemic is a human right. That favors local drug production and the promotion of generic substitutes.

race or ethnicity were all but ignored by official statistics. As soon as statistics become to appear, they confirmed UN worries: in fact, although Blacks account for 6.2 per cent of the Brazilian population (with mixed accounting for other 38.5 per cent) 11.2 per cent of infected men are Black, while Black women accounted for 14.3 per cent of AIDS cases last year.

Another major challenge is that Brazil is still dependent on raw material imported from other developing countries, particularly from India. In early 2005 the Ministry of Health recognized that stocks were so low that it had to import finished antiretrovirals from Argentina.

But the single most important challenge is still funding. The Brazilian project was possible thanks to three loans by the World Bank. The last one, a US \$100 million loan made in 2003, was matched with an equal amount from Brazilian Ministry of Health, and is supposed to support the program until 2006. But Brazil has to find a way to make it self-sustainable. And this can be a problem. "When the money comes pegged to the AIDS program, wherever it comes from, you can be sure it will hit the target," says Dr. Beatriz Tess, currently a researcher at Instituto do Coração, a distinguished public hospital in São Paulo. "But if the money has to come from the Ministry of Health general budget, whether the resources go to the Aids program or not will depend a lot on the judgment of policy makers and competing public health priorities."

Whatever will be its future, the Brazilian model is a notable showcase on how a developing country can control a deadly epidemic with some help from international agencies and, social mobilization and adequate policies. It remains to be seen if it can be applied to other countries. It is certain, however, that much can be learned from its experience.

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Aerial Spraying and Alternative Development in Plan Colombia

Two sides of the same coin or two contested policies?

BY MARÍA CLEMENCIA RAMÍREZ

AFTER ONE YEAR OF NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, President Pastrana presented Plan Colombia in 1999 as A Plan for Peace, Prosperity, and the Strengthening of the State "...to ensure order, stability, and compliance with the law; to guarantee effective sovereignty over the national territory; to protect the state and the civilian population from the threats of illegal armed groups and criminal organizations; and to break the existing ties between these groups and the drug industry that supports them." (Contraloría General de la República, Bogotá, Colombia, August 2001).

By 1999, Colombia was already the third largest recipient of U.S. military assistance in the world and, for the first time, the United States had provided a small amount of alternative development assistance. Plan Colombia's six-year budget was set at US\$7.5 billion. Colombia would provide \$4 billion and the international community, including the United States would provide US\$3.5 billion. During the Clinton administration, the U.S. Congress approved a special supplemental appropriation of US\$1.3 billion. Known collectively as "Plan Colombia," the bill included \$860 million for Colombia, \$180 million for several of Colombia's neighbors, and \$260 million for the counter-drug efforts of several U.S. agencies.

Of Colombia's share, 74% went to the armed forces and the police. The centerpiece of Plan Colombia, which administration documents called the "push into southern Colombia," was the addition of two counter-narcotics battalions to the one created in 1998-1999, to form a new Counter-Narcotics Brigade within the Colombian Army. Equipped with 45 helicopters, advanced communications and intelligence-gathering equipment, and light infantry training, arms, and ammunition, the 2,300-strong brigade would ease the way for the massive fumigation of coca crops in Putumayo in southern Colombia. The remaining 26 percent of Plan Colombia was allocated to alternative development, assistance to displaced population and strengthening the rule of law and democracy. These socio-economic programs executed by USAID are also intended to ameliorate the consequences of militarily conceived and executed anti-drug policies.

Since 2000, the security focus of the aid package has been maintained; in any given year, between 68 and 75% of the aid has gone to the military and police. The U.S. budget for the 2006 fiscal year presented to Congress by President George W. Bush February 7, 2005, proposes to keep military counter-drug aid to Colombia almost unchanged, despite calls by some members of Congress to spend more on social programs. Social investment projects have taken a back seat, since the strengthening of state institutions and the counterinsurgency struggle have been seen as prerequisites for their success. Plan Colombia economic and social aid has been provided through the International Narcotics Control budget at the State Department, underscoring the aid's link to drug control objectives, which poses a significant paradox.

But while the composition of the aid has not changed, the counterinsurgency and/or counterterrorist objectives have become more and more explicit both in U.S. and Colombian policy. After 9/11, Colombia's guerrillas became "narco-terrorists," and the over-emphasis on a military response was reinforced with the authorization given by Congress and signed by President Bush in August 2002 (supplemental appropriations bill) to use counterdrug assets for counterterrorist purposes, reversing the Clinton executive order banning the sharing of non-drug intelligence.

Furthermore, President Álvaro Uribe Vélez (2002-2006) has wholeheartedly embraced the discourse of counterterrorism, implementing the aid package he inherited with a counterinsurgency logic. As the antiterrorist struggle took priority, coca came to be viewed solely as a source of financing for terrorism. Small growers' social and economic problems were given no further consideration. As a result, the Uribe government intensified fumigations, allowed the use of higher concentrations of the active herbicidal agent glyphosate and declared fumigation non-negotiable. Indeed, the fundamental U.S. drug control goal under Plan Colombia is to eradicate coca and opium poppy crops through police-led fumigation operations or aerial spraying of chemical herbicides. These efforts have been highly controversial because of the possible negative impacts of fumigation on the environment and on the health and welfare of the populations in areas that are sprayed. Despite these concerns—unlike in Perú and Bolivia where aerial spraying is prohibited—fumigation efforts in Colombia dramatically increased during the late 1990s. During 1994, 13,240.8 acres of coca were sprayed, increasing in 1999 to 113,400 acres. Under Plan Colombia the figure tripled to a record of 358,605.9 acres in 2003.

Aerial eradication has punished those who make up the weakest link in the drug production chain: the small coca growers. In June 2004, the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime-UNODC estimated that "93% of all coca fields [in Colombia] were small than 3 ha (8.1 acres), accounting for approximately 69% of the total cultivation." Additionally, the highest concentrations of coca crops are found in the poorest departments. Since the beginning of fumigation, the government's attitude toward small cultivators has been ambiguous. In the first place, Law 30 of 1986 specified that the cultivation of marijuana, coca, and opium poppies in excess of 20 plants was a crime. Law 599 of 2000, which revised Colombia's penal code, reaffirmed that growing these crops is illegal and increased the penalties for violations. This law makes criminals out of small peasants growing coca and poppies, placing them in the same legal category as large-scale traffickers, without considering the structural economic, social and political aspects that cause peasants to resort to illicit crops. In the second place, policy initiatives throughout the 1990s differentiated between "industrial"



From left top, clockwise: a boy on fumigated farm, fumigated heart of palm, la señora:devasted by fumigation, the arm of a sprayed woman.

or “commercial” production (areas as large as 300 hectares. (810 acres) or more, directly controlled by drug traffickers) and “small coca growers” or coca cultivators” (peasant and indigenous farmers cultivating coca on parcels of land between two and five hectares (5.4 and 13.5 acres). Thus, small coca growers were eligible for alternative development plans to substitute illicit crops.

Under the War on Drugs guidelines, alternative development programs are implemented only as compensation after fumigation and forced eradication. As such, they do not occupy a central place, either financially or politically, as a strategy to combat coca cultivation through the promotion of a comprehensive rural development plan. Consequently, a report from the United States’ Accounting Office on USAID’S alternative development activities in the Andean Region states that “alternative development interdiction and eradication efforts must be carefully coordinated to achieve mutually reinforcing benefits.” (US General Accounting Office Report on Drug Control, February 2002:2).

Along these lines, the place of alternative development in the

Colombian Government anti-drug strategy is also ambiguous: on the one hand it is part of the reduction of supply component, along with spraying, interdiction and strengthening of the military. On the other hand it is a component on its own that seeks to promote social development and the economic restructuring of an illicit economy into a licit one, aim that goes beyond just reducing the supply of drug to the United States.

Decisions that determine the *campesinos* crop substitution practices are made in accordance with global anti-drug strategies. An undemocratic and authoritarian framework is closing off the spaces for political participation only recently opened by the *campesinos cocaleros* or small coca growers. In its third report on Plan Colombia, the *Contraloría General de la República*, which is Colombia’s equivalent to the Government Accountability Office (the former General Accounting Office), stated that citizen participation and transparency were lacking in the control and oversight of Plan Colombia resources being channeled to alternative development in peasant communities. Although peasant participation in adopting devel-

opment projects is important for the political empowerment of communities, peasants also stated that they had not participated in choosing projects and characterized the process of project selection as weak. As a result, much of the development aid does not even directly reach the affected communities. (Contraloría General de la República, Julio de 2002: 47).

Fumigation efforts, which indiscriminately impact large-scale and small coca growers alike, increase local suspicion of the national government in areas where state presence has been historically weak. The lack of confidence in the government's promises also undermines the effectiveness of aerial eradication because farmers are reluctant to give up coca with no guarantees that something else will fill the economic void. The delegitimation of the State role is even more grave given the activities of non-state armed actors in the region and the degree to which they actually control territory. In effect, armed conflict legitimizes fumigation, which in turn erodes state credibility, first because alternative development projects have been destroyed by spraying and second because fumigation programs have generated forced displacement of families. However, Colombian law provides for aid to displaced persons only as a

result of armed conflict. The "criminal" status of fumigation victims makes them ineligible for these programs.

In addition, the Colombian government has reduced investment in alternative development and diverted funding from areas with illegal crops to areas that enjoy the most advantageous agro-ecological conditions and the least difficult access to agricultural support services due to the agro-industrial nature of the programs promoted. At the same time, USAID has increased international cooperation funds to sustain the alternative development projects located in marginal conflictive zones where illegal crops are grown. However, these programs cover only a subset of the small coca growers whose crops are targeted for fumigation because the ultimate aim of these alternative programs is still to reduce the number of acres planted in coca, complying with the measurement of success established by the U.S. State Department. Accordingly, the presence of drug crops in a municipality is an obstacle to benefiting not only from alternative development programs but from USAID's municipal governance programs, at the same time that it provides the rationale for extending the military's presence.

USAID reported that 61,368 acres of illicit crops had been manually eradicated by September 30, 2004. This achievement has not been

U.S. DRUG AND COCA ERADICATION POLICIES IN BOLIVIA

The 1980s brought us such things as big hair, baggy clothes, and the resurgence of both neon colors and the electric keyboard. It also brought us Reaganomics and a rambunctious First Lady who took up arms against the drug lords of the world with her tough stance on drugs. President Nixon in 1972 initially coined the phrase "War on Drugs," but it was the drug policies of the Reagan Administration and the preceding presidents, that have added billion dollar budgets to match the powerful rhetoric.

Since the 1980s billions of dollars have been pumped into the Andean region with the express purpose of curbing cocaine abuse in the United States through the eradication of coca in Latin America. Source eradication has been the method choice in confronting the U.S. drug problem since the 1980s. Andy Messing, spokesperson of the National Defense Council, demonstrates the oversimplification common in policy makers of the time: "Eradication is elegant, almost beautiful, in its simplicity. Without the wholesale cultivation of the coca plant there is no cocaine trade." However this simplification discounts the potential of this nutritious plant by equating it with one of its many derivatives. The World Health Organization and the United Nation have confirmed what indigenous peasants have consistently argued, that coca is neither addictive nor harmful. It is only when coca is processed with forty-one other chemicals that it becomes an addictive narcotic.

Leonida Vargas, a prominent *cocalera* leader in Bolivia, likes to use the example—just as grapes do not equal wine, neither does coca equal cocaine. Coca eradication policies are the manifestation of a misconceived meta-narrative ingrained in US policy that equates the coca plant with cocaine. In addition, coca eradication policies discount the cultural and economic importance of coca for Quechua, Aymara, and other Andean cultures as well as the potential benefits of the plant.

The implementation of these policies has overlooked the cultural significance of the coca leaf to indigenous. Coca has been culti-

vated in the region for use in traditional medicine, social interactions, spiritual rituals, and commercial trade, since the Incas. Coca is both integrated into both the cultural and economic lives of rural peasants. *Campesinos*, rural peasants, treat scrapes and cuts with coca leaves that aid in the healing process and provide a light anesthetic. In addition, millions of Quechua and Aymara Indians *mastica la coca*—chew on the coca leaves—on a daily basis to ward off fatigue, hunger, and thirst. And even more Bolivians drink coca tea to help with the high altitudes in the north. The indigenous peasants of Bolivia have become highly organized in response to what they see as a US threat to their cultural and economic survival through repressive policies implemented by the militarization of their communities, the forced eradication of their coca, and the abuse, physical and psychological, of their people.

Vargas lives in the village of Eterazama. She has never had running water or electricity. Her parents were Quechua and lived in the lowland jungles of the Chapare. They both chewed coca and grew coca on their land. After her father died when Leonida was only two, her mother raised six children by growing coca. Leonida herself used to have coca fields but through the eradication process this land has been reduced to only a small plot of land known as a *chaco*. Leonida has been instrumental in mobilizing peasant women in the Chapare in defense of coca and their land. She was the first female president of the Six Federations of Coca Growers of the Chapare, a position that she still holds today. She has organized protests and demonstrations in defense of coca, land, and Bolivian sovereignty, including a twenty-one day march from Cochabamba to La Paz. For Leonida, and the other *cocaleros*, coca represents the ancestry and the future of her culture.

U.S. involvement in Bolivia skyrocketed in 1985, during the worst economic crisis in Bolivia's history. At this time the Bolivian government accepted aid from the U.S. government and the

accorded its rightful importance in any evaluation of the efficiency of the aerial fumigation policy. Manual and gradual eradication has been a principal *campesino* demand since fumigations started. Thus, the political commitment to fumigation on the part of both governments has made failure impossible to consider. It has also precluded serious consideration of very different but more promising options such as a concerted effort at comprehensive rural development. On the other hand, as the Alternative Development Plan is seen as one of the social components in a larger effort to control the drug supply chain, its role in the Rural Development Program is limited to conjunctural activities that complement interdiction.

In order to evaluate the outcomes of this fumigation policy, it is worth to take into account the following recommendation of the Council on Foreign Relations Center for Preventive Action, in the report “*Andes 2020: A New Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region*”: “the sustainable success of aerial crop eradication efforts is undermined by structural problems of inequality, poverty, and politically disenfranchised rural populations in the Andes. Simply put, eradication will never be completely successful so long as there are poor people on the ground whose only viable

option to support themselves and their families is to grow coca or poppy ... Improving the legitimate economic opportunities of the rural poor will be a critical step toward redressing the structural problems that inhibit the efficacy of the current supply-side counternarcotics program” (Andes 2020 2004:20).

After six years of implementing Plan Colombia under a military and forced eradication policy, a question has to be posed: Is it time to consider returning to the original version of Plan Colombia as a policy of investment for social development, the reduction of violence and the construction of peace? In other words, it is imperative to tackle the structural causes that cause peasants to resort to illicit crops.

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World Bank in exchange for the implementation of neoliberal policies, such as open markets and privatization of state-run facilities. One of the most important laws to be passed with U.S. influence was Ley 1008 in 1988. This “U.S. law,” as it was dubbed (the original was in English and had to be translated), was the most sensitive and difficult law on coca ever passed in Bolivia’s history.

The law was the first major step toward complete coca eradication of the Chapare and was met with grassroots demonstrations against 1) the implicit degradation of the integrity of the coca plant and; 2) the US-funded militarization of the Chapare tropics to enforce this law. Peasants of the region have accused the military of rape, physical abuse, human rights violations, and corruption and, in response, have organized marches and demonstrations to protest these practices. Vargas comments: “We are organized, because we are traumatized.”

The cocaleros blame the United States for these injustices and see U.S. intervention as a form of imperialism designed to acculturate their indigenous society with the Western world. Evo Morales, a Bolivian congressman and former Bolivian presidential candidate, expresses the ironic truth of a U.S. drug war fought in Bolivia: “More Bolivians die every year in the coca conflict (proportionately to population) than U.S. citizens die from cocaine abuse... [For us] the remedy is worse than the disease.”

The United States has funded the Bolivian government with millions of dollars to support coca eradication policies as part of U.S. foreign policy concerning drugs. However, cocaine use in the United States remains unchanged. Source eradication policies are ineffective in several ways. First, supply will always match demand. Eradication in one area only means more production in another, called the “balloon effect” (if you squeeze on one area the other area inflates to compensate, leaving net production the same). Production in Peru, Bolivia, and Colombia fluctuate in relation to the U.S. presence at the time—the United States lacks the resources and

manpower to regulate the entire region. In addition, the pay-offs are minimal. An independent study completed in 1994 concluded that drug treatment and education in the United States yield returns that are 50 times greater than those of coca eradication. Instead of the United States spending \$7 billion a year on an ineffective international drug war, the country should use its technological and military capabilities to impose controls on its own borders, thereby targeting drug traffickers rather than coca farmers.

This misguided approach also overlooks the potential of coca as rehabilitative treatment. Preliminary studies have shown promising uses of coca tea in preventing cocaine addicts from falling back into addiction. Multiple cups of coca tea on a daily basis for three months have shown positive results as a treatment for heroin, morphine, alcohol, nicotine and chemical addictions. This new market for coca could contribute to a reduction in the level of drug addiction in the United States. More funding for this type of scientific research is needed, and for that, the current stigma must be dismantled.

Coca eradication policies do not make a great enough impact on drug trafficking to justify their social cost, specifically on the Bolivian poor and on indigenous cultures. Coca within its cultural context is a valuable resource, and one has to question whether the utter destruction of coca fields would be profoundly detrimental cultural and economic consequences for Andean people. What is needed are new policies that build the Bolivian economy by integrating the indigenous culture into the formation of U.S. drug policies, rather than trying to implement policies that run counter to it.

Michelle Garza is a joint concentrator at Harvard in Anthropology and Women’s Studies who is currently working on her honors thesis on women’s leadership in the coca movement. Her research in the Chapare region of Bolivia in the summer of 2004 was funded by a DRCLAS grant.

The Cuban Economy in the Twenty First From the Inside and Out

Jorge I. Domínguez, Omar Everleny Pérez Villanueva, Lorena Barbería (editors), *The Cuban Economy at the Start of the Twenty-First Century*, David Rockefeller Center Series on Latin American Studies, distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004, 390 pps.

A REVIEW BY PAUL HARE

The profession of an independent economist in 21st century Cuba is unusual. Like unofficial journalists, such economists are targets of government repression. Several of them were imprisoned in the March 2003 crackdown on the opposition. Twenty years in a primitive jail is a heavy price to pay for economic opinions.

The collection of essays edited by Jorge Domínguez, Omar Everleny and Lorena Barbería is particularly welcome to Cuba scholars and observers because the material is current and comprehensive. The book is a stimulating mixture of opinions of Cuban and non-Cuban experts on what happens and how in one of the world's most complex economic systems. It also helps us understand why the role of economists and sociologists in contemporary Cuba is so valuable. Both professions will have important roles in the future "batalla de ideas" that Cuba needs but does not have.

In a system in which economic information is strictly controlled and policy has lurched back and forth, it is not easy to produce objective analysis of the options. Statistics in Cuba—the lifeblood of a social scientist—are also not as straightforward as the outsider might assume. Fidel Castro himself loves statistics. In his December 2004 speech to the young Communists, he quotes 97 of them in a short section. But his government

does not like to publish statistics that cast the Revolution in a negative light. It restricts access to the Internet (e-mail is more widely available for hard currency) on the grounds that the government has the right to defend Cuba from enemy propaganda. The Cuban government does publish some statistics that seem accurate. However, I have met Cuban government ministers who seriously claim that unemployment is negligible and heading to zero. You receive a different answer if you ask those on the streets of a Cuban city during working hours. An official of an international NGO told me of one barrio in Havana where there were 5,000 youth who were neither in education nor employment.

Where there are difficulties about publishing the true figures they simply do not appear. No foreign exchange reserves are public knowledge. In December 2004, Planning Minister José Luis Rodríguez claimed 5% annual GDP growth but admitted this was based on the Cuban government's own formula, not that used by the rest of the world. On health statistics, analysts need to recognize that whatever the merits of Cuban medical system, all the statistics are provided by Cuban doctors, subject of course to government influence.

That said, much can be learned from economic developments in Cuba. Major adjustments have been made



after Cuba lost the largesse of the Soviet bloc. Perhaps surprisingly, the authors of the essays generally detect little strategic planning, although features like the dollarization of the economy (reversed in November 2004) and the development of new sectors like tourism and biotech have been important. Cuban economist Pedro Monreal mentions the 1950s Chevys as a monument to Cuban creativity. I would agree but also note that being an economist in Cuba is akin to experimenting in a modern car design center, with some of the best materials to work with, including diagnostic kits. Unfortunately the director of the center prefers the old model, even if it stops and stalls. He likes the manual windows and lack of AC. They are more predictable – and what you can't have you don't want.

Before reading the set of essays I jotted down what I see as the core principles of Fidel

Castro's economic policy:

- The economy serves the Revolution and control rather than the other way around.
- A loathing of consumerism, and visible inequalities in purchasing power. He dislikes what is happening in China. Hence he refuses to develop sectors like real estate, retail, automotive etc.
- The state should control all hard currency receipts derived from economic activity of Cubans and the dollar remittances from Cuban-American families.
- Individual Cubans do not need material motivation in the Cuban economy. They are entitled to education and health, but not material satisfaction. The scant attention to housing and public transport is one result.
- A reluctance to repay loans except under unavoidable pressure. He views the world's financial system for developing countries as unjust.
- A preference for the barter form of trade. This derives from largesse received during the Soviet era and can be seen in current relations with Venezuela and with others such as China
- Foreign trade and investment with countries that are not close revolutionary allies of Cuba spell vulnerability.

No wonder, as Jorge Domínguez says, Cuban "economists tear their vestments" in frustration. So do many other educated Cubans.

But the purpose of control is served. Key mechanisms of the current Cuban economy—multiple exchange rates, formation of state-sponsored oligopolies, systematic lawless behavior and corruption—are well documented in the book. One of the most important effects of these features is that there is virtually no ‘multiplier’ from dollars or other currencies in circulation. The philosophy of the state is that once used in a transaction the currency should be consigned to the central coffers (the ever more dominant role of the Central Bank). How they are then deployed is a political decision.

This book is a stimulating mixture of opinions of both Cubans and non-Cubans on what happens and how in one of the world's most complex economic systems.

One senses throughout these essays a tragic squandering of opportunities. Cuba is not a sun, sand and sugar economy. It has, as Monreal and Everleny observe, other assets like substantial nickel deposits and a well-trained, literate and disciplined workforce. Cuba is a fertile land that—with better technology and more owner-producers—could be rapidly transformed from a major food importer to a net exporter.

Cuban creativity and ability to survive is strong. But the essays by Mayra Espina Prieto and Viviana Togores point out the realities of the fading capacity of Cuban wages to meet even minimum needs. Hence, many turn to various illegal activities and have a desperate dependence on family remittances. Togores and Garcia conclude that monthly per capita income in Cuba at the end of the 1990s

could not meet basic food needs. Inequalities abound, as those who live in Cuban cities know. It is not just the access to dollars, or tourism tips. But there is systematic elitism—like special clinics, foreign trips—offered by the communist party and military to its own. Tourism apartheid is particularly distasteful. As Domínguez says, ‘to each according to his connections, from each according to his luck.’ Dollar bills or Chinese TVs are delivered to those who toe the line.

How does foreign investment fit in? Everleny notes the recent downward turn in new projects. I disagree that this

trend has been due to ‘the world economic crisis, the US blockade and the deteriorating relationship with the EU’ Yes, the EU took a stand on human rights, but I know of many commercial projects that were being pushed after this, but received no Cuban response. Fidel Castro wants enough FDI to fund his apparatus of control, to reward those in it and his education and health services. But no more. What foreign investment has been permitted is small for a country of Cuba’s size. Foreign joint ventures probably employ fewer than 200,000 people in total. Those foreign investors who do make money have to accept the political rules. They cannot contract staff directly but only through state agencies. And the party is never far away. One major investor I know has to contend with 27 Communist Party branch organizations in his plant. The

essay by Dwight Perkins compares Cuba to Vietnam and China. In Vietnam in particular the openings to outside investors were made much more enthusiastically and efficiently than by Cuba. The Vietnamese growth rate hardly dipped after the Soviet demise and exports increased 17 fold in 12 years.

Lorena Barberia’s chapter on Remittances to Cuba is a thought-provoking analysis. How can it be that after 46 years of Revolution, Cuba’s second largest source of hard currency comes from family members who send their gifts from an economy which is hostile to Cuba and whose

economy, according to the Cuban government is on the verge of collapse? How can it be that Fidel Castro allows some Cubans to receive such money when probably half of the population has to survive without it? The answer is that the arrangement is politically important for both the U.S. and Cuban governments. For the former it keeps the Diaspora in touch and fulfils a basic bridging need for family units. For the Cuban government it reinforces the dependency syndrome. Money Cubans receive should not be related to their own work efforts but should be something that can be cut off if the government so decides. And the dollars nearly all end up in Cuban government shops!

A final thought. The economists who research in Cuba are indeed part of a growing consensus about what needs to be done. They know that

Cuban independence does not need to be sacrificed if a strong, diversified economy is promoted and innovative ideas allowed to circulate. Crucially the Cuban individual with his education needs to be motivated to work for him or herself as well as the common good, for example by paying taxes. Many in the Cuban government, I believe, agree this is the way forward. Two who tried to show more flair than was acceptable were fired in 2004—Tourism Minister Ferradaz and Energy and Mining Minister Marcos Portal. They were managing the two leading economic sectors for foreign investment. It shows that even in official circles economics remains a frustrating and risky profession in 21st century Cuba.

Paul Hare was British Ambassador to Cuba from 2001-2004. The views he expresses here are personal. He read *Politics and Economics* at Oxford University and then qualified as a lawyer. After working for five years in the private sector he joined HM Diplomatic Service in 1978. He has also been posted at the EU delegation in Brussels, Lisbon, New York and Caracas.

COMING SOON

The David Rockefeller Center Series on Latin American Studies will publish: *Passing Lines, Immigration and Sexuality*, edited by Brad Epps, Keja Valens and Bill Johnson González; *Philanthropy and Social Change in Latin America*, edited by Cynthia Sanborn and Felipe Portocarrero; *Titu Cusi: A 16th Century Account of the Conquest* by Nicole Delia Legnani, and a revised edition of *Bitter Fruit*.

FTAA: The Big Enchilada?

Antoni Esteveadeoral, Dani Rodrik, Alan M. Taylor, and Andrés Velasco, *Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond*. David Rockefeller Center Series on Latin American Studies, distributed by Harvard University Press, 2004, 821 pages


A REVIEW BY KEVIN P. GALLAGHER

Today, two out of five people in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) live below the official World Bank poverty line of two dollars per day. Over the last two decades, the number of poor people in the region has increased in both absolute and relative terms.

What will be the impact of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) on economic development in the region? *Integrating the Americas: FTAA and Beyond* takes a look at the broad implications of the agreement.

Since 1980, LAC has been experimenting with a free trade model—rapid liberalization of trade, investment and domestic policies. Yet income growth in the region has been a mere one percent per annum. Between World War II and 1980—a period characterized by high levels of protectionism—average incomes grew by three percent a year.

The community on this issue is split on the effects of free trade (or more broadly “neoliberalism” as its called south of the US border) on development in the region. Some say the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s are to blame for the region’s return to slow growth and stalled progress on poverty and inequality. Others argue that the current situation is a result of a poorly executed and incomplete set of reforms, rather than the reforms themselves. Neither group argues that LAC, or any other region for that matter, can develop without integrating into the world economy. The real ques-



tions are how, how quickly and to what extent?

In 1994, Latin American nations proposed the FTAA, a NAFTA-like free trade agreement that would stretch from “C to shining C” (Canada to the tip of Chile). After ten years of talks, FTAA negotiations are at a standstill. The U.S. unwillingness to negotiate reductions in agricultural support and insistence on “WTO plus” (commitments that go much deeper than conventional trade agreements) concessions has been met with a stiff resistance in the negotiations led by MERCOSUR countries, notably Brazil.

The promotional blurb for this book asks the following question: “The payoffs to the strategy of liberalization, privatization, and openness have been meager and disappointing to date. Will the FTAA be able to reverse this and allow Latin America to reap the benefits of globalization?” In more than 800 pages, the 44 authors in this volume say yes. The volume is a must read for anyone interested or involved

in the development debates in LAC. It provides an essential overview of virtually all of the key issues involved in the FTAA discussions. Given current developments and the myriad studies already out there however, the authors present quite an optimistic vision of hemispheric trade that will raise the eyebrows of some readers.

The book’s overwhelming strength is in its interdisciplinary approach. Although each of the editors is an economist by training, the authors tackle the historical, political and economic questions surrounding hemispheric integration. It would be impossible to summarize this truly mammoth volume, so let me act as politicians do and give three bullet points:

1) “Trade” in the FTAA is really much more than trade. Integration in the region as proposed under the FTAA will not only encompass reductions in tariffs on trade flows> It would also cover investment and intellectual property rules, competition policy, subsidies, and quite possibly labor and environmental issues as well. Many of these issues have been major sticking points in global trade talks, but they are all on the menu at the FTAA and even propose to go deeper than global rules (thus the WTO plus tag).

Aaditya Matoo shows that services liberalization could be highly beneficial to the region. Indeed, the greatest benefit could be in liberalizing the movement of labor across the hemisphere. Although this

is a political non-starter in the US, it is important to point out that such liberalization could swamp out the benefits from all other proposed liberalizations in the hemisphere. Julian Clarke and Simon Evenett discuss the merits of competition policy negotiations as part of an FTAA. Although similar measures have been rejected in the global arena, these authors nevertheless show that the benefits could be quite high in LAC.

Perhaps most important finding is that by Mario Berrios and four others from the Inter-American Development Bank. Contrary to the popular misconception that US subsidies are to blame for agricultural distortions in the world economy, like most other rigorous studies, the IDB team finds that reducing US agricultural subsidies will *not* alleviate the problem of agricultural distortions in the region. The authors show that tariffs are more the culprit (though such tariffs may be necessary to hold off dumping from the United States).

2) Integration will increase trade and investment flows, and maybe growth.

Drawing on some of the more state of the art statistical techniques, authors in this volume unequivocally show that an FTAA will increase trade and investment flows in LAC. Esteveadeoral and Robertson find that most LAC countries will experience increases in trade between 20 and 60 percent, though most of those increases will be in imports.

Levy Yeyati et al., estimate that liberalizing investment will increase flows of foreign direct investment by 27 percent. The authors are not unanimous that the predicted increases in trade and investment will automatically lead to growth and reductions in income inequality. Other authors in the volume argue that increases in foreign portfolio investment will not increase volatility in such markets—a phenomenon that has plagued the region for decades.

Although the reallocation of goods and services based on integration will lead to efficiency and productivity gains, the authors in the volume are not unanimous about whether it will lead to growth and a redistribution of incomes.

3) Negotiating an FTAA won't be easy. Several of the authors do a superb job of outlining the political economy of the FTAA negotiations. Coatsworth and Williamson show

that high tariffs have long been the norm in the region, leading other authors in the volume to note that persuading the beneficiaries of those protections to move toward liberalization could be a daunting task.

Destler argues that the same problem lies in the United States., where mobilized textiles and agricultural interests work hard to guard their protections. What's more, the economic benefits to the United States may not be enough to create the kind of political constituency for an agreement. NAFTA was already the big enchilada—more than 80 percent of all hemispheric trade occurs in the NAFTA region. According to the U.S. government, NAFTA only increased US GDP by one quarter of one percent over eight years (CAFTA is predicted to yield 1/100th of one percent growth).

Numerous other articles also show that highly contentious issues like labor and human rights and environmen-

tal protection are bound to muddy the waters even more.

For all the comprehensiveness of this book, gaps remain. Perhaps the most glaring is the lack of analysis of the period ranging from 1950 to the present. Split in two (1950 to 1980 and 1980 to 2004), each sub-period achieved numerous successes and failures. What worked and what didn't? To what extent did deep integration over the past twenty years make the region better off? Did the very policies that will be deepened under an FTAA lead to slow growth in the 1980s and 1990s? The volume's authors argue that changing investment rules will not increase volatility in the region, but that's exactly what happened in the 1990s. Why would an FTAA be different?

Little attention is also paid to the asymmetries between the United States and the rest of the countries in the region. The United States already

accounts for 80 percent of all economic activity in the region, has strong institutions, educational systems and safety nets to smooth trade policy transitions. Prominent economists argue that developing countries such as those in LAC need to maintain the policy space to develop similar institutions and that WTO plus arrangements make it difficult to instate effective development policy. In the volume, only Bustillo and Ocampo explicitly deal with this question, arguing that equal rules for unequal partners become unequal rules.

In spite of these shortcomings, the book is an ambitious undertaking that demands a close read. It will soon become a reference point for academic and policy debates alike.

Kevin P. Gallagher is Assistant Professor of International Relations at Boston University and author of *Free Trade and the Environment: Mexico, NAFTA, and Beyond* (Stanford, 2004).

Memories and Demons: A Look at Argentina's Toba

Gastón R. Gordillo, *Landscapes of Devils, Tensions of Place and Memory in the Argentinean Chaco*, Duke University Press, Durham & London 2004, 296 pages.

A REVIEW BY ANGELES MASE

Gastón R. Gordillo's portrayal of the Toba aborigines population from the *Gran Chaco* is a deep and thoughtful insight into the minds of the men and women of that region and the memories and demons that make up their world today.

This journey to the land of the Toba, into the western Argentinean Chaco, limited by Paraguay and Bolivia to the north, unravels how the forest-


bush came to be seen in the eyes of the Toba as the result of "a complex network of practices and memories."

The spatial definition of the *bush* is simultaneous to the actual incorporation of the autonomous Toba within the Argentine nation-state in the early 20th century. This fact provides the context for Gordillo, former DRCLAS de Fortabat Visiting Scholar

(2000-2001), to investigate this entanglement of space, history and subjectivity that helped define the Toba population as they are today.

Landscapes of Devils is the product of Gordillo's extensive fieldwork and the result of direct memories of many Toba who lived in "ancient times."

By giving detailed accounts of the components that make up the bush—the impenetrable for-



est of western Chaco—Gordillo is able to portray the contradictions that helped define the modern Toba. His description of the Toba's seasonal work at the sugar plantations and the foraging that takes place within the forest, reinforces the eternal contradiction faced by the Toba when it comes to defining their dependency and relationship with the outside world.

Part of the Toba's contradictory experience is culturally expressed by the existence of devils or evil spirits that acquire different features in different places, which would explain how the same spirit that would kill in the plantation would have healing powers in the bush.

Gordillo demonstrates the embedded relationship between the Toba and their geography through his accounts of people's social, cultural and political behavior. Through his description of the way the Toba interacted with the Argentine Army at the beginning of the 20th century, their work at the sugar plantations, their time at

the Anglican missions and their relationship with political figures during Carlos S. Menem's presidency in the 1990s, the author gives us a detailed view of the different political and economic settings that have helped to define the Toba.

The use of everyday stories told by the "ancient ones," those who lived at the time of the Chaco War (in the 30s) or worked in the plantations or lived at the missions, gives a detailed description of the relationship that the Toba have with their environment.

It is precisely in these contradictions, implicit in the social memory that the Toba have of the bush and life within and outside of those limits, that Gordillo finds the driving force of his book, which enables us to see the different patterns that have defined these people's lives through time. The book is vivid, although sometimes chaotic in the wealth of information that Gordillo presents.

Gordillo's description of Toba suffering at the hands of

the state or in the hands of their patron—employer—in the sugar fields allows us to see how the memory of these events are deeply related to the Toba's perception of the bush as a safe haven from the outside world.

While Gordillo's account of the morally strict life at the Anglican Mission or the exploitation at the sugar plantations introduces the reader to the suffering of the Toba in the outside world, it also gives way to the description of the forest as a place of resilience, where the tribe can counteract all the threats of dominance, terror and poverty.

On the other hand, while showing the continual contrast that set Toba apart from the rest of the world, Gordillo does not overlook the constant cross referencing by the Toba with the outside world. Gordillo goes as far as to show how at the time of the Argentine military dictatorship in the 1970s, the Tobas were using the term "disappeared," generally used in regard to those who were

made to disappear by the government, to characterize Toba who went to the outside world, but never returned.

In his book, Gordillo sets out to support the premise that "places are produced in tension with other geographies and that these tensions are made tangible through the spatialization of memory." It is precisely in his nuanced analysis of Toba experiences that Gordillo is able to sustain such an idea. His detailed accounts of the geographical changes of the Pilcomayo River; the new boundaries resulting of the Chaco War in the 1930s; the coming and going of different types of labor in the sugar plantations, among others, have helped define the spatial composition of the Toba and have given us a closer look into the land of Toba spirits.

Ángeles Mase is an Argentine journalist who recently moved back to Buenos Aires after living in the United States for five years. She has an MS in Journalism from Columbia University, New York.

Education Policy in Latin America: Process, Strategic Choice and Success

Merilee S. Grindle, *Despite the Odds: The Contentious Politics of Education Reform*. Princeton University Press, 2004, 257 pages

A REVIEW BY EILEEN O'CONNOR

In the 1990s, education policy in Latin America cried out for reform. Although literacy rates and access to education in Latin America had risen in previous decades, education reform became part of broader political projects to modernize the economy and increase civil welfare.

In *Despite the Odds: The Contentious Politics of Education Reform*, Merilee

S. Grindle uses five cases of education reform in Latin America to assess existing hypotheses about the success of education reforms. Grindle, Edward S. Mason Professor of International Development at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, counters the popular theory that successful reform is tied to economic patterns or related to electoral cycles and governing condi-

tions. *Despite the Odds* posits that policy makers concerned with education as part of broader political agendas give birth to reform initiatives and that the strategic choices both advocates and opponents make throughout the process of design, adoption, and implementation predict their long-term success and sustainability, even amidst contention.

Grindle's focus on 1990s



education reforms is distinctive. In previous decades education reforms had sought to increase access to education, while at the end of the millennium the salient goal was quality improvement. Enhancing education entailed an increase in accountability for management and utilization of resources; this implied the possibility of losing jobs and control over budgets and the certainty that the government would be responsible for more rather than less. Thus these reforms were contentious indeed. Implementing them necessitated more than perfunctory signatures on paper, but rather long processes of activities and decisions eventually affecting local classrooms. Since quality reform did not produce quick results, generating and maintaining public interest was a challenge. As Grindle explains, "the education reforms of the 1990s were so complex and politically contentious that it was reasonable to assume they would fail to be adopted, implemented and sustained." Nevertheless, at least 12 Latin American countries implemented controversial education policy changes in the 1990s. Despite mobilized opposition, bitter debates and resistant bureaucracies, politicians supported many unpopular initiatives. How can political theorists account for such reforms that succeed when the political cards are stacked against them?

"Clues to the conundrum of policy change despite the odds," Grindle believes, "lie in an analysis of the political process of reform." Her book focuses on the way in which reforms are introduced, designed, approved and implemented in an analysis of five education reform cases in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico,

Nicaragua and the state of Minas Gerais, Brazil to explain how Latin American education reformers in the 1990s created conditions under which divisive education policies could be introduced and sustained.

Grindle's choice of cases lends insight into particular types of education reform. In Minas Gerais, Nicaragua and Mexico reform was regarded as structural change that threatened the interests and influence of those with institutional power. The relatively successful implementation of these reforms dramatically

altered the dynamics of decision making about education. Bolivia represents comprehensive reform that both updated power structures and focused seriously on pedagogy, including the unprecedented introduction of bilingual education. Grindle uses this case to explore how educational reforms can be brought to the classroom under considerable opposition. Ecuador's attempts at education reform failed, and thus Grindle provides the example of "a counterpoint to the other cases in demonstrating some of the pathologies that inhibit education reform and in suggesting how reformers sometimes make strategic errors as they attempt to advance their visions of change."

Despite the Odds offers a unique focus on five policy arenas in which institutions, interests and reformers strategically interact: agenda setting, design, adoption, implementation and sustainability. Grindle makes the interesting observa-

tion that the initial stages of reform represented an opportunity for reformers to limit the power of opponents, most notably unions, in preparation for the more public arenas of adoption, implementation and sustainability. She also identifies a trend in the emergence of new stakeholders and alliances as a result of the process of sustaining new initiatives.

Grindle's treatment of the cases provides good evidence that neither political interests nor institutions fully account for policy reforms that occur despite political odds. Yet one

limitation of her analysis is its small scope—five Latin American cases that occurred in the 90s—which leaves questions about the applicability of her results on a broader scale. Are the observations in *Despite the Odds* particular to time and place? Would a different set of Latin American countries in the 1990s have produced different results? To what extent can her observations be extended to other analyses of policy reform in the developing world? And how much can the lessons learned from education reform teach us about other social sector changes?

Grindle herself grants that other cases could have been chosen and encourages further study. Her focus on Latin America's most recent education reforms contributes insights for the future. "I hope that by providing a general framework for understanding the politics of reform, others might be encouraged to test it using alternative experiences."

Despite the Odds diverges

from common political economy models that focus on institutions and interests as key players in the politics of reform and captures the factors that shape reforms and response to policy change. Grindle argues that "reform initiatives are dynamic political processes that unfold over time, as complex chains of decisions subject to interaction of proponents and opponents in institutional contexts sometimes subject to alteration." Evidence from the five case studies proves this point, demonstrating, for example, how alliances among teachers' unions and

political parties in Latin America sometimes aided unions in obstructing change, but in other cases prevented them from acting against reforms.

Grindle emphasizes the fragility of reforms in her analysis of those most opposed to change, teachers' unions. *Despite the Odds* takes on the complex topic of conflict between teachers' unions and education reformers in Latin America. The dynamics of contestation over reforms in the five case studies leads to observation of divergent values and ideas about education and egalitarian participation among different tiers of Latin American society, where "the gulf between reformer and unions was wide and deep." Reformers criticized union patronage, corruption and apathy towards improvements as the cause of education crisis. Union leaders decried poor salaries, the irrelevance and failure of past reforms, and their exclusion from reform dialogue. This conflict, Grindle argues, was

Grindle examines five policy arenas of educational reform in which institutions, interests and reforms intersect: agenda setting, design, adoption, implementation and sustainability.

critical to the fate of education reform in Latin America.

Grindle's extensive look at the long-term outcomes of reform provides valuable insights into how new contentions emerged long after education reforms had been designed and agreed upon. Her findings also sound a warning about an uncertain future for education reform in Latin America if not enough heed is paid to union agency and if parents, teachers, administrators and politicians are not courted to the side of reforms.

Indeed, after the introduction of reforms, much contention was likely to play out in local government and school communities. Grindle emphasizes how reform policies have

introduced new voices into public debates about education and makes an interesting case for the influence of grassroots support for reform: although Grindle's examples reveal that specific education reform processes were elite projects emerging from centers of decision-making power, she also notes that the implementation of reforms meant everyday citizens could become more politically involved and express their opinions about the costs and benefits of change. Grindle's analyses of reform in Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua and Minas Gerais challenge future reformers to find better means of engaging parents, teachers and communities in efforts to improve education

quality. Grindle points out that in the wake of the political trend towards greater democratization in Latin America, involving the general population in the reform process could mitigate the disruption to the reform process caused by unrest over economic and social disparities.

Nevertheless, *Despite the Odds* does not present a definitive equation for successful education reform. Rather, this innovative work offers a theory of how reform outcomes are shaped, which Grindle dubs the "strategic choice approach": the process through which reforms are designed, adopted, implemented and sustained and the strategic choices made by reform advocates and oppo-

nents. Her work reveals reform to be a fluid process in which sources of support and opportunity vary with each policy step and in which the choices reformers make at each point can potentially enhance or impede their success. *Despite the Odds* can be a useful tool for future reformers, as its lessons from the field about engaging citizen interest and garnering participation are pertinent to a new era of increased citizen demands for democratic accountability and more effective social services.

Eileen O'Connor, a former DRCLAS publications intern, studied Romance Languages and Literatures at Harvard College. She has taught high school Spanish and ESL to adult and children Latin American immigrants.

A Diplomatic, Unilateral "War"?

Philip B. Heymann, *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security: Winning Without War*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and London, England, 2003, 210 pages

A REVIEW BY AMANDA F. AUSTIN


Philip B. Heymann, the James Barr Ames Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, analyzes the domestic and foreign policy aftermath of September 11, 2001 in this insightful book. Heymann, formerly U.S. Deputy Attorney General in the Clinton Administration and Acting Administrator of the United States' State Department's Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, is definitely qualified to scrutinize U.S. strategy in its struggle against terrorist forces. His scrutiny, while given with a sense of urgency, is able to deftly consider different perspectives of the ramifications of U.S. policy, including how the U.S. stance is alienating many of its

allies from Latin America and beyond.

Terrorism, Freedom and Security takes issue with the Bush administration's declaration of a "war on terrorism" after the September 11th attacks. Although acutely aware of the world-changing events of that day, Heymann asserts that a proclamation of war (albeit informal and without Congress's official declaration) did not have to be an essential outcome. This "war," as it was, took on many different forms: a war against al Qaeda, a war against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, and eventually, a war against Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq. Heymann argues in part

that the declaration of war against al Qaeda gave too much credence to the terrorist group — war is a term usually reserved for intercountry conflicts — and therefore, gave "undeserved dignity to [the U.S.'s] opponents."

Furthermore, Heymann believes that the extent of the United States' aggressive military exercises will be detrimental to the country in the long term—partly by ostracizing the U.S. in the global community and also by not truly addressing the problem at hand. Pushing aside the rhetoric of war that pervades the mass media and popular culture, Heymann delves into investigating the significance



of the declared "war" against al Qaeda and terrorism. The author expresses his unease about U.S. engagement in a war against an enemy whose resources, capability and

future is very unknown. While the United States in the past has declared war on abstract concepts such as drugs, it rarely, if ever, has declared “war” on a foreign non-state group or a concept such as terrorism. Rather than let the military play the dominant role in combating terrorism, Heymann would rather utilize diplomatic strategy and multilateral alliances to prevent future terrorist acts.

Throughout *Terrorism, Freedom and Security*, Heymann

mann argues that the Bush administration’s propensity to act unilaterally in its fight against terrorism only further harms the global reputation of the United States. Already, according to Heymann, the United States is often the “scapegoat” for many of the problems in the Middle East stemming from external pressure. Worsening the situation is the fact that the U.S. has essentially committed itself to reducing the sovereignty of any country that houses al

of certain persons is almost inescapable in an effective post-September 11th terrorism deterrence plan. Heymann believes in the importance of open and honest dialogue regarding the maintenance of civil liberties, accepting that the situation necessitates a delicate balancing act.

One of the strengths of *Terrorism, Freedom and Security* is that Heymann does not try to place the problems of today into the framework of yesterday’s solutions nor does he

2003 publication date—its absence makes the foresight displayed by Heymann all the more striking. Over the past two years, the world has seen many of Heymann’s predictions come true: the war on terrorism is lingering; insurgents are still powerful; and the United States’ global reputation has suffered due to its perceived disregard for civil liberties (i.e. the Abu Ghraib scandal, friendly fire incidents, interrogation techniques, etc.). The lack of multilateral support and diplomatic overtures has seemingly isolated the United States from many of its former allies and it is uncertain how pervasive terrorists cells continue to exist.

Many have thought, including Heymann, that there must be another way to approach the post-September 11th terrorist threat — *Terrorism, Freedom, and Security* provides some feasible options for this divergent path.

Amanda F. Austin is in her final year at Harvard Law School. She has been an intern in the publications department of DRCLAS for the past five years.

In Latin America and elsewhere, resentment against the United States could lead to decreased intelligence gathering—with direct and adverse impact on U.S. anti-terrorist efforts.

offers a well-delineated set of solutions to combat the problem of terrorism against the United States. Heymann lays out a 5-pronged plan which emphasizes the importance of: decreasing the anti-U.S. fervor of terrorists; tangibly deterring terrorist threats; eliminating access to vulnerable U.S. interests; more efficient intelligence operations; and the disruption of the terrorists’ activities. The role of force is not completely absent in Heymann’s plan—however, he firmly believes that the United States must obtain “extensive international cooperation” without military coercion. The United States arguably has always been somewhat of a maverick in regards to its foreign policy—evidenced by its reticence to be under the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, a court of last resort meant to prosecute crimes against humanity, genocide, and crimes of war. Indeed, as historically the case in Latin America, U.S. policies and action are often construed as arrogant and selfish. Hey-

mann argues that the Bush administration’s propensity to act unilaterally in its fight against terrorism only further harms the global reputation of the United States. Already, according to Heymann, the United States is often the “scapegoat” for many of the problems in the Middle East stemming from external pressure. Worsening the situation is the fact that the U.S. has essentially committed itself to reducing the sovereignty of any country that houses al

Qaeda—certainly a stance some in the international community would find intimidating. Heymann notes that while military action, such as in Afghanistan, is necessary at times—there is a limit to the usefulness of aggression. While the current administration may be hoping that America is viewed as a “benevolent superpower,” Heymann is fairly sure that this will not happen and resentment will grow from U.S. behavior.

While the resentment alone may not be detrimental to the United States per se, Heymann notes that its effects include decreased intelligence gathering from essential countries and increased incentive for harboring terrorists—direct and adverse impacts on the U.S. struggle against terrorism.

Heymann observes how even a plan rooted in multilateralism, as his own, can disintegrate into a system that cultivates undemocratic values and the loss of civil liberties. The increased need for intelligence gathering and profiling

paint with a broad brush in his analysis. He does not contend that his ideas are foolproof. Instead, he offers them as alternatives to the current policy. He accepts that the United States cannot suppress other countries into submission, cannot rely on unilateral efforts and cannot hide behind its military. While the U.S. invasion of Iraq is not discussed heavily in this book—perhaps due to its late

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
Recently Published

Books Recently Published by Faculty, Visiting Scholars and Others Associated with the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies



Antonius C. G. M. Robben
Political Violence and Trauma in Argentina
University of Pennsylvania Press

Robben investigates political violence and cultural warfare in Argentina.




Peter Winn
Victims of the Chilean Miracle
Duke University Press

Winn investigates the impact of Chilean economic transformations on the labor market.



Jeffrey Davidow
The U.S. and Mexico: The Bear and the Porcupine
Markus Wiener Publishers

The former U.S. ambassador to Mexico discusses his experiences and Mexican foreign policy.




Haroldo Dilla
Globalización e Intermediación Urbana en América Latina
FLACSO

Cuban sociologist Haroldo Dilla, examines the impact of globalization on urban issues.




Jorge I. Domínguez and Michael Shifter
Constructing Democratic Governance in Latin America
John Hopkins University Press

Divided into two parts (Themes and Issues, and Country Studies), this book details the democratic governments of Latin America.




Cristina Rojas & Judy Meltzer
Elusive Peace
Palgrave Macmillan

This book investigates the past 40 years of conflict and resolution in Colombia and discusses U.S. foreign policy in the region.



Jody Heymann
Global Inequalities at Work
Oxford University Press

This book analyzes effects of occupations around the world; including the influence of working conditions on communities.




Sanjeev Khagram
Dams and Development
Cornell University Press

Khagram focuses on the significance of dam development and how the concept of appropriate development has changed.



Jorge I. Domínguez and Chappell Lawson
Mexico's Pivotal Democratic Election
Stanford University Press

This book analyzes the changing voter dynamics during the 2000 Mexican presidential contest.



Kenneth Maxwell
Conflicts and Conspiracies
Routledge

This book analyzes Brazil and Portugal from 1750-1808. Portuguese title is *A Devassa da Devassa*.




Todd A. Eisenstadt
Courting Democracy in Mexico
Cambridge University Press

This book investigates electoral courts and their use during Mexico's transition to democracy.




Francisco A. Ortega
La irrupción de lo impensado
cuaderno pensar en público

This book is an examination of the cultural and philosophical impact of Michel de Certeau.



John A. Quelch and Rohit Deshpande
The Global Market
Jossey-Bass

Harvard Business School professors discuss executives' experiences and problems in the global economy.



Jeffrey Quilter
Cobble Circles and Standing Stones
University of Iowa Press

Quilter writes about archaeological field work in Costa Rica and the community's connection to the site.



Ana María Bidegain
Historia del Cristianismo en Colombia
Taurus Historia

Comprised of 12 articles, this book chronicles the history of Christianity in Colombia.

BOOKS: SHORT TAKES

While we would love to review every single book published by a DRCLAS or Harvard affiliate that has to do with Latin America, Latino issues or Spain and Portugal, space does not permit it. Some of the books here will be reviewed in the Fall issue of *ReVista*, but we hope that these short takes will help inform our readers about new and interesting books.

Books for consideration in this section do not have to focus entirely on the region. For example, a book on trade that looks at the entire world, but considers Latin America would be welcome. Submissions should include the author's or editor's relationship to Harvard and/or DRCLAS. Please contact <jerlick@fas.harvard.edu>.

New Executive Director

Biorn Maybury-Lewis

BY JUNE CAROLYN ERLICK

Biorn Maybury-Lewis made his first trip to Latin America when he was only an infant. Brazilian Air Force pilots left him and his anthropologist parents in the middle of the central highlands of Brazil's vast interior, quickly taking off in their small aircraft before the local Brazilian indigenous people — the Shavante — showed up. The baby carried on his mother's hips in an Indian-style sling might never have dreamed that his future would lead him to his new job as executive director of Harvard's David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies (DRCLAS).

"Biorn Maybury-Lewis combines success as an academic administrator with a scholar's deep knowledge of Latin America," observes DRCLAS Director John H. Coatsworth, who is also Monroe Gutman Professor of Latin American Affairs. "With his fluent Portuguese and Spanish — and his extensive experience living and working in Brazil — he will be especially helpful as the Center deepens its presence in the region with the opening of offices in Mexico City and São Paulo."

Maybury-Lewis (Harvard '80), obtained his doctorate at Columbia in political science, never forgetting Brazil. He extensively revised his Ph.D. thesis, "The Politics of the Possible: The Growth and Political Development of the Brazilian Rural Workers' Union Movement, 1964–1985," transforming it into a book that Temple University Press published in 1994.

He has combined a career



in teaching, research, and leading expeditions into the Brazilian interior with more recent experience as a senior level college administrator in Florida. He co-founded a graduate program while serving as director of graduate programs at International Fine Arts College in Miami. He later chaired the Social Sciences Department at Miami-Dade College's North Campus. And in the past two years, as founding dean of academic affairs at Digital Media Arts College in Boca Raton, he launched undergraduate and graduate fine arts programs in the relatively new fields of graphic design and computer animation.

"I am committed to innovative programs in higher education and diversity within the educational community. This is precisely what the David Rockefeller Center has dedicated itself to since its founding while at the same time becoming recognized as the premiere Latin American Studies institute in the country," said Maybury-Lewis. "It will be

a wonderful challenge to help Dr. Coatsworth, his excellent staff, and his distinguished colleagues make the programs at DRCLAS as creative in their second decade as they were in their first."

Maybury-Lewis has taught at several Brazilian universities, as well as at the Boston campus of Springfield College where he taught students how to conduct research and design community programs for disadvantaged people in the Greater Boston area. He has also served as a Latin Americanist researcher at the University of Miami and as planning and development coordinator at the Brazilian Immigrant Center in Allston, helping this non-profit organization to fundraise, create an English as a Second Language Program, and to help Brazilians who walked into the Center.

He remembers especially fondly his two years as a social science professor and researcher at the University of Amazonas at its beautifully designed campus just outside of Manaus set in hundreds of acres of virgin rain forest. Maybury-Lewis remembers the monkey troupes and individual sloths that inhabited the trees surrounding his building, as well as the occasional 10 to 15 foot anaconda that would appear on the road to the campus during the rainy season. At night, moths and butterflies the size of baseball mitts would alight on the windows outside his office as he and his colleagues wrote up their research.

From Boston to Brazil, Maybury-Lewis has concerned himself with the disadvantaged and development issues. Collaborating with Brazil's University of Amazonas, he coordinated a multi-year research project on the impact of modernization and development on peasant populations living along the Amazon River and the resulting Amazonian urbanization trends.

Maybury-Lewis is also a consultant to Cultural Survival, Inc., a non-profit organization defending the rights of indigenous peoples around the world. His parents founded Cultural Survival in 1972. Dr. David Maybury-Lewis, Edward C. Henderson Research Professor at Harvard, and his mother, Pia Maybury-Lewis, a nutritionist by training, are long time researchers specializing in Latin American studies.

Biorn Maybury-Lewis speaks English, Portuguese, Spanish, and Danish, along with a smattering of French and Japanese. He may have forgotten his Shavante, the language he first heard as a child in Central Brazil, but he has never forgotten Latin America's hinterlands. "Brazil is where my heart is, in many ways, and Cambridge is where I grew up and went to school. As executive director of DRCLAS, I look forward to helping bring these two worlds closer together."

June Carolyn Erlick, DRCLAS publications director, is the author of *Disappeared, A Journalist Silenced* (Seal Press, 2004). An earlier version of this article appeared in the Harvard Gazette.

DRCLAS and IDB Launch Book Series

BY STEVE REIFENBERG

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and DRCLAS have signed an agreement to create the "Latin American Development Series," a peer-reviewed English-language books series on Latin American issues, along with a commitment to also co-publish books in Spanish.

"This partnership between Harvard University and the Inter-American Development Bank to publish their best works on development in Latin America and the Caribbean is a very promising initiative," said Mirna Liévano de Marques, the IDB's External

Relations Advisor. "Harvard's academic prestige and the Bank's extensive knowledge of Latin America as the largest regional financial institution will be mutually enriching."

"We are convinced that this co-publishing agreement will make a significant contribution to the literature on social and economic progress in the region," she added. "The series should prove useful to a wide range of audiences, from policymakers and politicians, think tanks, economists and academicians to journalists and civil society, as well as the development community in general."

Harvard University Press will distribute the IDB-DRCLAS Series, as it does the David Rockefeller Center Series on Latin American Studies. The IDB and DRCLAS also plan to co-publish a number of original Spanish-language books, as well as translate and publish English-language books into Spanish or Portuguese. Furthermore, the IDB will also translate two or three articles from each publication of *ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America*. As part of this agreement, the IDB may also choose to post articles from *ReVista* on its website.

"We hope that this collaborative effort between the IDB and DRCLAS will have an enormous impact in Latin America and the Caribbean by disseminating the most relevant work from each institution in a more effective way," said DRCLAS Director John Coatsworth. "This partnership will also help expand the DRCLAS book series, the majority titles to date that have been in English, into a wider audience of Spanish and Portuguese readers."

Steve Reifenberg is the director of the DRCLAS Regional Office in Santiago, Chile.

Adiós 61 Kirkland

BY JASON ASLAKSON

For the past eight years, the David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies has made its home at 61 Kirkland Street. Countless film screenings, celebrations and round-table discussions featuring heads of state, dignitaries and world renowned scholars have taken place in the building whose address has become synonymous with DRCLAS. This August, DRCLAS will be leaving its home at 61 Kirkland and beginning a new chapter in its life by returning to its roots. DRCLAS is relocating to the newly constructed Center for Government and International Studies (CGIS). CGIS stands adjacent to Coolidge Hall, the building in which DRCLAS was founded and operated prior to its move to 61 Kirkland Street.

DRCLAS Executive Direc-

tor Biorn Maybury-Lewis observed, "Though everyone understandably views most moves with some trepidation, DRCLAS's impending transfer to the CGIS building offers us a number of important advantages. We'll move from the edge of Harvard's campus closer to its center. We'll enjoy the benefits of working in a reasonably large space within a new building with good facilities for our dynamic conference, seminar, panel, and guest speaker series. And the grouping together of Harvard's centers at CGIS will offer the University community quite literally a one-stop opportunity to learn about Harvard's expertise and activities in a wide range of geographical and thematic areas."

The goal of the new com-

plex, as stated on the CGIS project web site, is "to unite members of the Government Department in a single location alongside the research centers in a location on campus central to other related social sciences programs," including the Anthropology and Sociology Departments, as well as the Center for European Studies on Kirkland Street and the Peabody Museum and Departments of East Asian Languages and Civilizations and Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations on Divinity Avenue.

Members of the DRCLAS staff expressed excitement about the new CGIS complex. "Moving to the new CGIS building will put DRCLAS in a more central location with increased visibility, which is fantastic," DRCLAS Student Services Coordinator Erin Goodman remarked, observing, "This will afford busy students a shorter walk to the Center and the ability to go from 'Japan' to 'Latin America' in a few minutes. The move also allows the Center

to collaborate on student activities and events with other area studies centers located in the building."

Increased collaboration will hopefully directly affect the quality of the student experience at Harvard in relation to international studies. Students and scholars will encounter new opportunities to work with the regional centers at CGIS to gain hands-on experience in Latin America or other parts of the world. Maybury-Lewis skillfully summarized the CGIS move and the promise that it holds for DRCLAS: "We trust that this proximity to our colleagues in the other centers will enhance the University's effort to become a truly global institution: with students, faculty, alumni, and staff better informed and inspired about what Harvard is doing around the world."

Jason Aslakson is the DRCLAS Information Technology and Operations Coordinator.

International Symposium in Puebla

El Quijote desde América

BY MARY M. GAYLORD

It is likely that Don Quijote first reached the Western hemisphere—in what was, at the time, lightning speed—as a stowaway. On September 28, 1605, Franciscan commissioners of the Inquisition at San Juan de Ulúa discovered the book *Historia del Ingenioso Hidalgo don Quijote de la Mancha* in the possession of several travelers, including one Alonso de Dassa, who declared he had brought the book along for his own amusement on the long transatlantic voyage, and Gaspar de Maya, captain of *La Encarnación*. Shipments of Cervantes' instant best-seller left Spain for Mexico and Cartagena in the spring and early summer of 1605, just months after its publication in Madrid. In 1608, a copy would be found among the belongings of Mateo Alemán, author of the *Guzmán de Alfarache* (1599, 1604), who at sixty had finally succeeded in making his way to the New World. Although

Cervantes' American dream was to remain unrealized, *Don Quijote*, soon imported in quantity to American markets, would find an eager readership in Mexico, Peru and elsewhere. Along with Alemán's picaresque saga, Cervantes' burlesque history of a self-appointed righter of wrongs would reshape colonial society's taste for prose fiction, as Irving Leonard has shown in *Books of the Brave* (Harvard University Press, 1949; University of California Press, 1992).

In the four centuries since its initial happenstance arrival, Cervantes' great book, often called the first modern novel, has had a particularly profound and lasting influence on Spanish-American and Anglo-American literature, as well as a vigorous presence in the writings of North- and South-American literary scholars. What could be more fitting, in the light of its American sojourns, than to celebrate the 400th birthday of this universal



classic of world literature in and from the Americas? These considerations prompted co-organizers Gustavo Illiades (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana of Iztapalapa, Mexico) and James Iffland (Boston University, currently Visiting Professor in Harvard's Department of Romance Languages and Literatures) to invite 23 fellow Cervantes specialists, all working in the Americas, to an international symposium in Mexico at the Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla.

Harvard's David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies, the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, and the Boston University Humanities Foundation joined with institutes and departments of five Mexican universities (the Instituto de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades of the Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla; the Centro de Estudios Lingüísticos y Literarios of the Colegio de México; the Universidad Autónoma-Iztapalapa; the Departamento de Ciencias

Sociales y Humanidades of the Universidad Iberoamericana-Puebla; and the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, the Instituto de Investigación Filológica and the Coordinación de Humanidades of the Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México) and a Puebla bookstore (Profética, Casa de la Lectura) in co-sponsoring four days of scholarly interaction in February.

The conference drew a lively audience, often including several hundred attendees, and considerable interest from the Mexican press to its eight academic sessions, which took place in the splendid period setting of the Benemérita's *Salón Barroco*. Academic meetings were capped by a dramatic reading of chapters of the novel by actor-director José Luis Ibáñez, by a classical guitar recital from Guillermo González, and by a banquet inspired by Don Quijote's Manchegan diet, at which guests were treated to a week's worth of dishes at one sitting.

Formal presentations brought together the work of scholars from 17 Western hemisphere universities, from Buenos Aires and São Paulo to Montreal, working on topics ranging from Cervantes' 16th-century models to *Don Quijote's* recent and controversial partial translation into Spanglish. The full conference program is available at <www.quijotedesdeamerica.org>.

Mary M. Gaylord is the Sosland Family Professor of Romance Languages and Literatures at Harvard University.

PALAFXIANA LIBRARY

Conference participants visited several monuments, but of particular interest to scholars of the colonial period is the celebrated Biblioteca Palafoxiana, named for Juan de Palafox y Mendoza, Bishop of Puebla de los Ángeles from 1639-1649, lover of learning and social visionary. Founded in 1646 and declared *Monumento Histórico de México* in 1981, the library houses some 42,000 volumes dating from the 15th to the 19th centuries. With its spectacular three-tiered, cedar-paneled reading room restored and the entirety of its holdings electronically catalogued following the earthquake of 1999, the Palafoxiana is eager to welcome U.S. researchers. The on-line catalogue is available at <www.bpm.gob.mx>.

Reader Forum

To the Editor,
I congratulate your agile and inclusive editing in this most recent *ReVista* (Flora and Fauna: Nature in Latin America Fall 2004/Winter 2005). Weaving together articles on conservation, citizenship and taxonomy was elegant. My thanks for bringing these important issues to light.

As one of the authors of the piece on Galapagos, I was reminded of the importance of seeing conservation in its broader context — the human systems which surround, which impact (sometimes disastrously), and which are finally responsible for the future of the flora and fauna we so cherish.

Making its way into the literature of conservation is the growing sense by the religious community (writ large for purposes of this letter) that environmental stewardship is not only the responsibility of the spiritual man, but indeed is an important way to honor the Divine in nature. Conservation can make strange bedfellows, and we welcome the participation of these, and other communities in the struggle to create positive and lasting protection for the delicate systems described in your recent publication.

I mention this because I was struck by the common thread running through this issue of *ReVista*. The Galapagos is a microcosm of the opportunities and challenges associated with Latin America's biodiversity. With a land area of less than 5,000 sq. miles and a population of less than 20,000, the Galapagos is replete with examples of the aesthetic, scientific and economic importance of native

and endemic species, on the one hand, and mounting threats from introduced insects and diseases and a rapidly growing human population, on the other.

As great as these challenges are, the Galapagos hold tremendous promise. But only if we are willing to wrestle with the thorny problem of human systems in the final equation. As many of your articles demonstrated, man is often the cause of significant and irreversible damage to fragile landscapes, but can be the architect of lasting solutions. The dialogue that *ReVista* promotes will be an important element in ensuring that these solutions are met quickly and equitably.

JOHANNAH E. BARRY

PRESIDENT

CHARLES DARWIN FOUNDATION, INC.
FALLS CHURCH, VA 22046
WWW.GALAPAGOS.ORG

Hi June,
I just received the additional *ReVistas*, thank you!I meant to commend you on the cover — a brilliant choice of a plant group that is at once most distinctive and most distinctly (Latin) American. The fact that this is a glass model only sinks in after reading. Great choice!

BRIAN D. FARRELL

PROFESSOR OF BIOLOGY,

CURATOR IN ENTOMOLOGY

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FACULTY/FARRELL/

Dear Ms Erlick,
We just received the issue of *ReVista* dated Fall 2004/Winter 2005, and numbered

v.3:1. It appears that this numbering repeats volume 3; according to our records, this should be v.4:1. Will all of volume 3 be repeated in numbering, or is this just a folio gone awry?

Please advise.

This issue, like others we've received, looks great! I'm sure regular readers must love it.

LEWIS BRIAN DAY

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We apologize! It seems hard to believe that ReVista is on its fourth volume. The Fall/Winter 2004-2005 issue on Flora and Fauna should have been marked 4:1, just as you point out.

CORRECTIONS

In "Highlights of Cuban Colonial History" by Michelle Tisdell-Flikke in the Fall 2004/Winter 2005 issue, Ortiz

Letters to the editor are welcome in English, Spanish or Portuguese! Please send your comments, suggestions and complaints to: June Carolyn Erlick <jerlick@fas.harvard.edu> or DRCLAS, 61 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 02138.

<http://www.drclas.fas.harvard.edu>

should have been written without an accent.

"Puerto Rico Summer Institute" by Josiane Peltier in the same issue should specify that the Universidad de Puerto Rico campus was in San Juan. The system, like California's, has several campuses and two-year branches.

Thanks to Professor Virgilio Fernando Acevedo of Roxbury Community College for pointing out the mistakes.

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS

How Can I Subscribe to *ReVista*?

You may subscribe on-line at <<http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/publications>> or by sending an e-mail to <drclas@fas.harvard.edu>. If you live nearby, feel free to drop by 61 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA and fill out a subscription form.

How Much Does It Cost?

ReVista is free to anyone in the world who wishes it. Libraries and schools are encouraged to subscribe. This year, *ReVista* will be published only twice for economic reasons, but we hope to return to three times a year. Therefore, we welcome donations and patrons. Suggested donation for students and seniors, \$15 yearly; others, \$25 yearly. Patrons: \$300 supports *ReVista* for a Latin American university classroom; \$150, a U.S. university classroom; \$100, three Latin American library subscriptions; \$50, three U.S. library subscriptions. Become a patron now! Send checks made payable to Harvard University to the attention of June Carolyn Erlick, DRCLAS, 61 Kirkland St., Cambridge, MA 02138.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY



EDITOR'S LETTER

by June Carolyn Erlick

INTRODUCTION

by Jorge I. Domínguez

REFLECTIONS

United States Interventions

by John H. Coatsworth

Engravings from the October Revolution (1944-1954)

by Oscar Guillermo Peláez Almengor

U.S. Policy Towards Latin America and the Arab World

by Federico Vélaz

The Academic and the Censor

by David Gallagher

FOCUS ON CUBA

The Changing Future

by Rafael Hernández

U.S. Covert Activities Against Cuba

by Don Bohning

Academic Exchanges with Cuba

by Lorena Barberia

FOCUS ON GUATEMALA

Contemporary U.S. Policy

by Michael J. Camilleri

The United States and Guatemala

by Oscar Guillermo Peláez Almengor

Photoessay — Guatemala: The Aftermath

by Jonathan Moller

COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES

Brazil and the United States

by Kenneth Maxwell

Nicaragua and the United States

by Sean Adrian Reagan

Vieques' Struggle for Peace

by Sebastián Sánchez

HEALTH AND DRUGS

2 When Ideology Undermines Public Health 46

by Bonnie Shepard

Reproduction Health in Perú *by Tarayn A. Grizzard* 49

3 Brazil and HIV/AIDS *by René Daniel Decol* 51

Aerial Spraying in Colombia

by María Clemencia Ramírez

6 U.S. Drug Policies in Bolivia *by Michelle Garza* 56

9 BOOK TALK

The Cuban Economy *by Paul Hare*

58

10 FTAA: The Big Enchilada *by Kevin P. Gallagher* 60

Memories and Demons *by Ángeles Mase*

61

13 Education Policy in Latin America 62

by Eileen O'Connor

A Diplomatic, Unilateral "War"?

64

by Amanda F. Austin

18 Recently Published 66

21 COMINGS & GOINGS

New DRCLAS Executive Director

68

by June Carolyn Erlick

DRCLAS and IDB Launch Book Series

69

by Steve Reifenberg

25 Adios 61 Kirkland *by Jason Aslakson* 69

28 International Symposium in Puebla 70

by Mary M. Gaylord

30 Reader Forum 71



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